1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
2 | /* |
3 | * Copyright (C) 2003 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de> |
4 | * Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org> |
5 | * Copyright (C) 2006-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. |
6 | * Copyright (C) 2013-2020 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> |
7 | * |
8 | * This file is released under the GPL. |
9 | */ |
10 | |
11 | #include <linux/completion.h> |
12 | #include <linux/err.h> |
13 | #include <linux/module.h> |
14 | #include <linux/init.h> |
15 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
16 | #include <linux/key.h> |
17 | #include <linux/bio.h> |
18 | #include <linux/blkdev.h> |
19 | #include <linux/blk-integrity.h> |
20 | #include <linux/mempool.h> |
21 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
22 | #include <linux/crypto.h> |
23 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
24 | #include <linux/kthread.h> |
25 | #include <linux/backing-dev.h> |
26 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
27 | #include <linux/scatterlist.h> |
28 | #include <linux/rbtree.h> |
29 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
30 | #include <asm/page.h> |
31 | #include <asm/unaligned.h> |
32 | #include <crypto/hash.h> |
33 | #include <crypto/md5.h> |
34 | #include <crypto/skcipher.h> |
35 | #include <crypto/aead.h> |
36 | #include <crypto/authenc.h> |
37 | #include <crypto/utils.h> |
38 | #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> /* for struct rtattr and RTA macros only */ |
39 | #include <linux/key-type.h> |
40 | #include <keys/user-type.h> |
41 | #include <keys/encrypted-type.h> |
42 | #include <keys/trusted-type.h> |
43 | |
44 | #include <linux/device-mapper.h> |
45 | |
46 | #include "dm-audit.h" |
47 | |
48 | #define DM_MSG_PREFIX "crypt" |
49 | |
50 | /* |
51 | * context holding the current state of a multi-part conversion |
52 | */ |
53 | struct convert_context { |
54 | struct completion restart; |
55 | struct bio *bio_in; |
56 | struct bio *bio_out; |
57 | struct bvec_iter iter_in; |
58 | struct bvec_iter iter_out; |
59 | u64 cc_sector; |
60 | atomic_t cc_pending; |
61 | union { |
62 | struct skcipher_request *req; |
63 | struct aead_request *req_aead; |
64 | } r; |
65 | |
66 | }; |
67 | |
68 | /* |
69 | * per bio private data |
70 | */ |
71 | struct dm_crypt_io { |
72 | struct crypt_config *cc; |
73 | struct bio *base_bio; |
74 | u8 *integrity_metadata; |
75 | bool integrity_metadata_from_pool:1; |
76 | bool in_tasklet:1; |
77 | |
78 | struct work_struct work; |
79 | struct tasklet_struct tasklet; |
80 | |
81 | struct convert_context ctx; |
82 | |
83 | atomic_t io_pending; |
84 | blk_status_t error; |
85 | sector_t sector; |
86 | |
87 | struct rb_node rb_node; |
88 | } CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR; |
89 | |
90 | struct dm_crypt_request { |
91 | struct convert_context *ctx; |
92 | struct scatterlist sg_in[4]; |
93 | struct scatterlist sg_out[4]; |
94 | u64 iv_sector; |
95 | }; |
96 | |
97 | struct crypt_config; |
98 | |
99 | struct crypt_iv_operations { |
100 | int (*ctr)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, |
101 | const char *opts); |
102 | void (*dtr)(struct crypt_config *cc); |
103 | int (*init)(struct crypt_config *cc); |
104 | int (*wipe)(struct crypt_config *cc); |
105 | int (*generator)(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
106 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq); |
107 | int (*post)(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
108 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq); |
109 | }; |
110 | |
111 | struct iv_benbi_private { |
112 | int shift; |
113 | }; |
114 | |
115 | #define LMK_SEED_SIZE 64 /* hash + 0 */ |
116 | struct iv_lmk_private { |
117 | struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; |
118 | u8 *seed; |
119 | }; |
120 | |
121 | #define TCW_WHITENING_SIZE 16 |
122 | struct iv_tcw_private { |
123 | struct crypto_shash *crc32_tfm; |
124 | u8 *iv_seed; |
125 | u8 *whitening; |
126 | }; |
127 | |
128 | #define ELEPHANT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 32 |
129 | struct iv_elephant_private { |
130 | struct crypto_skcipher *tfm; |
131 | }; |
132 | |
133 | /* |
134 | * Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device |
135 | * and encrypts / decrypts at the same time. |
136 | */ |
137 | enum flags { DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, |
138 | DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, |
139 | DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, |
140 | DM_CRYPT_WRITE_INLINE }; |
141 | |
142 | enum cipher_flags { |
143 | CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, /* Use authenticated mode for cipher */ |
144 | CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, /* Calculate IV from sector_size, not 512B sectors */ |
145 | CRYPT_ENCRYPT_PREPROCESS, /* Must preprocess data for encryption (elephant) */ |
146 | }; |
147 | |
148 | /* |
149 | * The fields in here must be read only after initialization. |
150 | */ |
151 | struct crypt_config { |
152 | struct dm_dev *dev; |
153 | sector_t start; |
154 | |
155 | struct percpu_counter n_allocated_pages; |
156 | |
157 | struct workqueue_struct *io_queue; |
158 | struct workqueue_struct *crypt_queue; |
159 | |
160 | spinlock_t write_thread_lock; |
161 | struct task_struct *write_thread; |
162 | struct rb_root write_tree; |
163 | |
164 | char *cipher_string; |
165 | char *cipher_auth; |
166 | char *key_string; |
167 | |
168 | const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops; |
169 | union { |
170 | struct iv_benbi_private benbi; |
171 | struct iv_lmk_private lmk; |
172 | struct iv_tcw_private tcw; |
173 | struct iv_elephant_private elephant; |
174 | } iv_gen_private; |
175 | u64 iv_offset; |
176 | unsigned int iv_size; |
177 | unsigned short sector_size; |
178 | unsigned char sector_shift; |
179 | |
180 | union { |
181 | struct crypto_skcipher **tfms; |
182 | struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead; |
183 | } cipher_tfm; |
184 | unsigned int tfms_count; |
185 | unsigned long cipher_flags; |
186 | |
187 | /* |
188 | * Layout of each crypto request: |
189 | * |
190 | * struct skcipher_request |
191 | * context |
192 | * padding |
193 | * struct dm_crypt_request |
194 | * padding |
195 | * IV |
196 | * |
197 | * The padding is added so that dm_crypt_request and the IV are |
198 | * correctly aligned. |
199 | */ |
200 | unsigned int dmreq_start; |
201 | |
202 | unsigned int per_bio_data_size; |
203 | |
204 | unsigned long flags; |
205 | unsigned int key_size; |
206 | unsigned int key_parts; /* independent parts in key buffer */ |
207 | unsigned int ; /* additional keys length */ |
208 | unsigned int key_mac_size; /* MAC key size for authenc(...) */ |
209 | |
210 | unsigned int integrity_tag_size; |
211 | unsigned int integrity_iv_size; |
212 | unsigned int on_disk_tag_size; |
213 | |
214 | /* |
215 | * pool for per bio private data, crypto requests, |
216 | * encryption requeusts/buffer pages and integrity tags |
217 | */ |
218 | unsigned int tag_pool_max_sectors; |
219 | mempool_t tag_pool; |
220 | mempool_t req_pool; |
221 | mempool_t page_pool; |
222 | |
223 | struct bio_set bs; |
224 | struct mutex bio_alloc_lock; |
225 | |
226 | u8 *authenc_key; /* space for keys in authenc() format (if used) */ |
227 | u8 key[] __counted_by(key_size); |
228 | }; |
229 | |
230 | #define MIN_IOS 64 |
231 | #define MAX_TAG_SIZE 480 |
232 | #define POOL_ENTRY_SIZE 512 |
233 | |
234 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(dm_crypt_clients_lock); |
235 | static unsigned int dm_crypt_clients_n; |
236 | static volatile unsigned long dm_crypt_pages_per_client; |
237 | #define DM_CRYPT_MEMORY_PERCENT 2 |
238 | #define DM_CRYPT_MIN_PAGES_PER_CLIENT (BIO_MAX_VECS * 16) |
239 | |
240 | static void crypt_endio(struct bio *clone); |
241 | static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io); |
242 | static struct scatterlist *crypt_get_sg_data(struct crypt_config *cc, |
243 | struct scatterlist *sg); |
244 | |
245 | static bool crypt_integrity_aead(struct crypt_config *cc); |
246 | |
247 | /* |
248 | * Use this to access cipher attributes that are independent of the key. |
249 | */ |
250 | static struct crypto_skcipher *any_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc) |
251 | { |
252 | return cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[0]; |
253 | } |
254 | |
255 | static struct crypto_aead *any_tfm_aead(struct crypt_config *cc) |
256 | { |
257 | return cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]; |
258 | } |
259 | |
260 | /* |
261 | * Different IV generation algorithms: |
262 | * |
263 | * plain: the initial vector is the 32-bit little-endian version of the sector |
264 | * number, padded with zeros if necessary. |
265 | * |
266 | * plain64: the initial vector is the 64-bit little-endian version of the sector |
267 | * number, padded with zeros if necessary. |
268 | * |
269 | * plain64be: the initial vector is the 64-bit big-endian version of the sector |
270 | * number, padded with zeros if necessary. |
271 | * |
272 | * essiv: "encrypted sector|salt initial vector", the sector number is |
273 | * encrypted with the bulk cipher using a salt as key. The salt |
274 | * should be derived from the bulk cipher's key via hashing. |
275 | * |
276 | * benbi: the 64-bit "big-endian 'narrow block'-count", starting at 1 |
277 | * (needed for LRW-32-AES and possible other narrow block modes) |
278 | * |
279 | * null: the initial vector is always zero. Provides compatibility with |
280 | * obsolete loop_fish2 devices. Do not use for new devices. |
281 | * |
282 | * lmk: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used |
283 | * by the Loop-AES block device encryption system |
284 | * designed by Jari Ruusu. See http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/ |
285 | * It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC |
286 | * with an IV derived from the sector number, the data and |
287 | * optionally extra IV seed. |
288 | * This means that after decryption the first block |
289 | * of sector must be tweaked according to decrypted data. |
290 | * Loop-AES can use three encryption schemes: |
291 | * version 1: is plain aes-cbc mode |
292 | * version 2: uses 64 multikey scheme with lmk IV generator |
293 | * version 3: the same as version 2 with additional IV seed |
294 | * (it uses 65 keys, last key is used as IV seed) |
295 | * |
296 | * tcw: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used |
297 | * by the TrueCrypt device encryption system (prior to version 4.1). |
298 | * For more info see: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/TrueCryptOnDiskFormat |
299 | * It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC |
300 | * with an IV derived from initial key and the sector number. |
301 | * In addition, whitening value is applied on every sector, whitening |
302 | * is calculated from initial key, sector number and mixed using CRC32. |
303 | * Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks |
304 | * and should be used for old compatible containers access only. |
305 | * |
306 | * eboiv: Encrypted byte-offset IV (used in Bitlocker in CBC mode) |
307 | * The IV is encrypted little-endian byte-offset (with the same key |
308 | * and cipher as the volume). |
309 | * |
310 | * elephant: The extended version of eboiv with additional Elephant diffuser |
311 | * used with Bitlocker CBC mode. |
312 | * This mode was used in older Windows systems |
313 | * https://download.microsoft.com/download/0/2/3/0238acaf-d3bf-4a6d-b3d6-0a0be4bbb36e/bitlockercipher200608.pdf |
314 | */ |
315 | |
316 | static int crypt_iv_plain_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
317 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
318 | { |
319 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); |
320 | *(__le32 *)iv = cpu_to_le32(dmreq->iv_sector & 0xffffffff); |
321 | |
322 | return 0; |
323 | } |
324 | |
325 | static int crypt_iv_plain64_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
326 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
327 | { |
328 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); |
329 | *(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector); |
330 | |
331 | return 0; |
332 | } |
333 | |
334 | static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
335 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
336 | { |
337 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); |
338 | /* iv_size is at least of size u64; usually it is 16 bytes */ |
339 | *(__be64 *)&iv[cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)] = cpu_to_be64(dmreq->iv_sector); |
340 | |
341 | return 0; |
342 | } |
343 | |
344 | static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
345 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
346 | { |
347 | /* |
348 | * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API, |
349 | * so just pass the plain sector number here. |
350 | */ |
351 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); |
352 | *(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector); |
353 | |
354 | return 0; |
355 | } |
356 | |
357 | static int crypt_iv_benbi_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, |
358 | const char *opts) |
359 | { |
360 | unsigned int bs; |
361 | int log; |
362 | |
363 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
364 | bs = crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm: any_tfm_aead(cc)); |
365 | else |
366 | bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm: any_tfm(cc)); |
367 | log = ilog2(bs); |
368 | |
369 | /* |
370 | * We need to calculate how far we must shift the sector count |
371 | * to get the cipher block count, we use this shift in _gen. |
372 | */ |
373 | if (1 << log != bs) { |
374 | ti->error = "cypher blocksize is not a power of 2" ; |
375 | return -EINVAL; |
376 | } |
377 | |
378 | if (log > 9) { |
379 | ti->error = "cypher blocksize is > 512" ; |
380 | return -EINVAL; |
381 | } |
382 | |
383 | cc->iv_gen_private.benbi.shift = 9 - log; |
384 | |
385 | return 0; |
386 | } |
387 | |
388 | static void crypt_iv_benbi_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc) |
389 | { |
390 | } |
391 | |
392 | static int crypt_iv_benbi_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
393 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
394 | { |
395 | __be64 val; |
396 | |
397 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)); /* rest is cleared below */ |
398 | |
399 | val = cpu_to_be64(((u64)dmreq->iv_sector << cc->iv_gen_private.benbi.shift) + 1); |
400 | put_unaligned(val, (__be64 *)(iv + cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64))); |
401 | |
402 | return 0; |
403 | } |
404 | |
405 | static int crypt_iv_null_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
406 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
407 | { |
408 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); |
409 | |
410 | return 0; |
411 | } |
412 | |
413 | static void crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc) |
414 | { |
415 | struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk; |
416 | |
417 | if (lmk->hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(ptr: lmk->hash_tfm)) |
418 | crypto_free_shash(tfm: lmk->hash_tfm); |
419 | lmk->hash_tfm = NULL; |
420 | |
421 | kfree_sensitive(objp: lmk->seed); |
422 | lmk->seed = NULL; |
423 | } |
424 | |
425 | static int crypt_iv_lmk_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, |
426 | const char *opts) |
427 | { |
428 | struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk; |
429 | |
430 | if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) { |
431 | ti->error = "Unsupported sector size for LMK" ; |
432 | return -EINVAL; |
433 | } |
434 | |
435 | lmk->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name: "md5" , type: 0, |
436 | CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); |
437 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: lmk->hash_tfm)) { |
438 | ti->error = "Error initializing LMK hash" ; |
439 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: lmk->hash_tfm); |
440 | } |
441 | |
442 | /* No seed in LMK version 2 */ |
443 | if (cc->key_parts == cc->tfms_count) { |
444 | lmk->seed = NULL; |
445 | return 0; |
446 | } |
447 | |
448 | lmk->seed = kzalloc(LMK_SEED_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); |
449 | if (!lmk->seed) { |
450 | crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(cc); |
451 | ti->error = "Error kmallocing seed storage in LMK" ; |
452 | return -ENOMEM; |
453 | } |
454 | |
455 | return 0; |
456 | } |
457 | |
458 | static int crypt_iv_lmk_init(struct crypt_config *cc) |
459 | { |
460 | struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk; |
461 | int subkey_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts; |
462 | |
463 | /* LMK seed is on the position of LMK_KEYS + 1 key */ |
464 | if (lmk->seed) |
465 | memcpy(lmk->seed, cc->key + (cc->tfms_count * subkey_size), |
466 | crypto_shash_digestsize(lmk->hash_tfm)); |
467 | |
468 | return 0; |
469 | } |
470 | |
471 | static int crypt_iv_lmk_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc) |
472 | { |
473 | struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk; |
474 | |
475 | if (lmk->seed) |
476 | memset(lmk->seed, 0, LMK_SEED_SIZE); |
477 | |
478 | return 0; |
479 | } |
480 | |
481 | static int crypt_iv_lmk_one(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
482 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq, |
483 | u8 *data) |
484 | { |
485 | struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk; |
486 | SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, lmk->hash_tfm); |
487 | struct md5_state md5state; |
488 | __le32 buf[4]; |
489 | int i, r; |
490 | |
491 | desc->tfm = lmk->hash_tfm; |
492 | |
493 | r = crypto_shash_init(desc); |
494 | if (r) |
495 | return r; |
496 | |
497 | if (lmk->seed) { |
498 | r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data: lmk->seed, LMK_SEED_SIZE); |
499 | if (r) |
500 | return r; |
501 | } |
502 | |
503 | /* Sector is always 512B, block size 16, add data of blocks 1-31 */ |
504 | r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data: data + 16, len: 16 * 31); |
505 | if (r) |
506 | return r; |
507 | |
508 | /* Sector is cropped to 56 bits here */ |
509 | buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(dmreq->iv_sector & 0xFFFFFFFF); |
510 | buf[1] = cpu_to_le32((((u64)dmreq->iv_sector >> 32) & 0x00FFFFFF) | 0x80000000); |
511 | buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(4024); |
512 | buf[3] = 0; |
513 | r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data: (u8 *)buf, len: sizeof(buf)); |
514 | if (r) |
515 | return r; |
516 | |
517 | /* No MD5 padding here */ |
518 | r = crypto_shash_export(desc, out: &md5state); |
519 | if (r) |
520 | return r; |
521 | |
522 | for (i = 0; i < MD5_HASH_WORDS; i++) |
523 | __cpu_to_le32s(&md5state.hash[i]); |
524 | memcpy(iv, &md5state.hash, cc->iv_size); |
525 | |
526 | return 0; |
527 | } |
528 | |
529 | static int crypt_iv_lmk_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
530 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
531 | { |
532 | struct scatterlist *sg; |
533 | u8 *src; |
534 | int r = 0; |
535 | |
536 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) { |
537 | sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, sg: dmreq->sg_in); |
538 | src = kmap_local_page(page: sg_page(sg)); |
539 | r = crypt_iv_lmk_one(cc, iv, dmreq, data: src + sg->offset); |
540 | kunmap_local(src); |
541 | } else |
542 | memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size); |
543 | |
544 | return r; |
545 | } |
546 | |
547 | static int crypt_iv_lmk_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
548 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
549 | { |
550 | struct scatterlist *sg; |
551 | u8 *dst; |
552 | int r; |
553 | |
554 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) |
555 | return 0; |
556 | |
557 | sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, sg: dmreq->sg_out); |
558 | dst = kmap_local_page(page: sg_page(sg)); |
559 | r = crypt_iv_lmk_one(cc, iv, dmreq, data: dst + sg->offset); |
560 | |
561 | /* Tweak the first block of plaintext sector */ |
562 | if (!r) |
563 | crypto_xor(dst: dst + sg->offset, src: iv, size: cc->iv_size); |
564 | |
565 | kunmap_local(dst); |
566 | return r; |
567 | } |
568 | |
569 | static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc) |
570 | { |
571 | struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; |
572 | |
573 | kfree_sensitive(objp: tcw->iv_seed); |
574 | tcw->iv_seed = NULL; |
575 | kfree_sensitive(objp: tcw->whitening); |
576 | tcw->whitening = NULL; |
577 | |
578 | if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(ptr: tcw->crc32_tfm)) |
579 | crypto_free_shash(tfm: tcw->crc32_tfm); |
580 | tcw->crc32_tfm = NULL; |
581 | } |
582 | |
583 | static int crypt_iv_tcw_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, |
584 | const char *opts) |
585 | { |
586 | struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; |
587 | |
588 | if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) { |
589 | ti->error = "Unsupported sector size for TCW" ; |
590 | return -EINVAL; |
591 | } |
592 | |
593 | if (cc->key_size <= (cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE)) { |
594 | ti->error = "Wrong key size for TCW" ; |
595 | return -EINVAL; |
596 | } |
597 | |
598 | tcw->crc32_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_name: "crc32" , type: 0, |
599 | CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); |
600 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: tcw->crc32_tfm)) { |
601 | ti->error = "Error initializing CRC32 in TCW" ; |
602 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: tcw->crc32_tfm); |
603 | } |
604 | |
605 | tcw->iv_seed = kzalloc(size: cc->iv_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
606 | tcw->whitening = kzalloc(TCW_WHITENING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); |
607 | if (!tcw->iv_seed || !tcw->whitening) { |
608 | crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(cc); |
609 | ti->error = "Error allocating seed storage in TCW" ; |
610 | return -ENOMEM; |
611 | } |
612 | |
613 | return 0; |
614 | } |
615 | |
616 | static int crypt_iv_tcw_init(struct crypt_config *cc) |
617 | { |
618 | struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; |
619 | int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->iv_size - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE; |
620 | |
621 | memcpy(tcw->iv_seed, &cc->key[key_offset], cc->iv_size); |
622 | memcpy(tcw->whitening, &cc->key[key_offset + cc->iv_size], |
623 | TCW_WHITENING_SIZE); |
624 | |
625 | return 0; |
626 | } |
627 | |
628 | static int crypt_iv_tcw_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc) |
629 | { |
630 | struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; |
631 | |
632 | memset(tcw->iv_seed, 0, cc->iv_size); |
633 | memset(tcw->whitening, 0, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE); |
634 | |
635 | return 0; |
636 | } |
637 | |
638 | static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct crypt_config *cc, |
639 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq, |
640 | u8 *data) |
641 | { |
642 | struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; |
643 | __le64 sector = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector); |
644 | u8 buf[TCW_WHITENING_SIZE]; |
645 | SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tcw->crc32_tfm); |
646 | int i, r; |
647 | |
648 | /* xor whitening with sector number */ |
649 | crypto_xor_cpy(dst: buf, src1: tcw->whitening, src2: (u8 *)§or, size: 8); |
650 | crypto_xor_cpy(dst: &buf[8], src1: tcw->whitening + 8, src2: (u8 *)§or, size: 8); |
651 | |
652 | /* calculate crc32 for every 32bit part and xor it */ |
653 | desc->tfm = tcw->crc32_tfm; |
654 | for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { |
655 | r = crypto_shash_digest(desc, data: &buf[i * 4], len: 4, out: &buf[i * 4]); |
656 | if (r) |
657 | goto out; |
658 | } |
659 | crypto_xor(dst: &buf[0], src: &buf[12], size: 4); |
660 | crypto_xor(dst: &buf[4], src: &buf[8], size: 4); |
661 | |
662 | /* apply whitening (8 bytes) to whole sector */ |
663 | for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++) |
664 | crypto_xor(dst: data + i * 8, src: buf, size: 8); |
665 | out: |
666 | memzero_explicit(s: buf, count: sizeof(buf)); |
667 | return r; |
668 | } |
669 | |
670 | static int crypt_iv_tcw_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
671 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
672 | { |
673 | struct scatterlist *sg; |
674 | struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw; |
675 | __le64 sector = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector); |
676 | u8 *src; |
677 | int r = 0; |
678 | |
679 | /* Remove whitening from ciphertext */ |
680 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) { |
681 | sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, sg: dmreq->sg_in); |
682 | src = kmap_local_page(page: sg_page(sg)); |
683 | r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, data: src + sg->offset); |
684 | kunmap_local(src); |
685 | } |
686 | |
687 | /* Calculate IV */ |
688 | crypto_xor_cpy(dst: iv, src1: tcw->iv_seed, src2: (u8 *)§or, size: 8); |
689 | if (cc->iv_size > 8) |
690 | crypto_xor_cpy(dst: &iv[8], src1: tcw->iv_seed + 8, src2: (u8 *)§or, |
691 | size: cc->iv_size - 8); |
692 | |
693 | return r; |
694 | } |
695 | |
696 | static int crypt_iv_tcw_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
697 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
698 | { |
699 | struct scatterlist *sg; |
700 | u8 *dst; |
701 | int r; |
702 | |
703 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) |
704 | return 0; |
705 | |
706 | /* Apply whitening on ciphertext */ |
707 | sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, sg: dmreq->sg_out); |
708 | dst = kmap_local_page(page: sg_page(sg)); |
709 | r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, data: dst + sg->offset); |
710 | kunmap_local(dst); |
711 | |
712 | return r; |
713 | } |
714 | |
715 | static int crypt_iv_random_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
716 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
717 | { |
718 | /* Used only for writes, there must be an additional space to store IV */ |
719 | get_random_bytes(buf: iv, len: cc->iv_size); |
720 | return 0; |
721 | } |
722 | |
723 | static int crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, |
724 | const char *opts) |
725 | { |
726 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) { |
727 | ti->error = "AEAD transforms not supported for EBOIV" ; |
728 | return -EINVAL; |
729 | } |
730 | |
731 | if (crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm: any_tfm(cc)) != cc->iv_size) { |
732 | ti->error = "Block size of EBOIV cipher does not match IV size of block cipher" ; |
733 | return -EINVAL; |
734 | } |
735 | |
736 | return 0; |
737 | } |
738 | |
739 | static int crypt_iv_eboiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
740 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
741 | { |
742 | struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = any_tfm(cc); |
743 | struct skcipher_request *req; |
744 | struct scatterlist src, dst; |
745 | DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); |
746 | unsigned int reqsize; |
747 | int err; |
748 | u8 *buf; |
749 | |
750 | reqsize = sizeof(*req) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm); |
751 | reqsize = ALIGN(reqsize, __alignof__(__le64)); |
752 | |
753 | req = kmalloc(size: reqsize + cc->iv_size, GFP_NOIO); |
754 | if (!req) |
755 | return -ENOMEM; |
756 | |
757 | skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm); |
758 | |
759 | buf = (u8 *)req + reqsize; |
760 | memset(buf, 0, cc->iv_size); |
761 | *(__le64 *)buf = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector * cc->sector_size); |
762 | |
763 | sg_init_one(&src, page_address(ZERO_PAGE(0)), cc->iv_size); |
764 | sg_init_one(&dst, iv, cc->iv_size); |
765 | skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src: &src, dst: &dst, cryptlen: cc->iv_size, iv: buf); |
766 | skcipher_request_set_callback(req, flags: 0, compl: crypto_req_done, data: &wait); |
767 | err = crypto_wait_req(err: crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), wait: &wait); |
768 | kfree_sensitive(objp: req); |
769 | |
770 | return err; |
771 | } |
772 | |
773 | static void crypt_iv_elephant_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc) |
774 | { |
775 | struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant; |
776 | |
777 | crypto_free_skcipher(tfm: elephant->tfm); |
778 | elephant->tfm = NULL; |
779 | } |
780 | |
781 | static int crypt_iv_elephant_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti, |
782 | const char *opts) |
783 | { |
784 | struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant; |
785 | int r; |
786 | |
787 | elephant->tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(alg_name: "ecb(aes)" , type: 0, |
788 | CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); |
789 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: elephant->tfm)) { |
790 | r = PTR_ERR(ptr: elephant->tfm); |
791 | elephant->tfm = NULL; |
792 | return r; |
793 | } |
794 | |
795 | r = crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr(cc, ti, NULL); |
796 | if (r) |
797 | crypt_iv_elephant_dtr(cc); |
798 | return r; |
799 | } |
800 | |
801 | static void diffuser_disk_to_cpu(u32 *d, size_t n) |
802 | { |
803 | #ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN |
804 | int i; |
805 | |
806 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) |
807 | d[i] = le32_to_cpu((__le32)d[i]); |
808 | #endif |
809 | } |
810 | |
811 | static void diffuser_cpu_to_disk(__le32 *d, size_t n) |
812 | { |
813 | #ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN |
814 | int i; |
815 | |
816 | for (i = 0; i < n; i++) |
817 | d[i] = cpu_to_le32((u32)d[i]); |
818 | #endif |
819 | } |
820 | |
821 | static void diffuser_a_decrypt(u32 *d, size_t n) |
822 | { |
823 | int i, i1, i2, i3; |
824 | |
825 | for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { |
826 | i1 = 0; |
827 | i2 = n - 2; |
828 | i3 = n - 5; |
829 | |
830 | while (i1 < (n - 1)) { |
831 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 9 | d[i3] >> 23); |
832 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
833 | |
834 | if (i3 >= n) |
835 | i3 -= n; |
836 | |
837 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
838 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
839 | |
840 | if (i2 >= n) |
841 | i2 -= n; |
842 | |
843 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 13 | d[i3] >> 19); |
844 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
845 | |
846 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
847 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
848 | } |
849 | } |
850 | } |
851 | |
852 | static void diffuser_a_encrypt(u32 *d, size_t n) |
853 | { |
854 | int i, i1, i2, i3; |
855 | |
856 | for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { |
857 | i1 = n - 1; |
858 | i2 = n - 2 - 1; |
859 | i3 = n - 5 - 1; |
860 | |
861 | while (i1 > 0) { |
862 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
863 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
864 | |
865 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 13 | d[i3] >> 19); |
866 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
867 | |
868 | if (i2 < 0) |
869 | i2 += n; |
870 | |
871 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
872 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
873 | |
874 | if (i3 < 0) |
875 | i3 += n; |
876 | |
877 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 9 | d[i3] >> 23); |
878 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
879 | } |
880 | } |
881 | } |
882 | |
883 | static void diffuser_b_decrypt(u32 *d, size_t n) |
884 | { |
885 | int i, i1, i2, i3; |
886 | |
887 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { |
888 | i1 = 0; |
889 | i2 = 2; |
890 | i3 = 5; |
891 | |
892 | while (i1 < (n - 1)) { |
893 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
894 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
895 | |
896 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 10 | d[i3] >> 22); |
897 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
898 | |
899 | if (i2 >= n) |
900 | i2 -= n; |
901 | |
902 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
903 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
904 | |
905 | if (i3 >= n) |
906 | i3 -= n; |
907 | |
908 | d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 25 | d[i3] >> 7); |
909 | i1++; i2++; i3++; |
910 | } |
911 | } |
912 | } |
913 | |
914 | static void diffuser_b_encrypt(u32 *d, size_t n) |
915 | { |
916 | int i, i1, i2, i3; |
917 | |
918 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { |
919 | i1 = n - 1; |
920 | i2 = 2 - 1; |
921 | i3 = 5 - 1; |
922 | |
923 | while (i1 > 0) { |
924 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 25 | d[i3] >> 7); |
925 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
926 | |
927 | if (i3 < 0) |
928 | i3 += n; |
929 | |
930 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
931 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
932 | |
933 | if (i2 < 0) |
934 | i2 += n; |
935 | |
936 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 10 | d[i3] >> 22); |
937 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
938 | |
939 | d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3]; |
940 | i1--; i2--; i3--; |
941 | } |
942 | } |
943 | } |
944 | |
945 | static int crypt_iv_elephant(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
946 | { |
947 | struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant; |
948 | u8 *es, *ks, *data, *data2, *data_offset; |
949 | struct skcipher_request *req; |
950 | struct scatterlist *sg, *sg2, src, dst; |
951 | DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); |
952 | int i, r; |
953 | |
954 | req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm: elephant->tfm, GFP_NOIO); |
955 | es = kzalloc(size: 16, GFP_NOIO); /* Key for AES */ |
956 | ks = kzalloc(size: 32, GFP_NOIO); /* Elephant sector key */ |
957 | |
958 | if (!req || !es || !ks) { |
959 | r = -ENOMEM; |
960 | goto out; |
961 | } |
962 | |
963 | *(__le64 *)es = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector * cc->sector_size); |
964 | |
965 | /* E(Ks, e(s)) */ |
966 | sg_init_one(&src, es, 16); |
967 | sg_init_one(&dst, ks, 16); |
968 | skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src: &src, dst: &dst, cryptlen: 16, NULL); |
969 | skcipher_request_set_callback(req, flags: 0, compl: crypto_req_done, data: &wait); |
970 | r = crypto_wait_req(err: crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), wait: &wait); |
971 | if (r) |
972 | goto out; |
973 | |
974 | /* E(Ks, e'(s)) */ |
975 | es[15] = 0x80; |
976 | sg_init_one(&dst, &ks[16], 16); |
977 | r = crypto_wait_req(err: crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), wait: &wait); |
978 | if (r) |
979 | goto out; |
980 | |
981 | sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, sg: dmreq->sg_out); |
982 | data = kmap_local_page(page: sg_page(sg)); |
983 | data_offset = data + sg->offset; |
984 | |
985 | /* Cannot modify original bio, copy to sg_out and apply Elephant to it */ |
986 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) { |
987 | sg2 = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, sg: dmreq->sg_in); |
988 | data2 = kmap_local_page(page: sg_page(sg: sg2)); |
989 | memcpy(data_offset, data2 + sg2->offset, cc->sector_size); |
990 | kunmap_local(data2); |
991 | } |
992 | |
993 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) { |
994 | diffuser_disk_to_cpu(d: (u32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
995 | diffuser_b_decrypt(d: (u32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
996 | diffuser_a_decrypt(d: (u32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
997 | diffuser_cpu_to_disk(d: (__le32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
998 | } |
999 | |
1000 | for (i = 0; i < (cc->sector_size / 32); i++) |
1001 | crypto_xor(dst: data_offset + i * 32, src: ks, size: 32); |
1002 | |
1003 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) { |
1004 | diffuser_disk_to_cpu(d: (u32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
1005 | diffuser_a_encrypt(d: (u32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
1006 | diffuser_b_encrypt(d: (u32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
1007 | diffuser_cpu_to_disk(d: (__le32 *)data_offset, n: cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32)); |
1008 | } |
1009 | |
1010 | kunmap_local(data); |
1011 | out: |
1012 | kfree_sensitive(objp: ks); |
1013 | kfree_sensitive(objp: es); |
1014 | skcipher_request_free(req); |
1015 | return r; |
1016 | } |
1017 | |
1018 | static int crypt_iv_elephant_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
1019 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1020 | { |
1021 | int r; |
1022 | |
1023 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) { |
1024 | r = crypt_iv_elephant(cc, dmreq); |
1025 | if (r) |
1026 | return r; |
1027 | } |
1028 | |
1029 | return crypt_iv_eboiv_gen(cc, iv, dmreq); |
1030 | } |
1031 | |
1032 | static int crypt_iv_elephant_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv, |
1033 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1034 | { |
1035 | if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) |
1036 | return crypt_iv_elephant(cc, dmreq); |
1037 | |
1038 | return 0; |
1039 | } |
1040 | |
1041 | static int crypt_iv_elephant_init(struct crypt_config *cc) |
1042 | { |
1043 | struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant; |
1044 | int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->key_extra_size; |
1045 | |
1046 | return crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm: elephant->tfm, key: &cc->key[key_offset], keylen: cc->key_extra_size); |
1047 | } |
1048 | |
1049 | static int crypt_iv_elephant_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc) |
1050 | { |
1051 | struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant; |
1052 | u8 key[ELEPHANT_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; |
1053 | |
1054 | memset(key, 0, cc->key_extra_size); |
1055 | return crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm: elephant->tfm, key, keylen: cc->key_extra_size); |
1056 | } |
1057 | |
1058 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = { |
1059 | .generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen |
1060 | }; |
1061 | |
1062 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64_ops = { |
1063 | .generator = crypt_iv_plain64_gen |
1064 | }; |
1065 | |
1066 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = { |
1067 | .generator = crypt_iv_plain64be_gen |
1068 | }; |
1069 | |
1070 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = { |
1071 | .generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen |
1072 | }; |
1073 | |
1074 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_benbi_ops = { |
1075 | .ctr = crypt_iv_benbi_ctr, |
1076 | .dtr = crypt_iv_benbi_dtr, |
1077 | .generator = crypt_iv_benbi_gen |
1078 | }; |
1079 | |
1080 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_null_ops = { |
1081 | .generator = crypt_iv_null_gen |
1082 | }; |
1083 | |
1084 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_lmk_ops = { |
1085 | .ctr = crypt_iv_lmk_ctr, |
1086 | .dtr = crypt_iv_lmk_dtr, |
1087 | .init = crypt_iv_lmk_init, |
1088 | .wipe = crypt_iv_lmk_wipe, |
1089 | .generator = crypt_iv_lmk_gen, |
1090 | .post = crypt_iv_lmk_post |
1091 | }; |
1092 | |
1093 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_tcw_ops = { |
1094 | .ctr = crypt_iv_tcw_ctr, |
1095 | .dtr = crypt_iv_tcw_dtr, |
1096 | .init = crypt_iv_tcw_init, |
1097 | .wipe = crypt_iv_tcw_wipe, |
1098 | .generator = crypt_iv_tcw_gen, |
1099 | .post = crypt_iv_tcw_post |
1100 | }; |
1101 | |
1102 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_random_ops = { |
1103 | .generator = crypt_iv_random_gen |
1104 | }; |
1105 | |
1106 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_eboiv_ops = { |
1107 | .ctr = crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr, |
1108 | .generator = crypt_iv_eboiv_gen |
1109 | }; |
1110 | |
1111 | static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_elephant_ops = { |
1112 | .ctr = crypt_iv_elephant_ctr, |
1113 | .dtr = crypt_iv_elephant_dtr, |
1114 | .init = crypt_iv_elephant_init, |
1115 | .wipe = crypt_iv_elephant_wipe, |
1116 | .generator = crypt_iv_elephant_gen, |
1117 | .post = crypt_iv_elephant_post |
1118 | }; |
1119 | |
1120 | /* |
1121 | * Integrity extensions |
1122 | */ |
1123 | static bool crypt_integrity_aead(struct crypt_config *cc) |
1124 | { |
1125 | return test_bit(CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, &cc->cipher_flags); |
1126 | } |
1127 | |
1128 | static bool crypt_integrity_hmac(struct crypt_config *cc) |
1129 | { |
1130 | return crypt_integrity_aead(cc) && cc->key_mac_size; |
1131 | } |
1132 | |
1133 | /* Get sg containing data */ |
1134 | static struct scatterlist *crypt_get_sg_data(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1135 | struct scatterlist *sg) |
1136 | { |
1137 | if (unlikely(crypt_integrity_aead(cc))) |
1138 | return &sg[2]; |
1139 | |
1140 | return sg; |
1141 | } |
1142 | |
1143 | static int dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(struct dm_crypt_io *io, struct bio *bio) |
1144 | { |
1145 | struct bio_integrity_payload *bip; |
1146 | unsigned int tag_len; |
1147 | int ret; |
1148 | |
1149 | if (!bio_sectors(bio) || !io->cc->on_disk_tag_size) |
1150 | return 0; |
1151 | |
1152 | bip = bio_integrity_alloc(bio, GFP_NOIO, 1); |
1153 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: bip)) |
1154 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: bip); |
1155 | |
1156 | tag_len = io->cc->on_disk_tag_size * (bio_sectors(bio) >> io->cc->sector_shift); |
1157 | |
1158 | bip->bip_iter.bi_sector = io->cc->start + io->sector; |
1159 | |
1160 | ret = bio_integrity_add_page(bio, virt_to_page(io->integrity_metadata), |
1161 | tag_len, offset_in_page(io->integrity_metadata)); |
1162 | if (unlikely(ret != tag_len)) |
1163 | return -ENOMEM; |
1164 | |
1165 | return 0; |
1166 | } |
1167 | |
1168 | static int crypt_integrity_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti) |
1169 | { |
1170 | #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY |
1171 | struct blk_integrity *bi = blk_get_integrity(disk: cc->dev->bdev->bd_disk); |
1172 | struct mapped_device *md = dm_table_get_md(t: ti->table); |
1173 | |
1174 | /* From now we require underlying device with our integrity profile */ |
1175 | if (!bi || strcasecmp(s1: bi->profile->name, s2: "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG" )) { |
1176 | ti->error = "Integrity profile not supported." ; |
1177 | return -EINVAL; |
1178 | } |
1179 | |
1180 | if (bi->tag_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size || |
1181 | bi->tuple_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size) { |
1182 | ti->error = "Integrity profile tag size mismatch." ; |
1183 | return -EINVAL; |
1184 | } |
1185 | if (1 << bi->interval_exp != cc->sector_size) { |
1186 | ti->error = "Integrity profile sector size mismatch." ; |
1187 | return -EINVAL; |
1188 | } |
1189 | |
1190 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) { |
1191 | cc->integrity_tag_size = cc->on_disk_tag_size - cc->integrity_iv_size; |
1192 | DMDEBUG("%s: Integrity AEAD, tag size %u, IV size %u." , dm_device_name(md), |
1193 | cc->integrity_tag_size, cc->integrity_iv_size); |
1194 | |
1195 | if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm: any_tfm_aead(cc), authsize: cc->integrity_tag_size)) { |
1196 | ti->error = "Integrity AEAD auth tag size is not supported." ; |
1197 | return -EINVAL; |
1198 | } |
1199 | } else if (cc->integrity_iv_size) |
1200 | DMDEBUG("%s: Additional per-sector space %u bytes for IV." , dm_device_name(md), |
1201 | cc->integrity_iv_size); |
1202 | |
1203 | if ((cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size) != bi->tag_size) { |
1204 | ti->error = "Not enough space for integrity tag in the profile." ; |
1205 | return -EINVAL; |
1206 | } |
1207 | |
1208 | return 0; |
1209 | #else |
1210 | ti->error = "Integrity profile not supported." ; |
1211 | return -EINVAL; |
1212 | #endif |
1213 | } |
1214 | |
1215 | static void crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1216 | struct convert_context *ctx, |
1217 | struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in, |
1218 | sector_t sector) |
1219 | { |
1220 | ctx->bio_in = bio_in; |
1221 | ctx->bio_out = bio_out; |
1222 | if (bio_in) |
1223 | ctx->iter_in = bio_in->bi_iter; |
1224 | if (bio_out) |
1225 | ctx->iter_out = bio_out->bi_iter; |
1226 | ctx->cc_sector = sector + cc->iv_offset; |
1227 | init_completion(x: &ctx->restart); |
1228 | } |
1229 | |
1230 | static struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq_of_req(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1231 | void *req) |
1232 | { |
1233 | return (struct dm_crypt_request *)((char *)req + cc->dmreq_start); |
1234 | } |
1235 | |
1236 | static void *req_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1237 | { |
1238 | return (void *)((char *)dmreq - cc->dmreq_start); |
1239 | } |
1240 | |
1241 | static u8 *iv_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1242 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1243 | { |
1244 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
1245 | return (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1), |
1246 | crypto_aead_alignmask(any_tfm_aead(cc)) + 1); |
1247 | else |
1248 | return (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1), |
1249 | crypto_skcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1); |
1250 | } |
1251 | |
1252 | static u8 *org_iv_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1253 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1254 | { |
1255 | return iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size; |
1256 | } |
1257 | |
1258 | static __le64 *org_sector_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1259 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1260 | { |
1261 | u8 *ptr = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size + cc->iv_size; |
1262 | |
1263 | return (__le64 *) ptr; |
1264 | } |
1265 | |
1266 | static unsigned int *org_tag_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1267 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1268 | { |
1269 | u8 *ptr = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size + |
1270 | cc->iv_size + sizeof(uint64_t); |
1271 | |
1272 | return (unsigned int *)ptr; |
1273 | } |
1274 | |
1275 | static void *tag_from_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1276 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1277 | { |
1278 | struct convert_context *ctx = dmreq->ctx; |
1279 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(ctx, struct dm_crypt_io, ctx); |
1280 | |
1281 | return &io->integrity_metadata[*org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) * |
1282 | cc->on_disk_tag_size]; |
1283 | } |
1284 | |
1285 | static void *iv_tag_from_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1286 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq) |
1287 | { |
1288 | return tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->integrity_tag_size; |
1289 | } |
1290 | |
1291 | static int crypt_convert_block_aead(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1292 | struct convert_context *ctx, |
1293 | struct aead_request *req, |
1294 | unsigned int tag_offset) |
1295 | { |
1296 | struct bio_vec bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in); |
1297 | struct bio_vec bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out); |
1298 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq; |
1299 | u8 *iv, *org_iv, *tag_iv, *tag; |
1300 | __le64 *sector; |
1301 | int r = 0; |
1302 | |
1303 | BUG_ON(cc->integrity_iv_size && cc->integrity_iv_size != cc->iv_size); |
1304 | |
1305 | /* Reject unexpected unaligned bio. */ |
1306 | if (unlikely(bv_in.bv_len & (cc->sector_size - 1))) |
1307 | return -EIO; |
1308 | |
1309 | dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req); |
1310 | dmreq->iv_sector = ctx->cc_sector; |
1311 | if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags)) |
1312 | dmreq->iv_sector >>= cc->sector_shift; |
1313 | dmreq->ctx = ctx; |
1314 | |
1315 | *org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) = tag_offset; |
1316 | |
1317 | sector = org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1318 | *sector = cpu_to_le64(ctx->cc_sector - cc->iv_offset); |
1319 | |
1320 | iv = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1321 | org_iv = org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1322 | tag = tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1323 | tag_iv = iv_tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1324 | |
1325 | /* AEAD request: |
1326 | * |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --| |
1327 | * | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | | |
1328 | * | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out | |
1329 | */ |
1330 | sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_in, 4); |
1331 | sg_set_buf(sg: &dmreq->sg_in[0], buf: sector, buflen: sizeof(uint64_t)); |
1332 | sg_set_buf(sg: &dmreq->sg_in[1], buf: org_iv, buflen: cc->iv_size); |
1333 | sg_set_page(sg: &dmreq->sg_in[2], page: bv_in.bv_page, len: cc->sector_size, offset: bv_in.bv_offset); |
1334 | sg_set_buf(sg: &dmreq->sg_in[3], buf: tag, buflen: cc->integrity_tag_size); |
1335 | |
1336 | sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_out, 4); |
1337 | sg_set_buf(sg: &dmreq->sg_out[0], buf: sector, buflen: sizeof(uint64_t)); |
1338 | sg_set_buf(sg: &dmreq->sg_out[1], buf: org_iv, buflen: cc->iv_size); |
1339 | sg_set_page(sg: &dmreq->sg_out[2], page: bv_out.bv_page, len: cc->sector_size, offset: bv_out.bv_offset); |
1340 | sg_set_buf(sg: &dmreq->sg_out[3], buf: tag, buflen: cc->integrity_tag_size); |
1341 | |
1342 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops) { |
1343 | /* For READs use IV stored in integrity metadata */ |
1344 | if (cc->integrity_iv_size && bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) { |
1345 | memcpy(org_iv, tag_iv, cc->iv_size); |
1346 | } else { |
1347 | r = cc->iv_gen_ops->generator(cc, org_iv, dmreq); |
1348 | if (r < 0) |
1349 | return r; |
1350 | /* Store generated IV in integrity metadata */ |
1351 | if (cc->integrity_iv_size) |
1352 | memcpy(tag_iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size); |
1353 | } |
1354 | /* Working copy of IV, to be modified in crypto API */ |
1355 | memcpy(iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size); |
1356 | } |
1357 | |
1358 | aead_request_set_ad(req, assoclen: sizeof(uint64_t) + cc->iv_size); |
1359 | if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) { |
1360 | aead_request_set_crypt(req, src: dmreq->sg_in, dst: dmreq->sg_out, |
1361 | cryptlen: cc->sector_size, iv); |
1362 | r = crypto_aead_encrypt(req); |
1363 | if (cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size) |
1364 | memset(tag + cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size, 0, |
1365 | cc->on_disk_tag_size - (cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size)); |
1366 | } else { |
1367 | aead_request_set_crypt(req, src: dmreq->sg_in, dst: dmreq->sg_out, |
1368 | cryptlen: cc->sector_size + cc->integrity_tag_size, iv); |
1369 | r = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); |
1370 | } |
1371 | |
1372 | if (r == -EBADMSG) { |
1373 | sector_t s = le64_to_cpu(*sector); |
1374 | |
1375 | DMERR_LIMIT("%pg: INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR, sector %llu" , |
1376 | ctx->bio_in->bi_bdev, s); |
1377 | dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, op: "integrity-aead" , |
1378 | bio: ctx->bio_in, sector: s, result: 0); |
1379 | } |
1380 | |
1381 | if (!r && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post) |
1382 | r = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv, dmreq); |
1383 | |
1384 | bio_advance_iter(bio: ctx->bio_in, iter: &ctx->iter_in, bytes: cc->sector_size); |
1385 | bio_advance_iter(bio: ctx->bio_out, iter: &ctx->iter_out, bytes: cc->sector_size); |
1386 | |
1387 | return r; |
1388 | } |
1389 | |
1390 | static int crypt_convert_block_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1391 | struct convert_context *ctx, |
1392 | struct skcipher_request *req, |
1393 | unsigned int tag_offset) |
1394 | { |
1395 | struct bio_vec bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in); |
1396 | struct bio_vec bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out); |
1397 | struct scatterlist *sg_in, *sg_out; |
1398 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq; |
1399 | u8 *iv, *org_iv, *tag_iv; |
1400 | __le64 *sector; |
1401 | int r = 0; |
1402 | |
1403 | /* Reject unexpected unaligned bio. */ |
1404 | if (unlikely(bv_in.bv_len & (cc->sector_size - 1))) |
1405 | return -EIO; |
1406 | |
1407 | dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req); |
1408 | dmreq->iv_sector = ctx->cc_sector; |
1409 | if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags)) |
1410 | dmreq->iv_sector >>= cc->sector_shift; |
1411 | dmreq->ctx = ctx; |
1412 | |
1413 | *org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) = tag_offset; |
1414 | |
1415 | iv = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1416 | org_iv = org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1417 | tag_iv = iv_tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1418 | |
1419 | sector = org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq); |
1420 | *sector = cpu_to_le64(ctx->cc_sector - cc->iv_offset); |
1421 | |
1422 | /* For skcipher we use only the first sg item */ |
1423 | sg_in = &dmreq->sg_in[0]; |
1424 | sg_out = &dmreq->sg_out[0]; |
1425 | |
1426 | sg_init_table(sg_in, 1); |
1427 | sg_set_page(sg: sg_in, page: bv_in.bv_page, len: cc->sector_size, offset: bv_in.bv_offset); |
1428 | |
1429 | sg_init_table(sg_out, 1); |
1430 | sg_set_page(sg: sg_out, page: bv_out.bv_page, len: cc->sector_size, offset: bv_out.bv_offset); |
1431 | |
1432 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops) { |
1433 | /* For READs use IV stored in integrity metadata */ |
1434 | if (cc->integrity_iv_size && bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) { |
1435 | memcpy(org_iv, tag_iv, cc->integrity_iv_size); |
1436 | } else { |
1437 | r = cc->iv_gen_ops->generator(cc, org_iv, dmreq); |
1438 | if (r < 0) |
1439 | return r; |
1440 | /* Data can be already preprocessed in generator */ |
1441 | if (test_bit(CRYPT_ENCRYPT_PREPROCESS, &cc->cipher_flags)) |
1442 | sg_in = sg_out; |
1443 | /* Store generated IV in integrity metadata */ |
1444 | if (cc->integrity_iv_size) |
1445 | memcpy(tag_iv, org_iv, cc->integrity_iv_size); |
1446 | } |
1447 | /* Working copy of IV, to be modified in crypto API */ |
1448 | memcpy(iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size); |
1449 | } |
1450 | |
1451 | skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src: sg_in, dst: sg_out, cryptlen: cc->sector_size, iv); |
1452 | |
1453 | if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) |
1454 | r = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); |
1455 | else |
1456 | r = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); |
1457 | |
1458 | if (!r && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post) |
1459 | r = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv, dmreq); |
1460 | |
1461 | bio_advance_iter(bio: ctx->bio_in, iter: &ctx->iter_in, bytes: cc->sector_size); |
1462 | bio_advance_iter(bio: ctx->bio_out, iter: &ctx->iter_out, bytes: cc->sector_size); |
1463 | |
1464 | return r; |
1465 | } |
1466 | |
1467 | static void kcryptd_async_done(void *async_req, int error); |
1468 | |
1469 | static int crypt_alloc_req_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1470 | struct convert_context *ctx) |
1471 | { |
1472 | unsigned int key_index = ctx->cc_sector & (cc->tfms_count - 1); |
1473 | |
1474 | if (!ctx->r.req) { |
1475 | ctx->r.req = mempool_alloc(pool: &cc->req_pool, in_interrupt() ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_NOIO); |
1476 | if (!ctx->r.req) |
1477 | return -ENOMEM; |
1478 | } |
1479 | |
1480 | skcipher_request_set_tfm(req: ctx->r.req, tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[key_index]); |
1481 | |
1482 | /* |
1483 | * Use REQ_MAY_BACKLOG so a cipher driver internally backlogs |
1484 | * requests if driver request queue is full. |
1485 | */ |
1486 | skcipher_request_set_callback(req: ctx->r.req, |
1487 | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, |
1488 | compl: kcryptd_async_done, data: dmreq_of_req(cc, req: ctx->r.req)); |
1489 | |
1490 | return 0; |
1491 | } |
1492 | |
1493 | static int crypt_alloc_req_aead(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1494 | struct convert_context *ctx) |
1495 | { |
1496 | if (!ctx->r.req_aead) { |
1497 | ctx->r.req_aead = mempool_alloc(pool: &cc->req_pool, in_interrupt() ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_NOIO); |
1498 | if (!ctx->r.req_aead) |
1499 | return -ENOMEM; |
1500 | } |
1501 | |
1502 | aead_request_set_tfm(req: ctx->r.req_aead, tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]); |
1503 | |
1504 | /* |
1505 | * Use REQ_MAY_BACKLOG so a cipher driver internally backlogs |
1506 | * requests if driver request queue is full. |
1507 | */ |
1508 | aead_request_set_callback(req: ctx->r.req_aead, |
1509 | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, |
1510 | compl: kcryptd_async_done, data: dmreq_of_req(cc, req: ctx->r.req_aead)); |
1511 | |
1512 | return 0; |
1513 | } |
1514 | |
1515 | static int crypt_alloc_req(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1516 | struct convert_context *ctx) |
1517 | { |
1518 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
1519 | return crypt_alloc_req_aead(cc, ctx); |
1520 | else |
1521 | return crypt_alloc_req_skcipher(cc, ctx); |
1522 | } |
1523 | |
1524 | static void crypt_free_req_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1525 | struct skcipher_request *req, struct bio *base_bio) |
1526 | { |
1527 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = dm_per_bio_data(bio: base_bio, data_size: cc->per_bio_data_size); |
1528 | |
1529 | if ((struct skcipher_request *)(io + 1) != req) |
1530 | mempool_free(element: req, pool: &cc->req_pool); |
1531 | } |
1532 | |
1533 | static void crypt_free_req_aead(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1534 | struct aead_request *req, struct bio *base_bio) |
1535 | { |
1536 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = dm_per_bio_data(bio: base_bio, data_size: cc->per_bio_data_size); |
1537 | |
1538 | if ((struct aead_request *)(io + 1) != req) |
1539 | mempool_free(element: req, pool: &cc->req_pool); |
1540 | } |
1541 | |
1542 | static void crypt_free_req(struct crypt_config *cc, void *req, struct bio *base_bio) |
1543 | { |
1544 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
1545 | crypt_free_req_aead(cc, req, base_bio); |
1546 | else |
1547 | crypt_free_req_skcipher(cc, req, base_bio); |
1548 | } |
1549 | |
1550 | /* |
1551 | * Encrypt / decrypt data from one bio to another one (can be the same one) |
1552 | */ |
1553 | static blk_status_t crypt_convert(struct crypt_config *cc, |
1554 | struct convert_context *ctx, bool atomic, bool reset_pending) |
1555 | { |
1556 | unsigned int tag_offset = 0; |
1557 | unsigned int sector_step = cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT; |
1558 | int r; |
1559 | |
1560 | /* |
1561 | * if reset_pending is set we are dealing with the bio for the first time, |
1562 | * else we're continuing to work on the previous bio, so don't mess with |
1563 | * the cc_pending counter |
1564 | */ |
1565 | if (reset_pending) |
1566 | atomic_set(v: &ctx->cc_pending, i: 1); |
1567 | |
1568 | while (ctx->iter_in.bi_size && ctx->iter_out.bi_size) { |
1569 | |
1570 | r = crypt_alloc_req(cc, ctx); |
1571 | if (r) { |
1572 | complete(&ctx->restart); |
1573 | return BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE; |
1574 | } |
1575 | |
1576 | atomic_inc(v: &ctx->cc_pending); |
1577 | |
1578 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
1579 | r = crypt_convert_block_aead(cc, ctx, req: ctx->r.req_aead, tag_offset); |
1580 | else |
1581 | r = crypt_convert_block_skcipher(cc, ctx, req: ctx->r.req, tag_offset); |
1582 | |
1583 | switch (r) { |
1584 | /* |
1585 | * The request was queued by a crypto driver |
1586 | * but the driver request queue is full, let's wait. |
1587 | */ |
1588 | case -EBUSY: |
1589 | if (in_interrupt()) { |
1590 | if (try_wait_for_completion(x: &ctx->restart)) { |
1591 | /* |
1592 | * we don't have to block to wait for completion, |
1593 | * so proceed |
1594 | */ |
1595 | } else { |
1596 | /* |
1597 | * we can't wait for completion without blocking |
1598 | * exit and continue processing in a workqueue |
1599 | */ |
1600 | ctx->r.req = NULL; |
1601 | ctx->cc_sector += sector_step; |
1602 | tag_offset++; |
1603 | return BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE; |
1604 | } |
1605 | } else { |
1606 | wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart); |
1607 | } |
1608 | reinit_completion(x: &ctx->restart); |
1609 | fallthrough; |
1610 | /* |
1611 | * The request is queued and processed asynchronously, |
1612 | * completion function kcryptd_async_done() will be called. |
1613 | */ |
1614 | case -EINPROGRESS: |
1615 | ctx->r.req = NULL; |
1616 | ctx->cc_sector += sector_step; |
1617 | tag_offset++; |
1618 | continue; |
1619 | /* |
1620 | * The request was already processed (synchronously). |
1621 | */ |
1622 | case 0: |
1623 | atomic_dec(v: &ctx->cc_pending); |
1624 | ctx->cc_sector += sector_step; |
1625 | tag_offset++; |
1626 | if (!atomic) |
1627 | cond_resched(); |
1628 | continue; |
1629 | /* |
1630 | * There was a data integrity error. |
1631 | */ |
1632 | case -EBADMSG: |
1633 | atomic_dec(v: &ctx->cc_pending); |
1634 | return BLK_STS_PROTECTION; |
1635 | /* |
1636 | * There was an error while processing the request. |
1637 | */ |
1638 | default: |
1639 | atomic_dec(v: &ctx->cc_pending); |
1640 | return BLK_STS_IOERR; |
1641 | } |
1642 | } |
1643 | |
1644 | return 0; |
1645 | } |
1646 | |
1647 | static void crypt_free_buffer_pages(struct crypt_config *cc, struct bio *clone); |
1648 | |
1649 | /* |
1650 | * Generate a new unfragmented bio with the given size |
1651 | * This should never violate the device limitations (but only because |
1652 | * max_segment_size is being constrained to PAGE_SIZE). |
1653 | * |
1654 | * This function may be called concurrently. If we allocate from the mempool |
1655 | * concurrently, there is a possibility of deadlock. For example, if we have |
1656 | * mempool of 256 pages, two processes, each wanting 256, pages allocate from |
1657 | * the mempool concurrently, it may deadlock in a situation where both processes |
1658 | * have allocated 128 pages and the mempool is exhausted. |
1659 | * |
1660 | * In order to avoid this scenario we allocate the pages under a mutex. |
1661 | * |
1662 | * In order to not degrade performance with excessive locking, we try |
1663 | * non-blocking allocations without a mutex first but on failure we fallback |
1664 | * to blocking allocations with a mutex. |
1665 | * |
1666 | * In order to reduce allocation overhead, we try to allocate compound pages in |
1667 | * the first pass. If they are not available, we fall back to the mempool. |
1668 | */ |
1669 | static struct bio *crypt_alloc_buffer(struct dm_crypt_io *io, unsigned int size) |
1670 | { |
1671 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
1672 | struct bio *clone; |
1673 | unsigned int nr_iovecs = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT; |
1674 | gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_HIGHMEM; |
1675 | unsigned int remaining_size; |
1676 | unsigned int order = MAX_ORDER - 1; |
1677 | |
1678 | retry: |
1679 | if (unlikely(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)) |
1680 | mutex_lock(&cc->bio_alloc_lock); |
1681 | |
1682 | clone = bio_alloc_bioset(bdev: cc->dev->bdev, nr_vecs: nr_iovecs, opf: io->base_bio->bi_opf, |
1683 | GFP_NOIO, bs: &cc->bs); |
1684 | clone->bi_private = io; |
1685 | clone->bi_end_io = crypt_endio; |
1686 | |
1687 | remaining_size = size; |
1688 | |
1689 | while (remaining_size) { |
1690 | struct page *pages; |
1691 | unsigned size_to_add; |
1692 | unsigned remaining_order = __fls(word: (remaining_size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT); |
1693 | order = min(order, remaining_order); |
1694 | |
1695 | while (order > 0) { |
1696 | if (unlikely(percpu_counter_read_positive(&cc->n_allocated_pages) + |
1697 | (1 << order) > dm_crypt_pages_per_client)) |
1698 | goto decrease_order; |
1699 | pages = alloc_pages(gfp: gfp_mask |
1700 | | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_COMP, |
1701 | order); |
1702 | if (likely(pages != NULL)) { |
1703 | percpu_counter_add(fbc: &cc->n_allocated_pages, amount: 1 << order); |
1704 | goto have_pages; |
1705 | } |
1706 | decrease_order: |
1707 | order--; |
1708 | } |
1709 | |
1710 | pages = mempool_alloc(pool: &cc->page_pool, gfp_mask); |
1711 | if (!pages) { |
1712 | crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone); |
1713 | bio_put(clone); |
1714 | gfp_mask |= __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM; |
1715 | order = 0; |
1716 | goto retry; |
1717 | } |
1718 | |
1719 | have_pages: |
1720 | size_to_add = min((unsigned)PAGE_SIZE << order, remaining_size); |
1721 | __bio_add_page(bio: clone, page: pages, len: size_to_add, off: 0); |
1722 | remaining_size -= size_to_add; |
1723 | } |
1724 | |
1725 | /* Allocate space for integrity tags */ |
1726 | if (dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(io, bio: clone)) { |
1727 | crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone); |
1728 | bio_put(clone); |
1729 | clone = NULL; |
1730 | } |
1731 | |
1732 | if (unlikely(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)) |
1733 | mutex_unlock(lock: &cc->bio_alloc_lock); |
1734 | |
1735 | return clone; |
1736 | } |
1737 | |
1738 | static void crypt_free_buffer_pages(struct crypt_config *cc, struct bio *clone) |
1739 | { |
1740 | struct folio_iter fi; |
1741 | |
1742 | if (clone->bi_vcnt > 0) { /* bio_for_each_folio_all crashes with an empty bio */ |
1743 | bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, clone) { |
1744 | if (folio_test_large(folio: fi.folio)) { |
1745 | percpu_counter_sub(fbc: &cc->n_allocated_pages, |
1746 | amount: 1 << folio_order(folio: fi.folio)); |
1747 | folio_put(folio: fi.folio); |
1748 | } else { |
1749 | mempool_free(element: &fi.folio->page, pool: &cc->page_pool); |
1750 | } |
1751 | } |
1752 | } |
1753 | } |
1754 | |
1755 | static void crypt_io_init(struct dm_crypt_io *io, struct crypt_config *cc, |
1756 | struct bio *bio, sector_t sector) |
1757 | { |
1758 | io->cc = cc; |
1759 | io->base_bio = bio; |
1760 | io->sector = sector; |
1761 | io->error = 0; |
1762 | io->ctx.r.req = NULL; |
1763 | io->integrity_metadata = NULL; |
1764 | io->integrity_metadata_from_pool = false; |
1765 | io->in_tasklet = false; |
1766 | atomic_set(v: &io->io_pending, i: 0); |
1767 | } |
1768 | |
1769 | static void crypt_inc_pending(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
1770 | { |
1771 | atomic_inc(v: &io->io_pending); |
1772 | } |
1773 | |
1774 | static void kcryptd_io_bio_endio(struct work_struct *work) |
1775 | { |
1776 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work); |
1777 | |
1778 | bio_endio(io->base_bio); |
1779 | } |
1780 | |
1781 | /* |
1782 | * One of the bios was finished. Check for completion of |
1783 | * the whole request and correctly clean up the buffer. |
1784 | */ |
1785 | static void crypt_dec_pending(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
1786 | { |
1787 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
1788 | struct bio *base_bio = io->base_bio; |
1789 | blk_status_t error = io->error; |
1790 | |
1791 | if (!atomic_dec_and_test(v: &io->io_pending)) |
1792 | return; |
1793 | |
1794 | if (io->ctx.r.req) |
1795 | crypt_free_req(cc, req: io->ctx.r.req, base_bio); |
1796 | |
1797 | if (unlikely(io->integrity_metadata_from_pool)) |
1798 | mempool_free(element: io->integrity_metadata, pool: &io->cc->tag_pool); |
1799 | else |
1800 | kfree(objp: io->integrity_metadata); |
1801 | |
1802 | base_bio->bi_status = error; |
1803 | |
1804 | /* |
1805 | * If we are running this function from our tasklet, |
1806 | * we can't call bio_endio() here, because it will call |
1807 | * clone_endio() from dm.c, which in turn will |
1808 | * free the current struct dm_crypt_io structure with |
1809 | * our tasklet. In this case we need to delay bio_endio() |
1810 | * execution to after the tasklet is done and dequeued. |
1811 | */ |
1812 | if (io->in_tasklet) { |
1813 | INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_io_bio_endio); |
1814 | queue_work(wq: cc->io_queue, work: &io->work); |
1815 | return; |
1816 | } |
1817 | |
1818 | bio_endio(base_bio); |
1819 | } |
1820 | |
1821 | /* |
1822 | * kcryptd/kcryptd_io: |
1823 | * |
1824 | * Needed because it would be very unwise to do decryption in an |
1825 | * interrupt context. |
1826 | * |
1827 | * kcryptd performs the actual encryption or decryption. |
1828 | * |
1829 | * kcryptd_io performs the IO submission. |
1830 | * |
1831 | * They must be separated as otherwise the final stages could be |
1832 | * starved by new requests which can block in the first stages due |
1833 | * to memory allocation. |
1834 | * |
1835 | * The work is done per CPU global for all dm-crypt instances. |
1836 | * They should not depend on each other and do not block. |
1837 | */ |
1838 | static void crypt_endio(struct bio *clone) |
1839 | { |
1840 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = clone->bi_private; |
1841 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
1842 | unsigned int rw = bio_data_dir(clone); |
1843 | blk_status_t error; |
1844 | |
1845 | /* |
1846 | * free the processed pages |
1847 | */ |
1848 | if (rw == WRITE) |
1849 | crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone); |
1850 | |
1851 | error = clone->bi_status; |
1852 | bio_put(clone); |
1853 | |
1854 | if (rw == READ && !error) { |
1855 | kcryptd_queue_crypt(io); |
1856 | return; |
1857 | } |
1858 | |
1859 | if (unlikely(error)) |
1860 | io->error = error; |
1861 | |
1862 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
1863 | } |
1864 | |
1865 | #define CRYPT_MAP_READ_GFP GFP_NOWAIT |
1866 | |
1867 | static int kcryptd_io_read(struct dm_crypt_io *io, gfp_t gfp) |
1868 | { |
1869 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
1870 | struct bio *clone; |
1871 | |
1872 | /* |
1873 | * We need the original biovec array in order to decrypt the whole bio |
1874 | * data *afterwards* -- thanks to immutable biovecs we don't need to |
1875 | * worry about the block layer modifying the biovec array; so leverage |
1876 | * bio_alloc_clone(). |
1877 | */ |
1878 | clone = bio_alloc_clone(bdev: cc->dev->bdev, bio_src: io->base_bio, gfp, bs: &cc->bs); |
1879 | if (!clone) |
1880 | return 1; |
1881 | clone->bi_private = io; |
1882 | clone->bi_end_io = crypt_endio; |
1883 | |
1884 | crypt_inc_pending(io); |
1885 | |
1886 | clone->bi_iter.bi_sector = cc->start + io->sector; |
1887 | |
1888 | if (dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(io, bio: clone)) { |
1889 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
1890 | bio_put(clone); |
1891 | return 1; |
1892 | } |
1893 | |
1894 | dm_submit_bio_remap(clone: io->base_bio, tgt_clone: clone); |
1895 | return 0; |
1896 | } |
1897 | |
1898 | static void kcryptd_io_read_work(struct work_struct *work) |
1899 | { |
1900 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work); |
1901 | |
1902 | crypt_inc_pending(io); |
1903 | if (kcryptd_io_read(io, GFP_NOIO)) |
1904 | io->error = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; |
1905 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
1906 | } |
1907 | |
1908 | static void kcryptd_queue_read(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
1909 | { |
1910 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
1911 | |
1912 | INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_io_read_work); |
1913 | queue_work(wq: cc->io_queue, work: &io->work); |
1914 | } |
1915 | |
1916 | static void kcryptd_io_write(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
1917 | { |
1918 | struct bio *clone = io->ctx.bio_out; |
1919 | |
1920 | dm_submit_bio_remap(clone: io->base_bio, tgt_clone: clone); |
1921 | } |
1922 | |
1923 | #define crypt_io_from_node(node) rb_entry((node), struct dm_crypt_io, rb_node) |
1924 | |
1925 | static int dmcrypt_write(void *data) |
1926 | { |
1927 | struct crypt_config *cc = data; |
1928 | struct dm_crypt_io *io; |
1929 | |
1930 | while (1) { |
1931 | struct rb_root write_tree; |
1932 | struct blk_plug plug; |
1933 | |
1934 | spin_lock_irq(lock: &cc->write_thread_lock); |
1935 | continue_locked: |
1936 | |
1937 | if (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&cc->write_tree)) |
1938 | goto pop_from_list; |
1939 | |
1940 | set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); |
1941 | |
1942 | spin_unlock_irq(lock: &cc->write_thread_lock); |
1943 | |
1944 | if (unlikely(kthread_should_stop())) { |
1945 | set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); |
1946 | break; |
1947 | } |
1948 | |
1949 | schedule(); |
1950 | |
1951 | set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); |
1952 | spin_lock_irq(lock: &cc->write_thread_lock); |
1953 | goto continue_locked; |
1954 | |
1955 | pop_from_list: |
1956 | write_tree = cc->write_tree; |
1957 | cc->write_tree = RB_ROOT; |
1958 | spin_unlock_irq(lock: &cc->write_thread_lock); |
1959 | |
1960 | BUG_ON(rb_parent(write_tree.rb_node)); |
1961 | |
1962 | /* |
1963 | * Note: we cannot walk the tree here with rb_next because |
1964 | * the structures may be freed when kcryptd_io_write is called. |
1965 | */ |
1966 | blk_start_plug(&plug); |
1967 | do { |
1968 | io = crypt_io_from_node(rb_first(&write_tree)); |
1969 | rb_erase(&io->rb_node, &write_tree); |
1970 | kcryptd_io_write(io); |
1971 | cond_resched(); |
1972 | } while (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&write_tree)); |
1973 | blk_finish_plug(&plug); |
1974 | } |
1975 | return 0; |
1976 | } |
1977 | |
1978 | static void kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(struct dm_crypt_io *io, int async) |
1979 | { |
1980 | struct bio *clone = io->ctx.bio_out; |
1981 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
1982 | unsigned long flags; |
1983 | sector_t sector; |
1984 | struct rb_node **rbp, *parent; |
1985 | |
1986 | if (unlikely(io->error)) { |
1987 | crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone); |
1988 | bio_put(clone); |
1989 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
1990 | return; |
1991 | } |
1992 | |
1993 | /* crypt_convert should have filled the clone bio */ |
1994 | BUG_ON(io->ctx.iter_out.bi_size); |
1995 | |
1996 | clone->bi_iter.bi_sector = cc->start + io->sector; |
1997 | |
1998 | if ((likely(!async) && test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags)) || |
1999 | test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags)) { |
2000 | dm_submit_bio_remap(clone: io->base_bio, tgt_clone: clone); |
2001 | return; |
2002 | } |
2003 | |
2004 | spin_lock_irqsave(&cc->write_thread_lock, flags); |
2005 | if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&cc->write_tree)) |
2006 | wake_up_process(tsk: cc->write_thread); |
2007 | rbp = &cc->write_tree.rb_node; |
2008 | parent = NULL; |
2009 | sector = io->sector; |
2010 | while (*rbp) { |
2011 | parent = *rbp; |
2012 | if (sector < crypt_io_from_node(parent)->sector) |
2013 | rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_left; |
2014 | else |
2015 | rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_right; |
2016 | } |
2017 | rb_link_node(node: &io->rb_node, parent, rb_link: rbp); |
2018 | rb_insert_color(&io->rb_node, &cc->write_tree); |
2019 | spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock: &cc->write_thread_lock, flags); |
2020 | } |
2021 | |
2022 | static bool kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(struct crypt_config *cc, |
2023 | struct convert_context *ctx) |
2024 | |
2025 | { |
2026 | if (!test_bit(DM_CRYPT_WRITE_INLINE, &cc->flags)) |
2027 | return false; |
2028 | |
2029 | /* |
2030 | * Note: zone append writes (REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND) do not have ordering |
2031 | * constraints so they do not need to be issued inline by |
2032 | * kcryptd_crypt_write_convert(). |
2033 | */ |
2034 | switch (bio_op(bio: ctx->bio_in)) { |
2035 | case REQ_OP_WRITE: |
2036 | case REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES: |
2037 | return true; |
2038 | default: |
2039 | return false; |
2040 | } |
2041 | } |
2042 | |
2043 | static void kcryptd_crypt_write_continue(struct work_struct *work) |
2044 | { |
2045 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work); |
2046 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
2047 | struct convert_context *ctx = &io->ctx; |
2048 | int crypt_finished; |
2049 | sector_t sector = io->sector; |
2050 | blk_status_t r; |
2051 | |
2052 | wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart); |
2053 | reinit_completion(x: &ctx->restart); |
2054 | |
2055 | r = crypt_convert(cc, ctx: &io->ctx, atomic: true, reset_pending: false); |
2056 | if (r) |
2057 | io->error = r; |
2058 | crypt_finished = atomic_dec_and_test(v: &ctx->cc_pending); |
2059 | if (!crypt_finished && kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(cc, ctx)) { |
2060 | /* Wait for completion signaled by kcryptd_async_done() */ |
2061 | wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart); |
2062 | crypt_finished = 1; |
2063 | } |
2064 | |
2065 | /* Encryption was already finished, submit io now */ |
2066 | if (crypt_finished) { |
2067 | kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(io, async: 0); |
2068 | io->sector = sector; |
2069 | } |
2070 | |
2071 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
2072 | } |
2073 | |
2074 | static void kcryptd_crypt_write_convert(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
2075 | { |
2076 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
2077 | struct convert_context *ctx = &io->ctx; |
2078 | struct bio *clone; |
2079 | int crypt_finished; |
2080 | sector_t sector = io->sector; |
2081 | blk_status_t r; |
2082 | |
2083 | /* |
2084 | * Prevent io from disappearing until this function completes. |
2085 | */ |
2086 | crypt_inc_pending(io); |
2087 | crypt_convert_init(cc, ctx, NULL, bio_in: io->base_bio, sector); |
2088 | |
2089 | clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(io, size: io->base_bio->bi_iter.bi_size); |
2090 | if (unlikely(!clone)) { |
2091 | io->error = BLK_STS_IOERR; |
2092 | goto dec; |
2093 | } |
2094 | |
2095 | io->ctx.bio_out = clone; |
2096 | io->ctx.iter_out = clone->bi_iter; |
2097 | |
2098 | sector += bio_sectors(clone); |
2099 | |
2100 | crypt_inc_pending(io); |
2101 | r = crypt_convert(cc, ctx, |
2102 | test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags), reset_pending: true); |
2103 | /* |
2104 | * Crypto API backlogged the request, because its queue was full |
2105 | * and we're in softirq context, so continue from a workqueue |
2106 | * (TODO: is it actually possible to be in softirq in the write path?) |
2107 | */ |
2108 | if (r == BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE) { |
2109 | INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_crypt_write_continue); |
2110 | queue_work(wq: cc->crypt_queue, work: &io->work); |
2111 | return; |
2112 | } |
2113 | if (r) |
2114 | io->error = r; |
2115 | crypt_finished = atomic_dec_and_test(v: &ctx->cc_pending); |
2116 | if (!crypt_finished && kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(cc, ctx)) { |
2117 | /* Wait for completion signaled by kcryptd_async_done() */ |
2118 | wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart); |
2119 | crypt_finished = 1; |
2120 | } |
2121 | |
2122 | /* Encryption was already finished, submit io now */ |
2123 | if (crypt_finished) { |
2124 | kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(io, async: 0); |
2125 | io->sector = sector; |
2126 | } |
2127 | |
2128 | dec: |
2129 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
2130 | } |
2131 | |
2132 | static void kcryptd_crypt_read_done(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
2133 | { |
2134 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
2135 | } |
2136 | |
2137 | static void kcryptd_crypt_read_continue(struct work_struct *work) |
2138 | { |
2139 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work); |
2140 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
2141 | blk_status_t r; |
2142 | |
2143 | wait_for_completion(&io->ctx.restart); |
2144 | reinit_completion(x: &io->ctx.restart); |
2145 | |
2146 | r = crypt_convert(cc, ctx: &io->ctx, atomic: true, reset_pending: false); |
2147 | if (r) |
2148 | io->error = r; |
2149 | |
2150 | if (atomic_dec_and_test(v: &io->ctx.cc_pending)) |
2151 | kcryptd_crypt_read_done(io); |
2152 | |
2153 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
2154 | } |
2155 | |
2156 | static void kcryptd_crypt_read_convert(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
2157 | { |
2158 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
2159 | blk_status_t r; |
2160 | |
2161 | crypt_inc_pending(io); |
2162 | |
2163 | crypt_convert_init(cc, ctx: &io->ctx, bio_out: io->base_bio, bio_in: io->base_bio, |
2164 | sector: io->sector); |
2165 | |
2166 | r = crypt_convert(cc, ctx: &io->ctx, |
2167 | test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags), reset_pending: true); |
2168 | /* |
2169 | * Crypto API backlogged the request, because its queue was full |
2170 | * and we're in softirq context, so continue from a workqueue |
2171 | */ |
2172 | if (r == BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE) { |
2173 | INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_crypt_read_continue); |
2174 | queue_work(wq: cc->crypt_queue, work: &io->work); |
2175 | return; |
2176 | } |
2177 | if (r) |
2178 | io->error = r; |
2179 | |
2180 | if (atomic_dec_and_test(v: &io->ctx.cc_pending)) |
2181 | kcryptd_crypt_read_done(io); |
2182 | |
2183 | crypt_dec_pending(io); |
2184 | } |
2185 | |
2186 | static void kcryptd_async_done(void *data, int error) |
2187 | { |
2188 | struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq = data; |
2189 | struct convert_context *ctx = dmreq->ctx; |
2190 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(ctx, struct dm_crypt_io, ctx); |
2191 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
2192 | |
2193 | /* |
2194 | * A request from crypto driver backlog is going to be processed now, |
2195 | * finish the completion and continue in crypt_convert(). |
2196 | * (Callback will be called for the second time for this request.) |
2197 | */ |
2198 | if (error == -EINPROGRESS) { |
2199 | complete(&ctx->restart); |
2200 | return; |
2201 | } |
2202 | |
2203 | if (!error && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post) |
2204 | error = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq), dmreq); |
2205 | |
2206 | if (error == -EBADMSG) { |
2207 | sector_t s = le64_to_cpu(*org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq)); |
2208 | |
2209 | DMERR_LIMIT("%pg: INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR, sector %llu" , |
2210 | ctx->bio_in->bi_bdev, s); |
2211 | dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, op: "integrity-aead" , |
2212 | bio: ctx->bio_in, sector: s, result: 0); |
2213 | io->error = BLK_STS_PROTECTION; |
2214 | } else if (error < 0) |
2215 | io->error = BLK_STS_IOERR; |
2216 | |
2217 | crypt_free_req(cc, req: req_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq), base_bio: io->base_bio); |
2218 | |
2219 | if (!atomic_dec_and_test(v: &ctx->cc_pending)) |
2220 | return; |
2221 | |
2222 | /* |
2223 | * The request is fully completed: for inline writes, let |
2224 | * kcryptd_crypt_write_convert() do the IO submission. |
2225 | */ |
2226 | if (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ) { |
2227 | kcryptd_crypt_read_done(io); |
2228 | return; |
2229 | } |
2230 | |
2231 | if (kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(cc, ctx)) { |
2232 | complete(&ctx->restart); |
2233 | return; |
2234 | } |
2235 | |
2236 | kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(io, async: 1); |
2237 | } |
2238 | |
2239 | static void kcryptd_crypt(struct work_struct *work) |
2240 | { |
2241 | struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work); |
2242 | |
2243 | if (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ) |
2244 | kcryptd_crypt_read_convert(io); |
2245 | else |
2246 | kcryptd_crypt_write_convert(io); |
2247 | } |
2248 | |
2249 | static void kcryptd_crypt_tasklet(unsigned long work) |
2250 | { |
2251 | kcryptd_crypt(work: (struct work_struct *)work); |
2252 | } |
2253 | |
2254 | static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io) |
2255 | { |
2256 | struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc; |
2257 | |
2258 | if ((bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ && test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags)) || |
2259 | (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == WRITE && test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags))) { |
2260 | /* |
2261 | * in_hardirq(): Crypto API's skcipher_walk_first() refuses to work in hard IRQ context. |
2262 | * irqs_disabled(): the kernel may run some IO completion from the idle thread, but |
2263 | * it is being executed with irqs disabled. |
2264 | */ |
2265 | if (in_hardirq() || irqs_disabled()) { |
2266 | io->in_tasklet = true; |
2267 | tasklet_init(t: &io->tasklet, func: kcryptd_crypt_tasklet, data: (unsigned long)&io->work); |
2268 | tasklet_schedule(t: &io->tasklet); |
2269 | return; |
2270 | } |
2271 | |
2272 | kcryptd_crypt(work: &io->work); |
2273 | return; |
2274 | } |
2275 | |
2276 | INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_crypt); |
2277 | queue_work(wq: cc->crypt_queue, work: &io->work); |
2278 | } |
2279 | |
2280 | static void crypt_free_tfms_aead(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2281 | { |
2282 | if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead) |
2283 | return; |
2284 | |
2285 | if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] && !IS_ERR(ptr: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0])) { |
2286 | crypto_free_aead(tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]); |
2287 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] = NULL; |
2288 | } |
2289 | |
2290 | kfree(objp: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead); |
2291 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead = NULL; |
2292 | } |
2293 | |
2294 | static void crypt_free_tfms_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2295 | { |
2296 | unsigned int i; |
2297 | |
2298 | if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms) |
2299 | return; |
2300 | |
2301 | for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) |
2302 | if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] && !IS_ERR(ptr: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i])) { |
2303 | crypto_free_skcipher(tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i]); |
2304 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] = NULL; |
2305 | } |
2306 | |
2307 | kfree(objp: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms); |
2308 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = NULL; |
2309 | } |
2310 | |
2311 | static void crypt_free_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2312 | { |
2313 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
2314 | crypt_free_tfms_aead(cc); |
2315 | else |
2316 | crypt_free_tfms_skcipher(cc); |
2317 | } |
2318 | |
2319 | static int crypt_alloc_tfms_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode) |
2320 | { |
2321 | unsigned int i; |
2322 | int err; |
2323 | |
2324 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = kcalloc(n: cc->tfms_count, |
2325 | size: sizeof(struct crypto_skcipher *), |
2326 | GFP_KERNEL); |
2327 | if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms) |
2328 | return -ENOMEM; |
2329 | |
2330 | for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) { |
2331 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] = crypto_alloc_skcipher(alg_name: ciphermode, type: 0, |
2332 | CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); |
2333 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i])) { |
2334 | err = PTR_ERR(ptr: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i]); |
2335 | crypt_free_tfms(cc); |
2336 | return err; |
2337 | } |
2338 | } |
2339 | |
2340 | /* |
2341 | * dm-crypt performance can vary greatly depending on which crypto |
2342 | * algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug performance |
2343 | * problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name. |
2344 | */ |
2345 | DMDEBUG_LIMIT("%s using implementation \"%s\"" , ciphermode, |
2346 | crypto_skcipher_alg(any_tfm(cc))->base.cra_driver_name); |
2347 | return 0; |
2348 | } |
2349 | |
2350 | static int crypt_alloc_tfms_aead(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode) |
2351 | { |
2352 | int err; |
2353 | |
2354 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = kmalloc(size: sizeof(struct crypto_aead *), GFP_KERNEL); |
2355 | if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms) |
2356 | return -ENOMEM; |
2357 | |
2358 | cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] = crypto_alloc_aead(alg_name: ciphermode, type: 0, |
2359 | CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); |
2360 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0])) { |
2361 | err = PTR_ERR(ptr: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]); |
2362 | crypt_free_tfms(cc); |
2363 | return err; |
2364 | } |
2365 | |
2366 | DMDEBUG_LIMIT("%s using implementation \"%s\"" , ciphermode, |
2367 | crypto_aead_alg(any_tfm_aead(cc))->base.cra_driver_name); |
2368 | return 0; |
2369 | } |
2370 | |
2371 | static int crypt_alloc_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode) |
2372 | { |
2373 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
2374 | return crypt_alloc_tfms_aead(cc, ciphermode); |
2375 | else |
2376 | return crypt_alloc_tfms_skcipher(cc, ciphermode); |
2377 | } |
2378 | |
2379 | static unsigned int crypt_subkey_size(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2380 | { |
2381 | return (cc->key_size - cc->key_extra_size) >> ilog2(cc->tfms_count); |
2382 | } |
2383 | |
2384 | static unsigned int crypt_authenckey_size(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2385 | { |
2386 | return crypt_subkey_size(cc) + RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct crypto_authenc_key_param)); |
2387 | } |
2388 | |
2389 | /* |
2390 | * If AEAD is composed like authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes)), |
2391 | * the key must be for some reason in special format. |
2392 | * This funcion converts cc->key to this special format. |
2393 | */ |
2394 | static void crypt_copy_authenckey(char *p, const void *key, |
2395 | unsigned int enckeylen, unsigned int authkeylen) |
2396 | { |
2397 | struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param; |
2398 | struct rtattr *rta; |
2399 | |
2400 | rta = (struct rtattr *)p; |
2401 | param = RTA_DATA(rta); |
2402 | param->enckeylen = cpu_to_be32(enckeylen); |
2403 | rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(*param)); |
2404 | rta->rta_type = CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM; |
2405 | p += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param)); |
2406 | memcpy(p, key + enckeylen, authkeylen); |
2407 | p += authkeylen; |
2408 | memcpy(p, key, enckeylen); |
2409 | } |
2410 | |
2411 | static int crypt_setkey(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2412 | { |
2413 | unsigned int subkey_size; |
2414 | int err = 0, i, r; |
2415 | |
2416 | /* Ignore extra keys (which are used for IV etc) */ |
2417 | subkey_size = crypt_subkey_size(cc); |
2418 | |
2419 | if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) { |
2420 | if (subkey_size < cc->key_mac_size) |
2421 | return -EINVAL; |
2422 | |
2423 | crypt_copy_authenckey(p: cc->authenc_key, key: cc->key, |
2424 | enckeylen: subkey_size - cc->key_mac_size, |
2425 | authkeylen: cc->key_mac_size); |
2426 | } |
2427 | |
2428 | for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) { |
2429 | if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) |
2430 | r = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i], |
2431 | key: cc->authenc_key, keylen: crypt_authenckey_size(cc)); |
2432 | else if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
2433 | r = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i], |
2434 | key: cc->key + (i * subkey_size), |
2435 | keylen: subkey_size); |
2436 | else |
2437 | r = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm: cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i], |
2438 | key: cc->key + (i * subkey_size), |
2439 | keylen: subkey_size); |
2440 | if (r) |
2441 | err = r; |
2442 | } |
2443 | |
2444 | if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) |
2445 | memzero_explicit(s: cc->authenc_key, count: crypt_authenckey_size(cc)); |
2446 | |
2447 | return err; |
2448 | } |
2449 | |
2450 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
2451 | |
2452 | static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str) |
2453 | { |
2454 | while (*str) |
2455 | if (isspace(*str++)) |
2456 | return true; |
2457 | return false; |
2458 | } |
2459 | |
2460 | static int set_key_user(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key) |
2461 | { |
2462 | const struct user_key_payload *ukp; |
2463 | |
2464 | ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key); |
2465 | if (!ukp) |
2466 | return -EKEYREVOKED; |
2467 | |
2468 | if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen) |
2469 | return -EINVAL; |
2470 | |
2471 | memcpy(cc->key, ukp->data, cc->key_size); |
2472 | |
2473 | return 0; |
2474 | } |
2475 | |
2476 | static int set_key_encrypted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key) |
2477 | { |
2478 | const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp; |
2479 | |
2480 | ekp = key->payload.data[0]; |
2481 | if (!ekp) |
2482 | return -EKEYREVOKED; |
2483 | |
2484 | if (cc->key_size != ekp->decrypted_datalen) |
2485 | return -EINVAL; |
2486 | |
2487 | memcpy(cc->key, ekp->decrypted_data, cc->key_size); |
2488 | |
2489 | return 0; |
2490 | } |
2491 | |
2492 | static int set_key_trusted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key) |
2493 | { |
2494 | const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp; |
2495 | |
2496 | tkp = key->payload.data[0]; |
2497 | if (!tkp) |
2498 | return -EKEYREVOKED; |
2499 | |
2500 | if (cc->key_size != tkp->key_len) |
2501 | return -EINVAL; |
2502 | |
2503 | memcpy(cc->key, tkp->key, cc->key_size); |
2504 | |
2505 | return 0; |
2506 | } |
2507 | |
2508 | static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string) |
2509 | { |
2510 | char *new_key_string, *key_desc; |
2511 | int ret; |
2512 | struct key_type *type; |
2513 | struct key *key; |
2514 | int (*set_key)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key); |
2515 | |
2516 | /* |
2517 | * Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for |
2518 | * proper whitespace escaping in arguments on DM_TABLE_STATUS path. |
2519 | */ |
2520 | if (contains_whitespace(str: key_string)) { |
2521 | DMERR("whitespace chars not allowed in key string" ); |
2522 | return -EINVAL; |
2523 | } |
2524 | |
2525 | /* look for next ':' separating key_type from key_description */ |
2526 | key_desc = strchr(key_string, ':'); |
2527 | if (!key_desc || key_desc == key_string || !strlen(key_desc + 1)) |
2528 | return -EINVAL; |
2529 | |
2530 | if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:" , key_desc - key_string + 1)) { |
2531 | type = &key_type_logon; |
2532 | set_key = set_key_user; |
2533 | } else if (!strncmp(key_string, "user:" , key_desc - key_string + 1)) { |
2534 | type = &key_type_user; |
2535 | set_key = set_key_user; |
2536 | } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) && |
2537 | !strncmp(key_string, "encrypted:" , key_desc - key_string + 1)) { |
2538 | type = &key_type_encrypted; |
2539 | set_key = set_key_encrypted; |
2540 | } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) && |
2541 | !strncmp(key_string, "trusted:" , key_desc - key_string + 1)) { |
2542 | type = &key_type_trusted; |
2543 | set_key = set_key_trusted; |
2544 | } else { |
2545 | return -EINVAL; |
2546 | } |
2547 | |
2548 | new_key_string = kstrdup(s: key_string, GFP_KERNEL); |
2549 | if (!new_key_string) |
2550 | return -ENOMEM; |
2551 | |
2552 | key = request_key(type, description: key_desc + 1, NULL); |
2553 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: key)) { |
2554 | kfree_sensitive(objp: new_key_string); |
2555 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: key); |
2556 | } |
2557 | |
2558 | down_read(sem: &key->sem); |
2559 | |
2560 | ret = set_key(cc, key); |
2561 | if (ret < 0) { |
2562 | up_read(sem: &key->sem); |
2563 | key_put(key); |
2564 | kfree_sensitive(objp: new_key_string); |
2565 | return ret; |
2566 | } |
2567 | |
2568 | up_read(sem: &key->sem); |
2569 | key_put(key); |
2570 | |
2571 | /* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate previously valid key */ |
2572 | clear_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, addr: &cc->flags); |
2573 | |
2574 | ret = crypt_setkey(cc); |
2575 | |
2576 | if (!ret) { |
2577 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, addr: &cc->flags); |
2578 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->key_string); |
2579 | cc->key_string = new_key_string; |
2580 | } else |
2581 | kfree_sensitive(objp: new_key_string); |
2582 | |
2583 | return ret; |
2584 | } |
2585 | |
2586 | static int get_key_size(char **key_string) |
2587 | { |
2588 | char *colon, dummy; |
2589 | int ret; |
2590 | |
2591 | if (*key_string[0] != ':') |
2592 | return strlen(*key_string) >> 1; |
2593 | |
2594 | /* look for next ':' in key string */ |
2595 | colon = strpbrk(*key_string + 1, ":" ); |
2596 | if (!colon) |
2597 | return -EINVAL; |
2598 | |
2599 | if (sscanf(*key_string + 1, "%u%c" , &ret, &dummy) != 2 || dummy != ':') |
2600 | return -EINVAL; |
2601 | |
2602 | *key_string = colon; |
2603 | |
2604 | /* remaining key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */ |
2605 | |
2606 | return ret; |
2607 | } |
2608 | |
2609 | #else |
2610 | |
2611 | static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string) |
2612 | { |
2613 | return -EINVAL; |
2614 | } |
2615 | |
2616 | static int get_key_size(char **key_string) |
2617 | { |
2618 | return (*key_string[0] == ':') ? -EINVAL : (int)(strlen(*key_string) >> 1); |
2619 | } |
2620 | |
2621 | #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ |
2622 | |
2623 | static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key) |
2624 | { |
2625 | int r = -EINVAL; |
2626 | int key_string_len = strlen(key); |
2627 | |
2628 | /* Hyphen (which gives a key_size of zero) means there is no key. */ |
2629 | if (!cc->key_size && strcmp(key, "-" )) |
2630 | goto out; |
2631 | |
2632 | /* ':' means the key is in kernel keyring, short-circuit normal key processing */ |
2633 | if (key[0] == ':') { |
2634 | r = crypt_set_keyring_key(cc, key_string: key + 1); |
2635 | goto out; |
2636 | } |
2637 | |
2638 | /* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate previously valid key */ |
2639 | clear_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, addr: &cc->flags); |
2640 | |
2641 | /* wipe references to any kernel keyring key */ |
2642 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->key_string); |
2643 | cc->key_string = NULL; |
2644 | |
2645 | /* Decode key from its hex representation. */ |
2646 | if (cc->key_size && hex2bin(dst: cc->key, src: key, count: cc->key_size) < 0) |
2647 | goto out; |
2648 | |
2649 | r = crypt_setkey(cc); |
2650 | if (!r) |
2651 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, addr: &cc->flags); |
2652 | |
2653 | out: |
2654 | /* Hex key string not needed after here, so wipe it. */ |
2655 | memset(key, '0', key_string_len); |
2656 | |
2657 | return r; |
2658 | } |
2659 | |
2660 | static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc) |
2661 | { |
2662 | int r; |
2663 | |
2664 | clear_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, addr: &cc->flags); |
2665 | get_random_bytes(buf: &cc->key, len: cc->key_size); |
2666 | |
2667 | /* Wipe IV private keys */ |
2668 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) { |
2669 | r = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc); |
2670 | if (r) |
2671 | return r; |
2672 | } |
2673 | |
2674 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->key_string); |
2675 | cc->key_string = NULL; |
2676 | r = crypt_setkey(cc); |
2677 | memset(&cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8)); |
2678 | |
2679 | return r; |
2680 | } |
2681 | |
2682 | static void crypt_calculate_pages_per_client(void) |
2683 | { |
2684 | unsigned long pages = (totalram_pages() - totalhigh_pages()) * DM_CRYPT_MEMORY_PERCENT / 100; |
2685 | |
2686 | if (!dm_crypt_clients_n) |
2687 | return; |
2688 | |
2689 | pages /= dm_crypt_clients_n; |
2690 | if (pages < DM_CRYPT_MIN_PAGES_PER_CLIENT) |
2691 | pages = DM_CRYPT_MIN_PAGES_PER_CLIENT; |
2692 | dm_crypt_pages_per_client = pages; |
2693 | } |
2694 | |
2695 | static void *crypt_page_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask, void *pool_data) |
2696 | { |
2697 | struct crypt_config *cc = pool_data; |
2698 | struct page *page; |
2699 | |
2700 | /* |
2701 | * Note, percpu_counter_read_positive() may over (and under) estimate |
2702 | * the current usage by at most (batch - 1) * num_online_cpus() pages, |
2703 | * but avoids potential spinlock contention of an exact result. |
2704 | */ |
2705 | if (unlikely(percpu_counter_read_positive(&cc->n_allocated_pages) >= dm_crypt_pages_per_client) && |
2706 | likely(gfp_mask & __GFP_NORETRY)) |
2707 | return NULL; |
2708 | |
2709 | page = alloc_page(gfp_mask); |
2710 | if (likely(page != NULL)) |
2711 | percpu_counter_add(fbc: &cc->n_allocated_pages, amount: 1); |
2712 | |
2713 | return page; |
2714 | } |
2715 | |
2716 | static void crypt_page_free(void *page, void *pool_data) |
2717 | { |
2718 | struct crypt_config *cc = pool_data; |
2719 | |
2720 | __free_page(page); |
2721 | percpu_counter_sub(fbc: &cc->n_allocated_pages, amount: 1); |
2722 | } |
2723 | |
2724 | static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti) |
2725 | { |
2726 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
2727 | |
2728 | ti->private = NULL; |
2729 | |
2730 | if (!cc) |
2731 | return; |
2732 | |
2733 | if (cc->write_thread) |
2734 | kthread_stop(k: cc->write_thread); |
2735 | |
2736 | if (cc->io_queue) |
2737 | destroy_workqueue(wq: cc->io_queue); |
2738 | if (cc->crypt_queue) |
2739 | destroy_workqueue(wq: cc->crypt_queue); |
2740 | |
2741 | crypt_free_tfms(cc); |
2742 | |
2743 | bioset_exit(&cc->bs); |
2744 | |
2745 | mempool_exit(pool: &cc->page_pool); |
2746 | mempool_exit(pool: &cc->req_pool); |
2747 | mempool_exit(pool: &cc->tag_pool); |
2748 | |
2749 | WARN_ON(percpu_counter_sum(&cc->n_allocated_pages) != 0); |
2750 | percpu_counter_destroy(fbc: &cc->n_allocated_pages); |
2751 | |
2752 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr) |
2753 | cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr(cc); |
2754 | |
2755 | if (cc->dev) |
2756 | dm_put_device(ti, d: cc->dev); |
2757 | |
2758 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->cipher_string); |
2759 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->key_string); |
2760 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->cipher_auth); |
2761 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc->authenc_key); |
2762 | |
2763 | mutex_destroy(lock: &cc->bio_alloc_lock); |
2764 | |
2765 | /* Must zero key material before freeing */ |
2766 | kfree_sensitive(objp: cc); |
2767 | |
2768 | spin_lock(lock: &dm_crypt_clients_lock); |
2769 | WARN_ON(!dm_crypt_clients_n); |
2770 | dm_crypt_clients_n--; |
2771 | crypt_calculate_pages_per_client(); |
2772 | spin_unlock(lock: &dm_crypt_clients_lock); |
2773 | |
2774 | dm_audit_log_dtr(DM_MSG_PREFIX, ti, result: 1); |
2775 | } |
2776 | |
2777 | static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode) |
2778 | { |
2779 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
2780 | |
2781 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
2782 | cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm: any_tfm_aead(cc)); |
2783 | else |
2784 | cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm: any_tfm(cc)); |
2785 | |
2786 | if (cc->iv_size) |
2787 | /* at least a 64 bit sector number should fit in our buffer */ |
2788 | cc->iv_size = max(cc->iv_size, |
2789 | (unsigned int)(sizeof(u64) / sizeof(u8))); |
2790 | else if (ivmode) { |
2791 | DMWARN("Selected cipher does not support IVs" ); |
2792 | ivmode = NULL; |
2793 | } |
2794 | |
2795 | /* Choose ivmode, see comments at iv code. */ |
2796 | if (ivmode == NULL) |
2797 | cc->iv_gen_ops = NULL; |
2798 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain" ) == 0) |
2799 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain_ops; |
2800 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain64" ) == 0) |
2801 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain64_ops; |
2802 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain64be" ) == 0) |
2803 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain64be_ops; |
2804 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "essiv" ) == 0) |
2805 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_essiv_ops; |
2806 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "benbi" ) == 0) |
2807 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_benbi_ops; |
2808 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "null" ) == 0) |
2809 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops; |
2810 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "eboiv" ) == 0) |
2811 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_eboiv_ops; |
2812 | else if (strcmp(ivmode, "elephant" ) == 0) { |
2813 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_elephant_ops; |
2814 | cc->key_parts = 2; |
2815 | cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / 2; |
2816 | if (cc->key_extra_size > ELEPHANT_MAX_KEY_SIZE) |
2817 | return -EINVAL; |
2818 | set_bit(nr: CRYPT_ENCRYPT_PREPROCESS, addr: &cc->cipher_flags); |
2819 | } else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk" ) == 0) { |
2820 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops; |
2821 | /* |
2822 | * Version 2 and 3 is recognised according |
2823 | * to length of provided multi-key string. |
2824 | * If present (version 3), last key is used as IV seed. |
2825 | * All keys (including IV seed) are always the same size. |
2826 | */ |
2827 | if (cc->key_size % cc->key_parts) { |
2828 | cc->key_parts++; |
2829 | cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts; |
2830 | } |
2831 | } else if (strcmp(ivmode, "tcw" ) == 0) { |
2832 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_tcw_ops; |
2833 | cc->key_parts += 2; /* IV + whitening */ |
2834 | cc->key_extra_size = cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE; |
2835 | } else if (strcmp(ivmode, "random" ) == 0) { |
2836 | cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_random_ops; |
2837 | /* Need storage space in integrity fields. */ |
2838 | cc->integrity_iv_size = cc->iv_size; |
2839 | } else { |
2840 | ti->error = "Invalid IV mode" ; |
2841 | return -EINVAL; |
2842 | } |
2843 | |
2844 | return 0; |
2845 | } |
2846 | |
2847 | /* |
2848 | * Workaround to parse HMAC algorithm from AEAD crypto API spec. |
2849 | * The HMAC is needed to calculate tag size (HMAC digest size). |
2850 | * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...) |
2851 | */ |
2852 | static int crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *cipher_api) |
2853 | { |
2854 | char *start, *end, *mac_alg = NULL; |
2855 | struct crypto_ahash *mac; |
2856 | |
2857 | if (!strstarts(str: cipher_api, prefix: "authenc(" )) |
2858 | return 0; |
2859 | |
2860 | start = strchr(cipher_api, '('); |
2861 | end = strchr(cipher_api, ','); |
2862 | if (!start || !end || ++start > end) |
2863 | return -EINVAL; |
2864 | |
2865 | mac_alg = kmemdup_nul(s: start, len: end - start, GFP_KERNEL); |
2866 | if (!mac_alg) |
2867 | return -ENOMEM; |
2868 | |
2869 | mac = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_name: mac_alg, type: 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY); |
2870 | kfree(objp: mac_alg); |
2871 | |
2872 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: mac)) |
2873 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: mac); |
2874 | |
2875 | cc->key_mac_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm: mac); |
2876 | crypto_free_ahash(tfm: mac); |
2877 | |
2878 | cc->authenc_key = kmalloc(size: crypt_authenckey_size(cc), GFP_KERNEL); |
2879 | if (!cc->authenc_key) |
2880 | return -ENOMEM; |
2881 | |
2882 | return 0; |
2883 | } |
2884 | |
2885 | static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key, |
2886 | char **ivmode, char **ivopts) |
2887 | { |
2888 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
2889 | char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; |
2890 | int ret = -EINVAL; |
2891 | |
2892 | cc->tfms_count = 1; |
2893 | |
2894 | /* |
2895 | * New format (capi: prefix) |
2896 | * capi:cipher_api_spec-iv:ivopts |
2897 | */ |
2898 | tmp = &cipher_in[strlen("capi:" )]; |
2899 | |
2900 | /* Separate IV options if present, it can contain another '-' in hash name */ |
2901 | *ivopts = strrchr(tmp, ':'); |
2902 | if (*ivopts) { |
2903 | **ivopts = '\0'; |
2904 | (*ivopts)++; |
2905 | } |
2906 | /* Parse IV mode */ |
2907 | *ivmode = strrchr(tmp, '-'); |
2908 | if (*ivmode) { |
2909 | **ivmode = '\0'; |
2910 | (*ivmode)++; |
2911 | } |
2912 | /* The rest is crypto API spec */ |
2913 | cipher_api = tmp; |
2914 | |
2915 | /* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */ |
2916 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) { |
2917 | ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api); |
2918 | if (ret < 0) { |
2919 | ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec" ; |
2920 | return ret; |
2921 | } |
2922 | } |
2923 | |
2924 | if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk" )) |
2925 | cc->tfms_count = 64; |
2926 | |
2927 | if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv" )) { |
2928 | if (!*ivopts) { |
2929 | ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode" ; |
2930 | return -EINVAL; |
2931 | } |
2932 | ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, fmt: "essiv(%s,%s)" , |
2933 | cipher_api, *ivopts); |
2934 | if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) { |
2935 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string" ; |
2936 | return -ENOMEM; |
2937 | } |
2938 | cipher_api = buf; |
2939 | } |
2940 | |
2941 | cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count; |
2942 | |
2943 | /* Allocate cipher */ |
2944 | ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, ciphermode: cipher_api); |
2945 | if (ret < 0) { |
2946 | ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm" ; |
2947 | return ret; |
2948 | } |
2949 | |
2950 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
2951 | cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm: any_tfm_aead(cc)); |
2952 | else |
2953 | cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm: any_tfm(cc)); |
2954 | |
2955 | return 0; |
2956 | } |
2957 | |
2958 | static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key, |
2959 | char **ivmode, char **ivopts) |
2960 | { |
2961 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
2962 | char *tmp, *cipher, *chainmode, *keycount; |
2963 | char *cipher_api = NULL; |
2964 | int ret = -EINVAL; |
2965 | char dummy; |
2966 | |
2967 | if (strchr(cipher_in, '(') || crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) { |
2968 | ti->error = "Bad cipher specification" ; |
2969 | return -EINVAL; |
2970 | } |
2971 | |
2972 | /* |
2973 | * Legacy dm-crypt cipher specification |
2974 | * cipher[:keycount]-mode-iv:ivopts |
2975 | */ |
2976 | tmp = cipher_in; |
2977 | keycount = strsep(&tmp, "-" ); |
2978 | cipher = strsep(&keycount, ":" ); |
2979 | |
2980 | if (!keycount) |
2981 | cc->tfms_count = 1; |
2982 | else if (sscanf(keycount, "%u%c" , &cc->tfms_count, &dummy) != 1 || |
2983 | !is_power_of_2(n: cc->tfms_count)) { |
2984 | ti->error = "Bad cipher key count specification" ; |
2985 | return -EINVAL; |
2986 | } |
2987 | cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count; |
2988 | |
2989 | chainmode = strsep(&tmp, "-" ); |
2990 | *ivmode = strsep(&tmp, ":" ); |
2991 | *ivopts = tmp; |
2992 | |
2993 | /* |
2994 | * For compatibility with the original dm-crypt mapping format, if |
2995 | * only the cipher name is supplied, use cbc-plain. |
2996 | */ |
2997 | if (!chainmode || (!strcmp(chainmode, "plain" ) && !*ivmode)) { |
2998 | chainmode = "cbc" ; |
2999 | *ivmode = "plain" ; |
3000 | } |
3001 | |
3002 | if (strcmp(chainmode, "ecb" ) && !*ivmode) { |
3003 | ti->error = "IV mechanism required" ; |
3004 | return -EINVAL; |
3005 | } |
3006 | |
3007 | cipher_api = kmalloc(CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, GFP_KERNEL); |
3008 | if (!cipher_api) |
3009 | goto bad_mem; |
3010 | |
3011 | if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv" )) { |
3012 | if (!*ivopts) { |
3013 | ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode" ; |
3014 | kfree(objp: cipher_api); |
3015 | return -EINVAL; |
3016 | } |
3017 | ret = snprintf(buf: cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, |
3018 | fmt: "essiv(%s(%s),%s)" , chainmode, cipher, *ivopts); |
3019 | } else { |
3020 | ret = snprintf(buf: cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, |
3021 | fmt: "%s(%s)" , chainmode, cipher); |
3022 | } |
3023 | if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) { |
3024 | kfree(objp: cipher_api); |
3025 | goto bad_mem; |
3026 | } |
3027 | |
3028 | /* Allocate cipher */ |
3029 | ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, ciphermode: cipher_api); |
3030 | if (ret < 0) { |
3031 | ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm" ; |
3032 | kfree(objp: cipher_api); |
3033 | return ret; |
3034 | } |
3035 | kfree(objp: cipher_api); |
3036 | |
3037 | return 0; |
3038 | bad_mem: |
3039 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher strings" ; |
3040 | return -ENOMEM; |
3041 | } |
3042 | |
3043 | static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key) |
3044 | { |
3045 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3046 | char *ivmode = NULL, *ivopts = NULL; |
3047 | int ret; |
3048 | |
3049 | cc->cipher_string = kstrdup(s: cipher_in, GFP_KERNEL); |
3050 | if (!cc->cipher_string) { |
3051 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher strings" ; |
3052 | return -ENOMEM; |
3053 | } |
3054 | |
3055 | if (strstarts(str: cipher_in, prefix: "capi:" )) |
3056 | ret = crypt_ctr_cipher_new(ti, cipher_in, key, ivmode: &ivmode, ivopts: &ivopts); |
3057 | else |
3058 | ret = crypt_ctr_cipher_old(ti, cipher_in, key, ivmode: &ivmode, ivopts: &ivopts); |
3059 | if (ret) |
3060 | return ret; |
3061 | |
3062 | /* Initialize IV */ |
3063 | ret = crypt_ctr_ivmode(ti, ivmode); |
3064 | if (ret < 0) |
3065 | return ret; |
3066 | |
3067 | /* Initialize and set key */ |
3068 | ret = crypt_set_key(cc, key); |
3069 | if (ret < 0) { |
3070 | ti->error = "Error decoding and setting key" ; |
3071 | return ret; |
3072 | } |
3073 | |
3074 | /* Allocate IV */ |
3075 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr) { |
3076 | ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr(cc, ti, ivopts); |
3077 | if (ret < 0) { |
3078 | ti->error = "Error creating IV" ; |
3079 | return ret; |
3080 | } |
3081 | } |
3082 | |
3083 | /* Initialize IV (set keys for ESSIV etc) */ |
3084 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init) { |
3085 | ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc); |
3086 | if (ret < 0) { |
3087 | ti->error = "Error initialising IV" ; |
3088 | return ret; |
3089 | } |
3090 | } |
3091 | |
3092 | /* wipe the kernel key payload copy */ |
3093 | if (cc->key_string) |
3094 | memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8)); |
3095 | |
3096 | return ret; |
3097 | } |
3098 | |
3099 | static int crypt_ctr_optional(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) |
3100 | { |
3101 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3102 | struct dm_arg_set as; |
3103 | static const struct dm_arg _args[] = { |
3104 | {0, 8, "Invalid number of feature args" }, |
3105 | }; |
3106 | unsigned int opt_params, val; |
3107 | const char *opt_string, *sval; |
3108 | char dummy; |
3109 | int ret; |
3110 | |
3111 | /* Optional parameters */ |
3112 | as.argc = argc; |
3113 | as.argv = argv; |
3114 | |
3115 | ret = dm_read_arg_group(arg: _args, arg_set: &as, num_args: &opt_params, error: &ti->error); |
3116 | if (ret) |
3117 | return ret; |
3118 | |
3119 | while (opt_params--) { |
3120 | opt_string = dm_shift_arg(as: &as); |
3121 | if (!opt_string) { |
3122 | ti->error = "Not enough feature arguments" ; |
3123 | return -EINVAL; |
3124 | } |
3125 | |
3126 | if (!strcasecmp(s1: opt_string, s2: "allow_discards" )) |
3127 | ti->num_discard_bios = 1; |
3128 | |
3129 | else if (!strcasecmp(s1: opt_string, s2: "same_cpu_crypt" )) |
3130 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, addr: &cc->flags); |
3131 | |
3132 | else if (!strcasecmp(s1: opt_string, s2: "submit_from_crypt_cpus" )) |
3133 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, addr: &cc->flags); |
3134 | else if (!strcasecmp(s1: opt_string, s2: "no_read_workqueue" )) |
3135 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, addr: &cc->flags); |
3136 | else if (!strcasecmp(s1: opt_string, s2: "no_write_workqueue" )) |
3137 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, addr: &cc->flags); |
3138 | else if (sscanf(opt_string, "integrity:%u:" , &val) == 1) { |
3139 | if (val == 0 || val > MAX_TAG_SIZE) { |
3140 | ti->error = "Invalid integrity arguments" ; |
3141 | return -EINVAL; |
3142 | } |
3143 | cc->on_disk_tag_size = val; |
3144 | sval = strchr(opt_string + strlen("integrity:" ), ':') + 1; |
3145 | if (!strcasecmp(s1: sval, s2: "aead" )) { |
3146 | set_bit(nr: CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, addr: &cc->cipher_flags); |
3147 | } else if (strcasecmp(s1: sval, s2: "none" )) { |
3148 | ti->error = "Unknown integrity profile" ; |
3149 | return -EINVAL; |
3150 | } |
3151 | |
3152 | cc->cipher_auth = kstrdup(s: sval, GFP_KERNEL); |
3153 | if (!cc->cipher_auth) |
3154 | return -ENOMEM; |
3155 | } else if (sscanf(opt_string, "sector_size:%hu%c" , &cc->sector_size, &dummy) == 1) { |
3156 | if (cc->sector_size < (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) || |
3157 | cc->sector_size > 4096 || |
3158 | (cc->sector_size & (cc->sector_size - 1))) { |
3159 | ti->error = "Invalid feature value for sector_size" ; |
3160 | return -EINVAL; |
3161 | } |
3162 | if (ti->len & ((cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) { |
3163 | ti->error = "Device size is not multiple of sector_size feature" ; |
3164 | return -EINVAL; |
3165 | } |
3166 | cc->sector_shift = __ffs(cc->sector_size) - SECTOR_SHIFT; |
3167 | } else if (!strcasecmp(s1: opt_string, s2: "iv_large_sectors" )) |
3168 | set_bit(nr: CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, addr: &cc->cipher_flags); |
3169 | else { |
3170 | ti->error = "Invalid feature arguments" ; |
3171 | return -EINVAL; |
3172 | } |
3173 | } |
3174 | |
3175 | return 0; |
3176 | } |
3177 | |
3178 | #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED |
3179 | static int crypt_report_zones(struct dm_target *ti, |
3180 | struct dm_report_zones_args *args, unsigned int nr_zones) |
3181 | { |
3182 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3183 | |
3184 | return dm_report_zones(bdev: cc->dev->bdev, start: cc->start, |
3185 | sector: cc->start + dm_target_offset(ti, args->next_sector), |
3186 | args, nr_zones); |
3187 | } |
3188 | #else |
3189 | #define crypt_report_zones NULL |
3190 | #endif |
3191 | |
3192 | /* |
3193 | * Construct an encryption mapping: |
3194 | * <cipher> [<key>|:<key_size>:<user|logon>:<key_description>] <iv_offset> <dev_path> <start> |
3195 | */ |
3196 | static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) |
3197 | { |
3198 | struct crypt_config *cc; |
3199 | const char *devname = dm_table_device_name(t: ti->table); |
3200 | int key_size; |
3201 | unsigned int align_mask; |
3202 | unsigned long long tmpll; |
3203 | int ret; |
3204 | size_t iv_size_padding, additional_req_size; |
3205 | char dummy; |
3206 | |
3207 | if (argc < 5) { |
3208 | ti->error = "Not enough arguments" ; |
3209 | return -EINVAL; |
3210 | } |
3211 | |
3212 | key_size = get_key_size(key_string: &argv[1]); |
3213 | if (key_size < 0) { |
3214 | ti->error = "Cannot parse key size" ; |
3215 | return -EINVAL; |
3216 | } |
3217 | |
3218 | cc = kzalloc(struct_size(cc, key, key_size), GFP_KERNEL); |
3219 | if (!cc) { |
3220 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate encryption context" ; |
3221 | return -ENOMEM; |
3222 | } |
3223 | cc->key_size = key_size; |
3224 | cc->sector_size = (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT); |
3225 | cc->sector_shift = 0; |
3226 | |
3227 | ti->private = cc; |
3228 | |
3229 | spin_lock(lock: &dm_crypt_clients_lock); |
3230 | dm_crypt_clients_n++; |
3231 | crypt_calculate_pages_per_client(); |
3232 | spin_unlock(lock: &dm_crypt_clients_lock); |
3233 | |
3234 | ret = percpu_counter_init(&cc->n_allocated_pages, 0, GFP_KERNEL); |
3235 | if (ret < 0) |
3236 | goto bad; |
3237 | |
3238 | /* Optional parameters need to be read before cipher constructor */ |
3239 | if (argc > 5) { |
3240 | ret = crypt_ctr_optional(ti, argc: argc - 5, argv: &argv[5]); |
3241 | if (ret) |
3242 | goto bad; |
3243 | } |
3244 | |
3245 | ret = crypt_ctr_cipher(ti, cipher_in: argv[0], key: argv[1]); |
3246 | if (ret < 0) |
3247 | goto bad; |
3248 | |
3249 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) { |
3250 | cc->dmreq_start = sizeof(struct aead_request); |
3251 | cc->dmreq_start += crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm: any_tfm_aead(cc)); |
3252 | align_mask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm: any_tfm_aead(cc)); |
3253 | } else { |
3254 | cc->dmreq_start = sizeof(struct skcipher_request); |
3255 | cc->dmreq_start += crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm: any_tfm(cc)); |
3256 | align_mask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm: any_tfm(cc)); |
3257 | } |
3258 | cc->dmreq_start = ALIGN(cc->dmreq_start, __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request)); |
3259 | |
3260 | if (align_mask < CRYPTO_MINALIGN) { |
3261 | /* Allocate the padding exactly */ |
3262 | iv_size_padding = -(cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request)) |
3263 | & align_mask; |
3264 | } else { |
3265 | /* |
3266 | * If the cipher requires greater alignment than kmalloc |
3267 | * alignment, we don't know the exact position of the |
3268 | * initialization vector. We must assume worst case. |
3269 | */ |
3270 | iv_size_padding = align_mask; |
3271 | } |
3272 | |
3273 | /* ...| IV + padding | original IV | original sec. number | bio tag offset | */ |
3274 | additional_req_size = sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) + |
3275 | iv_size_padding + cc->iv_size + |
3276 | cc->iv_size + |
3277 | sizeof(uint64_t) + |
3278 | sizeof(unsigned int); |
3279 | |
3280 | ret = mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(pool: &cc->req_pool, MIN_IOS, size: cc->dmreq_start + additional_req_size); |
3281 | if (ret) { |
3282 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate crypt request mempool" ; |
3283 | goto bad; |
3284 | } |
3285 | |
3286 | cc->per_bio_data_size = ti->per_io_data_size = |
3287 | ALIGN(sizeof(struct dm_crypt_io) + cc->dmreq_start + additional_req_size, |
3288 | ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN); |
3289 | |
3290 | ret = mempool_init(pool: &cc->page_pool, BIO_MAX_VECS, alloc_fn: crypt_page_alloc, free_fn: crypt_page_free, pool_data: cc); |
3291 | if (ret) { |
3292 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate page mempool" ; |
3293 | goto bad; |
3294 | } |
3295 | |
3296 | ret = bioset_init(&cc->bs, MIN_IOS, 0, flags: BIOSET_NEED_BVECS); |
3297 | if (ret) { |
3298 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate crypt bioset" ; |
3299 | goto bad; |
3300 | } |
3301 | |
3302 | mutex_init(&cc->bio_alloc_lock); |
3303 | |
3304 | ret = -EINVAL; |
3305 | if ((sscanf(argv[2], "%llu%c" , &tmpll, &dummy) != 1) || |
3306 | (tmpll & ((cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))) { |
3307 | ti->error = "Invalid iv_offset sector" ; |
3308 | goto bad; |
3309 | } |
3310 | cc->iv_offset = tmpll; |
3311 | |
3312 | ret = dm_get_device(ti, path: argv[3], mode: dm_table_get_mode(t: ti->table), result: &cc->dev); |
3313 | if (ret) { |
3314 | ti->error = "Device lookup failed" ; |
3315 | goto bad; |
3316 | } |
3317 | |
3318 | ret = -EINVAL; |
3319 | if (sscanf(argv[4], "%llu%c" , &tmpll, &dummy) != 1 || tmpll != (sector_t)tmpll) { |
3320 | ti->error = "Invalid device sector" ; |
3321 | goto bad; |
3322 | } |
3323 | cc->start = tmpll; |
3324 | |
3325 | if (bdev_is_zoned(bdev: cc->dev->bdev)) { |
3326 | /* |
3327 | * For zoned block devices, we need to preserve the issuer write |
3328 | * ordering. To do so, disable write workqueues and force inline |
3329 | * encryption completion. |
3330 | */ |
3331 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, addr: &cc->flags); |
3332 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_WRITE_INLINE, addr: &cc->flags); |
3333 | |
3334 | /* |
3335 | * All zone append writes to a zone of a zoned block device will |
3336 | * have the same BIO sector, the start of the zone. When the |
3337 | * cypher IV mode uses sector values, all data targeting a |
3338 | * zone will be encrypted using the first sector numbers of the |
3339 | * zone. This will not result in write errors but will |
3340 | * cause most reads to fail as reads will use the sector values |
3341 | * for the actual data locations, resulting in IV mismatch. |
3342 | * To avoid this problem, ask DM core to emulate zone append |
3343 | * operations with regular writes. |
3344 | */ |
3345 | DMDEBUG("Zone append operations will be emulated" ); |
3346 | ti->emulate_zone_append = true; |
3347 | } |
3348 | |
3349 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc) || cc->integrity_iv_size) { |
3350 | ret = crypt_integrity_ctr(cc, ti); |
3351 | if (ret) |
3352 | goto bad; |
3353 | |
3354 | cc->tag_pool_max_sectors = POOL_ENTRY_SIZE / cc->on_disk_tag_size; |
3355 | if (!cc->tag_pool_max_sectors) |
3356 | cc->tag_pool_max_sectors = 1; |
3357 | |
3358 | ret = mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(pool: &cc->tag_pool, MIN_IOS, |
3359 | size: cc->tag_pool_max_sectors * cc->on_disk_tag_size); |
3360 | if (ret) { |
3361 | ti->error = "Cannot allocate integrity tags mempool" ; |
3362 | goto bad; |
3363 | } |
3364 | |
3365 | cc->tag_pool_max_sectors <<= cc->sector_shift; |
3366 | } |
3367 | |
3368 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
3369 | cc->io_queue = alloc_workqueue(fmt: "kcryptd_io/%s" , flags: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, max_active: 1, devname); |
3370 | if (!cc->io_queue) { |
3371 | ti->error = "Couldn't create kcryptd io queue" ; |
3372 | goto bad; |
3373 | } |
3374 | |
3375 | if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags)) |
3376 | cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue(fmt: "kcryptd/%s" , flags: WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, |
3377 | max_active: 1, devname); |
3378 | else |
3379 | cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue(fmt: "kcryptd/%s" , |
3380 | flags: WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, |
3381 | max_active: num_online_cpus(), devname); |
3382 | if (!cc->crypt_queue) { |
3383 | ti->error = "Couldn't create kcryptd queue" ; |
3384 | goto bad; |
3385 | } |
3386 | |
3387 | spin_lock_init(&cc->write_thread_lock); |
3388 | cc->write_tree = RB_ROOT; |
3389 | |
3390 | cc->write_thread = kthread_run(dmcrypt_write, cc, "dmcrypt_write/%s" , devname); |
3391 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: cc->write_thread)) { |
3392 | ret = PTR_ERR(ptr: cc->write_thread); |
3393 | cc->write_thread = NULL; |
3394 | ti->error = "Couldn't spawn write thread" ; |
3395 | goto bad; |
3396 | } |
3397 | |
3398 | ti->num_flush_bios = 1; |
3399 | ti->limit_swap_bios = true; |
3400 | ti->accounts_remapped_io = true; |
3401 | |
3402 | dm_audit_log_ctr(DM_MSG_PREFIX, ti, result: 1); |
3403 | return 0; |
3404 | |
3405 | bad: |
3406 | dm_audit_log_ctr(DM_MSG_PREFIX, ti, result: 0); |
3407 | crypt_dtr(ti); |
3408 | return ret; |
3409 | } |
3410 | |
3411 | static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio) |
3412 | { |
3413 | struct dm_crypt_io *io; |
3414 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3415 | |
3416 | /* |
3417 | * If bio is REQ_PREFLUSH or REQ_OP_DISCARD, just bypass crypt queues. |
3418 | * - for REQ_PREFLUSH device-mapper core ensures that no IO is in-flight |
3419 | * - for REQ_OP_DISCARD caller must use flush if IO ordering matters |
3420 | */ |
3421 | if (unlikely(bio->bi_opf & REQ_PREFLUSH || |
3422 | bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD)) { |
3423 | bio_set_dev(bio, bdev: cc->dev->bdev); |
3424 | if (bio_sectors(bio)) |
3425 | bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = cc->start + |
3426 | dm_target_offset(ti, bio->bi_iter.bi_sector); |
3427 | return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED; |
3428 | } |
3429 | |
3430 | /* |
3431 | * Check if bio is too large, split as needed. |
3432 | */ |
3433 | if (unlikely(bio->bi_iter.bi_size > (BIO_MAX_VECS << PAGE_SHIFT)) && |
3434 | (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE || cc->on_disk_tag_size)) |
3435 | dm_accept_partial_bio(bio, n_sectors: ((BIO_MAX_VECS << PAGE_SHIFT) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)); |
3436 | |
3437 | /* |
3438 | * Ensure that bio is a multiple of internal sector encryption size |
3439 | * and is aligned to this size as defined in IO hints. |
3440 | */ |
3441 | if (unlikely((bio->bi_iter.bi_sector & ((cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) != 0)) |
3442 | return DM_MAPIO_KILL; |
3443 | |
3444 | if (unlikely(bio->bi_iter.bi_size & (cc->sector_size - 1))) |
3445 | return DM_MAPIO_KILL; |
3446 | |
3447 | io = dm_per_bio_data(bio, data_size: cc->per_bio_data_size); |
3448 | crypt_io_init(io, cc, bio, dm_target_offset(ti, bio->bi_iter.bi_sector)); |
3449 | |
3450 | if (cc->on_disk_tag_size) { |
3451 | unsigned int tag_len = cc->on_disk_tag_size * (bio_sectors(bio) >> cc->sector_shift); |
3452 | |
3453 | if (unlikely(tag_len > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)) |
3454 | io->integrity_metadata = NULL; |
3455 | else |
3456 | io->integrity_metadata = kmalloc(size: tag_len, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN); |
3457 | |
3458 | if (unlikely(!io->integrity_metadata)) { |
3459 | if (bio_sectors(bio) > cc->tag_pool_max_sectors) |
3460 | dm_accept_partial_bio(bio, n_sectors: cc->tag_pool_max_sectors); |
3461 | io->integrity_metadata = mempool_alloc(pool: &cc->tag_pool, GFP_NOIO); |
3462 | io->integrity_metadata_from_pool = true; |
3463 | } |
3464 | } |
3465 | |
3466 | if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) |
3467 | io->ctx.r.req_aead = (struct aead_request *)(io + 1); |
3468 | else |
3469 | io->ctx.r.req = (struct skcipher_request *)(io + 1); |
3470 | |
3471 | if (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ) { |
3472 | if (kcryptd_io_read(io, CRYPT_MAP_READ_GFP)) |
3473 | kcryptd_queue_read(io); |
3474 | } else |
3475 | kcryptd_queue_crypt(io); |
3476 | |
3477 | return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED; |
3478 | } |
3479 | |
3480 | static char hex2asc(unsigned char c) |
3481 | { |
3482 | return c + '0' + ((unsigned int)(9 - c) >> 4 & 0x27); |
3483 | } |
3484 | |
3485 | static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type, |
3486 | unsigned int status_flags, char *result, unsigned int maxlen) |
3487 | { |
3488 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3489 | unsigned int i, sz = 0; |
3490 | int num_feature_args = 0; |
3491 | |
3492 | switch (type) { |
3493 | case STATUSTYPE_INFO: |
3494 | result[0] = '\0'; |
3495 | break; |
3496 | |
3497 | case STATUSTYPE_TABLE: |
3498 | DMEMIT("%s " , cc->cipher_string); |
3499 | |
3500 | if (cc->key_size > 0) { |
3501 | if (cc->key_string) |
3502 | DMEMIT(":%u:%s" , cc->key_size, cc->key_string); |
3503 | else { |
3504 | for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++) { |
3505 | DMEMIT("%c%c" , hex2asc(cc->key[i] >> 4), |
3506 | hex2asc(cc->key[i] & 0xf)); |
3507 | } |
3508 | } |
3509 | } else |
3510 | DMEMIT("-" ); |
3511 | |
3512 | DMEMIT(" %llu %s %llu" , (unsigned long long)cc->iv_offset, |
3513 | cc->dev->name, (unsigned long long)cc->start); |
3514 | |
3515 | num_feature_args += !!ti->num_discard_bios; |
3516 | num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags); |
3517 | num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags); |
3518 | num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags); |
3519 | num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags); |
3520 | num_feature_args += cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT); |
3521 | num_feature_args += test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags); |
3522 | if (cc->on_disk_tag_size) |
3523 | num_feature_args++; |
3524 | if (num_feature_args) { |
3525 | DMEMIT(" %d" , num_feature_args); |
3526 | if (ti->num_discard_bios) |
3527 | DMEMIT(" allow_discards" ); |
3528 | if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags)) |
3529 | DMEMIT(" same_cpu_crypt" ); |
3530 | if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags)) |
3531 | DMEMIT(" submit_from_crypt_cpus" ); |
3532 | if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags)) |
3533 | DMEMIT(" no_read_workqueue" ); |
3534 | if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags)) |
3535 | DMEMIT(" no_write_workqueue" ); |
3536 | if (cc->on_disk_tag_size) |
3537 | DMEMIT(" integrity:%u:%s" , cc->on_disk_tag_size, cc->cipher_auth); |
3538 | if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) |
3539 | DMEMIT(" sector_size:%d" , cc->sector_size); |
3540 | if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags)) |
3541 | DMEMIT(" iv_large_sectors" ); |
3542 | } |
3543 | break; |
3544 | |
3545 | case STATUSTYPE_IMA: |
3546 | DMEMIT_TARGET_NAME_VERSION(ti->type); |
3547 | DMEMIT(",allow_discards=%c" , ti->num_discard_bios ? 'y' : 'n'); |
3548 | DMEMIT(",same_cpu_crypt=%c" , test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags) ? 'y' : 'n'); |
3549 | DMEMIT(",submit_from_crypt_cpus=%c" , test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags) ? |
3550 | 'y' : 'n'); |
3551 | DMEMIT(",no_read_workqueue=%c" , test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags) ? |
3552 | 'y' : 'n'); |
3553 | DMEMIT(",no_write_workqueue=%c" , test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags) ? |
3554 | 'y' : 'n'); |
3555 | DMEMIT(",iv_large_sectors=%c" , test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags) ? |
3556 | 'y' : 'n'); |
3557 | |
3558 | if (cc->on_disk_tag_size) |
3559 | DMEMIT(",integrity_tag_size=%u,cipher_auth=%s" , |
3560 | cc->on_disk_tag_size, cc->cipher_auth); |
3561 | if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) |
3562 | DMEMIT(",sector_size=%d" , cc->sector_size); |
3563 | if (cc->cipher_string) |
3564 | DMEMIT(",cipher_string=%s" , cc->cipher_string); |
3565 | |
3566 | DMEMIT(",key_size=%u" , cc->key_size); |
3567 | DMEMIT(",key_parts=%u" , cc->key_parts); |
3568 | DMEMIT(",key_extra_size=%u" , cc->key_extra_size); |
3569 | DMEMIT(",key_mac_size=%u" , cc->key_mac_size); |
3570 | DMEMIT(";" ); |
3571 | break; |
3572 | } |
3573 | } |
3574 | |
3575 | static void crypt_postsuspend(struct dm_target *ti) |
3576 | { |
3577 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3578 | |
3579 | set_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, addr: &cc->flags); |
3580 | } |
3581 | |
3582 | static int crypt_preresume(struct dm_target *ti) |
3583 | { |
3584 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3585 | |
3586 | if (!test_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags)) { |
3587 | DMERR("aborting resume - crypt key is not set." ); |
3588 | return -EAGAIN; |
3589 | } |
3590 | |
3591 | return 0; |
3592 | } |
3593 | |
3594 | static void crypt_resume(struct dm_target *ti) |
3595 | { |
3596 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3597 | |
3598 | clear_bit(nr: DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, addr: &cc->flags); |
3599 | } |
3600 | |
3601 | /* Message interface |
3602 | * key set <key> |
3603 | * key wipe |
3604 | */ |
3605 | static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv, |
3606 | char *result, unsigned int maxlen) |
3607 | { |
3608 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3609 | int key_size, ret = -EINVAL; |
3610 | |
3611 | if (argc < 2) |
3612 | goto error; |
3613 | |
3614 | if (!strcasecmp(s1: argv[0], s2: "key" )) { |
3615 | if (!test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, &cc->flags)) { |
3616 | DMWARN("not suspended during key manipulation." ); |
3617 | return -EINVAL; |
3618 | } |
3619 | if (argc == 3 && !strcasecmp(s1: argv[1], s2: "set" )) { |
3620 | /* The key size may not be changed. */ |
3621 | key_size = get_key_size(key_string: &argv[2]); |
3622 | if (key_size < 0 || cc->key_size != key_size) { |
3623 | memset(argv[2], '0', strlen(argv[2])); |
3624 | return -EINVAL; |
3625 | } |
3626 | |
3627 | ret = crypt_set_key(cc, key: argv[2]); |
3628 | if (ret) |
3629 | return ret; |
3630 | if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init) |
3631 | ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc); |
3632 | /* wipe the kernel key payload copy */ |
3633 | if (cc->key_string) |
3634 | memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8)); |
3635 | return ret; |
3636 | } |
3637 | if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(s1: argv[1], s2: "wipe" )) |
3638 | return crypt_wipe_key(cc); |
3639 | } |
3640 | |
3641 | error: |
3642 | DMWARN("unrecognised message received." ); |
3643 | return -EINVAL; |
3644 | } |
3645 | |
3646 | static int crypt_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti, |
3647 | iterate_devices_callout_fn fn, void *data) |
3648 | { |
3649 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3650 | |
3651 | return fn(ti, cc->dev, cc->start, ti->len, data); |
3652 | } |
3653 | |
3654 | static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits) |
3655 | { |
3656 | struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; |
3657 | |
3658 | /* |
3659 | * Unfortunate constraint that is required to avoid the potential |
3660 | * for exceeding underlying device's max_segments limits -- due to |
3661 | * crypt_alloc_buffer() possibly allocating pages for the encryption |
3662 | * bio that are not as physically contiguous as the original bio. |
3663 | */ |
3664 | limits->max_segment_size = PAGE_SIZE; |
3665 | |
3666 | limits->logical_block_size = |
3667 | max_t(unsigned int, limits->logical_block_size, cc->sector_size); |
3668 | limits->physical_block_size = |
3669 | max_t(unsigned int, limits->physical_block_size, cc->sector_size); |
3670 | limits->io_min = max_t(unsigned int, limits->io_min, cc->sector_size); |
3671 | limits->dma_alignment = limits->logical_block_size - 1; |
3672 | } |
3673 | |
3674 | static struct target_type crypt_target = { |
3675 | .name = "crypt" , |
3676 | .version = {1, 24, 0}, |
3677 | .module = THIS_MODULE, |
3678 | .ctr = crypt_ctr, |
3679 | .dtr = crypt_dtr, |
3680 | .features = DM_TARGET_ZONED_HM, |
3681 | .report_zones = crypt_report_zones, |
3682 | .map = crypt_map, |
3683 | .status = crypt_status, |
3684 | .postsuspend = crypt_postsuspend, |
3685 | .preresume = crypt_preresume, |
3686 | .resume = crypt_resume, |
3687 | .message = crypt_message, |
3688 | .iterate_devices = crypt_iterate_devices, |
3689 | .io_hints = crypt_io_hints, |
3690 | }; |
3691 | module_dm(crypt); |
3692 | |
3693 | MODULE_AUTHOR("Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>" ); |
3694 | MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DM_NAME " target for transparent encryption / decryption" ); |
3695 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL" ); |
3696 | |