1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
2 | /* |
3 | * linux/kernel/sys.c |
4 | * |
5 | * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds |
6 | */ |
7 | |
8 | #include <linux/export.h> |
9 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
10 | #include <linux/mm_inline.h> |
11 | #include <linux/utsname.h> |
12 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
13 | #include <linux/reboot.h> |
14 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
15 | #include <linux/highuid.h> |
16 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
17 | #include <linux/kmod.h> |
18 | #include <linux/ksm.h> |
19 | #include <linux/perf_event.h> |
20 | #include <linux/resource.h> |
21 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
22 | #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
23 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
24 | #include <linux/device.h> |
25 | #include <linux/key.h> |
26 | #include <linux/times.h> |
27 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
28 | #include <linux/security.h> |
29 | #include <linux/random.h> |
30 | #include <linux/suspend.h> |
31 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
32 | #include <linux/signal.h> |
33 | #include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
34 | #include <linux/getcpu.h> |
35 | #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
36 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
37 | #include <linux/cpu.h> |
38 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
39 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
40 | #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
41 | #include <linux/file.h> |
42 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
43 | #include <linux/gfp.h> |
44 | #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
45 | #include <linux/version.h> |
46 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
47 | #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h> |
48 | |
49 | #include <linux/compat.h> |
50 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
51 | #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
52 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
53 | #include <linux/time_namespace.h> |
54 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
55 | |
56 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
57 | #include <linux/sched/autogroup.h> |
58 | #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> |
59 | #include <linux/sched/stat.h> |
60 | #include <linux/sched/mm.h> |
61 | #include <linux/sched/coredump.h> |
62 | #include <linux/sched/task.h> |
63 | #include <linux/sched/cputime.h> |
64 | #include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
65 | #include <linux/uidgid.h> |
66 | #include <linux/cred.h> |
67 | |
68 | #include <linux/nospec.h> |
69 | |
70 | #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
71 | /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ |
72 | #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
73 | |
74 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
75 | #include <asm/io.h> |
76 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
77 | |
78 | #include "uid16.h" |
79 | |
80 | #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
81 | # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
82 | #endif |
83 | #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
84 | # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
85 | #endif |
86 | #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
87 | # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
88 | #endif |
89 | #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
90 | # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
91 | #endif |
92 | #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
93 | # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
94 | #endif |
95 | #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
96 | # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
97 | #endif |
98 | #ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
99 | # define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
100 | #endif |
101 | #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
102 | # define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
103 | #endif |
104 | #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL |
105 | # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
106 | #endif |
107 | #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL |
108 | # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
109 | #endif |
110 | #ifndef GET_FP_MODE |
111 | # define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL) |
112 | #endif |
113 | #ifndef SET_FP_MODE |
114 | # define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
115 | #endif |
116 | #ifndef SVE_SET_VL |
117 | # define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) |
118 | #endif |
119 | #ifndef SVE_GET_VL |
120 | # define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) |
121 | #endif |
122 | #ifndef SME_SET_VL |
123 | # define SME_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL) |
124 | #endif |
125 | #ifndef SME_GET_VL |
126 | # define SME_GET_VL() (-EINVAL) |
127 | #endif |
128 | #ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS |
129 | # define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL) |
130 | #endif |
131 | #ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS |
132 | # define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c) (-EINVAL) |
133 | #endif |
134 | #ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS |
135 | # define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a) (-EINVAL) |
136 | #endif |
137 | #ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL |
138 | # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL) |
139 | #endif |
140 | #ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL |
141 | # define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL) |
142 | #endif |
143 | #ifndef RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL |
144 | # define RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL(a) (-EINVAL) |
145 | #endif |
146 | #ifndef RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL |
147 | # define RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL() (-EINVAL) |
148 | #endif |
149 | |
150 | /* |
151 | * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for |
152 | * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past |
153 | */ |
154 | |
155 | int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; |
156 | int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
157 | |
158 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); |
159 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
160 | |
161 | /* |
162 | * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit |
163 | * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures |
164 | */ |
165 | |
166 | int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
167 | int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID; |
168 | |
169 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); |
170 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); |
171 | |
172 | /* |
173 | * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, |
174 | * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. |
175 | * |
176 | * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe |
177 | */ |
178 | static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) |
179 | { |
180 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
181 | |
182 | if (uid_eq(left: pcred->uid, right: cred->euid) || |
183 | uid_eq(left: pcred->euid, right: cred->euid)) |
184 | return true; |
185 | if (ns_capable(ns: pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
186 | return true; |
187 | return false; |
188 | } |
189 | |
190 | /* |
191 | * set the priority of a task |
192 | * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock |
193 | */ |
194 | static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) |
195 | { |
196 | int no_nice; |
197 | |
198 | if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
199 | error = -EPERM; |
200 | goto out; |
201 | } |
202 | if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, nice: niceval)) { |
203 | error = -EACCES; |
204 | goto out; |
205 | } |
206 | no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, nice: niceval); |
207 | if (no_nice) { |
208 | error = no_nice; |
209 | goto out; |
210 | } |
211 | if (error == -ESRCH) |
212 | error = 0; |
213 | set_user_nice(p, nice: niceval); |
214 | out: |
215 | return error; |
216 | } |
217 | |
218 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
219 | { |
220 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
221 | struct user_struct *user; |
222 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
223 | int error = -EINVAL; |
224 | struct pid *pgrp; |
225 | kuid_t uid; |
226 | |
227 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
228 | goto out; |
229 | |
230 | /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ |
231 | error = -ESRCH; |
232 | if (niceval < MIN_NICE) |
233 | niceval = MIN_NICE; |
234 | if (niceval > MAX_NICE) |
235 | niceval = MAX_NICE; |
236 | |
237 | rcu_read_lock(); |
238 | switch (which) { |
239 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
240 | if (who) |
241 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: who); |
242 | else |
243 | p = current; |
244 | if (p) |
245 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
246 | break; |
247 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
248 | if (who) |
249 | pgrp = find_vpid(nr: who); |
250 | else |
251 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
252 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
253 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
254 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
255 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
256 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
257 | break; |
258 | case PRIO_USER: |
259 | uid = make_kuid(from: cred->user_ns, uid: who); |
260 | user = cred->user; |
261 | if (!who) |
262 | uid = cred->uid; |
263 | else if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) { |
264 | user = find_user(uid); |
265 | if (!user) |
266 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
267 | } |
268 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) { |
269 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), right: uid) && task_pid_vnr(tsk: p)) |
270 | error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
271 | } |
272 | if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) |
273 | free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ |
274 | break; |
275 | } |
276 | out_unlock: |
277 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
278 | out: |
279 | return error; |
280 | } |
281 | |
282 | /* |
283 | * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will |
284 | * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that |
285 | * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) |
286 | * to stay compatible. |
287 | */ |
288 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
289 | { |
290 | struct task_struct *g, *p; |
291 | struct user_struct *user; |
292 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
293 | long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
294 | struct pid *pgrp; |
295 | kuid_t uid; |
296 | |
297 | if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
298 | return -EINVAL; |
299 | |
300 | rcu_read_lock(); |
301 | switch (which) { |
302 | case PRIO_PROCESS: |
303 | if (who) |
304 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: who); |
305 | else |
306 | p = current; |
307 | if (p) { |
308 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(nice: task_nice(p)); |
309 | if (niceval > retval) |
310 | retval = niceval; |
311 | } |
312 | break; |
313 | case PRIO_PGRP: |
314 | if (who) |
315 | pgrp = find_vpid(nr: who); |
316 | else |
317 | pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
318 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
319 | do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
320 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(nice: task_nice(p)); |
321 | if (niceval > retval) |
322 | retval = niceval; |
323 | } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
324 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
325 | break; |
326 | case PRIO_USER: |
327 | uid = make_kuid(from: cred->user_ns, uid: who); |
328 | user = cred->user; |
329 | if (!who) |
330 | uid = cred->uid; |
331 | else if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) { |
332 | user = find_user(uid); |
333 | if (!user) |
334 | goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
335 | } |
336 | for_each_process_thread(g, p) { |
337 | if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), right: uid) && task_pid_vnr(tsk: p)) { |
338 | niceval = nice_to_rlimit(nice: task_nice(p)); |
339 | if (niceval > retval) |
340 | retval = niceval; |
341 | } |
342 | } |
343 | if (!uid_eq(left: uid, right: cred->uid)) |
344 | free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ |
345 | break; |
346 | } |
347 | out_unlock: |
348 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
349 | |
350 | return retval; |
351 | } |
352 | |
353 | /* |
354 | * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid |
355 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
356 | * |
357 | * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not |
358 | * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. |
359 | * |
360 | * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its |
361 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
362 | * a security audit over a program. |
363 | * |
364 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be |
365 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
366 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
367 | * |
368 | * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem |
369 | * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). |
370 | */ |
371 | #ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER |
372 | long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) |
373 | { |
374 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
375 | const struct cred *old; |
376 | struct cred *new; |
377 | int retval; |
378 | kgid_t krgid, kegid; |
379 | |
380 | krgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: rgid); |
381 | kegid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: egid); |
382 | |
383 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: krgid)) |
384 | return -EINVAL; |
385 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: kegid)) |
386 | return -EINVAL; |
387 | |
388 | new = prepare_creds(); |
389 | if (!new) |
390 | return -ENOMEM; |
391 | old = current_cred(); |
392 | |
393 | retval = -EPERM; |
394 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
395 | if (gid_eq(left: old->gid, right: krgid) || |
396 | gid_eq(left: old->egid, right: krgid) || |
397 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
398 | new->gid = krgid; |
399 | else |
400 | goto error; |
401 | } |
402 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
403 | if (gid_eq(left: old->gid, right: kegid) || |
404 | gid_eq(left: old->egid, right: kegid) || |
405 | gid_eq(left: old->sgid, right: kegid) || |
406 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
407 | new->egid = kegid; |
408 | else |
409 | goto error; |
410 | } |
411 | |
412 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
413 | (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->gid))) |
414 | new->sgid = new->egid; |
415 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
416 | |
417 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
418 | if (retval < 0) |
419 | goto error; |
420 | |
421 | return commit_creds(new); |
422 | |
423 | error: |
424 | abort_creds(new); |
425 | return retval; |
426 | } |
427 | |
428 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
429 | { |
430 | return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid); |
431 | } |
432 | |
433 | /* |
434 | * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
435 | * |
436 | * SMP: Same implicit races as above. |
437 | */ |
438 | long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid) |
439 | { |
440 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
441 | const struct cred *old; |
442 | struct cred *new; |
443 | int retval; |
444 | kgid_t kgid; |
445 | |
446 | kgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid); |
447 | if (!gid_valid(gid: kgid)) |
448 | return -EINVAL; |
449 | |
450 | new = prepare_creds(); |
451 | if (!new) |
452 | return -ENOMEM; |
453 | old = current_cred(); |
454 | |
455 | retval = -EPERM; |
456 | if (ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
457 | new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
458 | else if (gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->gid) || gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->sgid)) |
459 | new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
460 | else |
461 | goto error; |
462 | |
463 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
464 | if (retval < 0) |
465 | goto error; |
466 | |
467 | return commit_creds(new); |
468 | |
469 | error: |
470 | abort_creds(new); |
471 | return retval; |
472 | } |
473 | |
474 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
475 | { |
476 | return __sys_setgid(gid); |
477 | } |
478 | |
479 | /* |
480 | * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID |
481 | */ |
482 | static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
483 | { |
484 | struct user_struct *new_user; |
485 | |
486 | new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
487 | if (!new_user) |
488 | return -EAGAIN; |
489 | |
490 | free_uid(new->user); |
491 | new->user = new_user; |
492 | return 0; |
493 | } |
494 | |
495 | static void flag_nproc_exceeded(struct cred *new) |
496 | { |
497 | if (new->ucounts == current_ucounts()) |
498 | return; |
499 | |
500 | /* |
501 | * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many |
502 | * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming |
503 | * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit |
504 | * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the |
505 | * failure to the execve() stage. |
506 | */ |
507 | if (is_rlimit_overlimit(ucounts: new->ucounts, type: UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, max: rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) && |
508 | new->user != INIT_USER) |
509 | current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
510 | else |
511 | current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
512 | } |
513 | |
514 | /* |
515 | * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid |
516 | * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
517 | * |
518 | * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not |
519 | * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. |
520 | * |
521 | * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its |
522 | * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
523 | * a security audit over a program. |
524 | * |
525 | * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be |
526 | * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
527 | * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
528 | */ |
529 | long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) |
530 | { |
531 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
532 | const struct cred *old; |
533 | struct cred *new; |
534 | int retval; |
535 | kuid_t kruid, keuid; |
536 | |
537 | kruid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: ruid); |
538 | keuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: euid); |
539 | |
540 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: kruid)) |
541 | return -EINVAL; |
542 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: keuid)) |
543 | return -EINVAL; |
544 | |
545 | new = prepare_creds(); |
546 | if (!new) |
547 | return -ENOMEM; |
548 | old = current_cred(); |
549 | |
550 | retval = -EPERM; |
551 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
552 | new->uid = kruid; |
553 | if (!uid_eq(left: old->uid, right: kruid) && |
554 | !uid_eq(left: old->euid, right: kruid) && |
555 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
556 | goto error; |
557 | } |
558 | |
559 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
560 | new->euid = keuid; |
561 | if (!uid_eq(left: old->uid, right: keuid) && |
562 | !uid_eq(left: old->euid, right: keuid) && |
563 | !uid_eq(left: old->suid, right: keuid) && |
564 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
565 | goto error; |
566 | } |
567 | |
568 | if (!uid_eq(left: new->uid, right: old->uid)) { |
569 | retval = set_user(new); |
570 | if (retval < 0) |
571 | goto error; |
572 | } |
573 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
574 | (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->uid))) |
575 | new->suid = new->euid; |
576 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
577 | |
578 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
579 | if (retval < 0) |
580 | goto error; |
581 | |
582 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
583 | if (retval < 0) |
584 | goto error; |
585 | |
586 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new); |
587 | return commit_creds(new); |
588 | |
589 | error: |
590 | abort_creds(new); |
591 | return retval; |
592 | } |
593 | |
594 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
595 | { |
596 | return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid); |
597 | } |
598 | |
599 | /* |
600 | * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS |
601 | * |
602 | * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
603 | * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
604 | * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets |
605 | * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people |
606 | * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() |
607 | * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
608 | * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
609 | */ |
610 | long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid) |
611 | { |
612 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
613 | const struct cred *old; |
614 | struct cred *new; |
615 | int retval; |
616 | kuid_t kuid; |
617 | |
618 | kuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid); |
619 | if (!uid_valid(uid: kuid)) |
620 | return -EINVAL; |
621 | |
622 | new = prepare_creds(); |
623 | if (!new) |
624 | return -ENOMEM; |
625 | old = current_cred(); |
626 | |
627 | retval = -EPERM; |
628 | if (ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
629 | new->suid = new->uid = kuid; |
630 | if (!uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->uid)) { |
631 | retval = set_user(new); |
632 | if (retval < 0) |
633 | goto error; |
634 | } |
635 | } else if (!uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->uid) && !uid_eq(left: kuid, right: new->suid)) { |
636 | goto error; |
637 | } |
638 | |
639 | new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
640 | |
641 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
642 | if (retval < 0) |
643 | goto error; |
644 | |
645 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
646 | if (retval < 0) |
647 | goto error; |
648 | |
649 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new); |
650 | return commit_creds(new); |
651 | |
652 | error: |
653 | abort_creds(new); |
654 | return retval; |
655 | } |
656 | |
657 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
658 | { |
659 | return __sys_setuid(uid); |
660 | } |
661 | |
662 | |
663 | /* |
664 | * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, |
665 | * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). |
666 | */ |
667 | long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) |
668 | { |
669 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
670 | const struct cred *old; |
671 | struct cred *new; |
672 | int retval; |
673 | kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; |
674 | bool ruid_new, euid_new, suid_new; |
675 | |
676 | kruid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: ruid); |
677 | keuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: euid); |
678 | ksuid = make_kuid(from: ns, uid: suid); |
679 | |
680 | if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: kruid)) |
681 | return -EINVAL; |
682 | |
683 | if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: keuid)) |
684 | return -EINVAL; |
685 | |
686 | if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid: ksuid)) |
687 | return -EINVAL; |
688 | |
689 | old = current_cred(); |
690 | |
691 | /* check for no-op */ |
692 | if ((ruid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->uid)) && |
693 | (euid == (uid_t) -1 || (uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->euid) && |
694 | uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->fsuid))) && |
695 | (suid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->suid))) |
696 | return 0; |
697 | |
698 | ruid_new = ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->uid) && |
699 | !uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->euid) && !uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->suid); |
700 | euid_new = euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->uid) && |
701 | !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->euid) && !uid_eq(left: keuid, right: old->suid); |
702 | suid_new = suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->uid) && |
703 | !uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->euid) && !uid_eq(left: ksuid, right: old->suid); |
704 | if ((ruid_new || euid_new || suid_new) && |
705 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) |
706 | return -EPERM; |
707 | |
708 | new = prepare_creds(); |
709 | if (!new) |
710 | return -ENOMEM; |
711 | |
712 | if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
713 | new->uid = kruid; |
714 | if (!uid_eq(left: kruid, right: old->uid)) { |
715 | retval = set_user(new); |
716 | if (retval < 0) |
717 | goto error; |
718 | } |
719 | } |
720 | if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
721 | new->euid = keuid; |
722 | if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
723 | new->suid = ksuid; |
724 | new->fsuid = new->euid; |
725 | |
726 | retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
727 | if (retval < 0) |
728 | goto error; |
729 | |
730 | retval = set_cred_ucounts(new); |
731 | if (retval < 0) |
732 | goto error; |
733 | |
734 | flag_nproc_exceeded(new); |
735 | return commit_creds(new); |
736 | |
737 | error: |
738 | abort_creds(new); |
739 | return retval; |
740 | } |
741 | |
742 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
743 | { |
744 | return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid); |
745 | } |
746 | |
747 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
748 | { |
749 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
750 | int retval; |
751 | uid_t ruid, euid, suid; |
752 | |
753 | ruid = from_kuid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, uid: cred->uid); |
754 | euid = from_kuid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, uid: cred->euid); |
755 | suid = from_kuid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, uid: cred->suid); |
756 | |
757 | retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp); |
758 | if (!retval) { |
759 | retval = put_user(euid, euidp); |
760 | if (!retval) |
761 | return put_user(suid, suidp); |
762 | } |
763 | return retval; |
764 | } |
765 | |
766 | /* |
767 | * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. |
768 | */ |
769 | long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) |
770 | { |
771 | struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
772 | const struct cred *old; |
773 | struct cred *new; |
774 | int retval; |
775 | kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; |
776 | bool rgid_new, egid_new, sgid_new; |
777 | |
778 | krgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: rgid); |
779 | kegid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: egid); |
780 | ksgid = make_kgid(from: ns, gid: sgid); |
781 | |
782 | if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: krgid)) |
783 | return -EINVAL; |
784 | if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: kegid)) |
785 | return -EINVAL; |
786 | if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid: ksgid)) |
787 | return -EINVAL; |
788 | |
789 | old = current_cred(); |
790 | |
791 | /* check for no-op */ |
792 | if ((rgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->gid)) && |
793 | (egid == (gid_t) -1 || (gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->egid) && |
794 | gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->fsgid))) && |
795 | (sgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->sgid))) |
796 | return 0; |
797 | |
798 | rgid_new = rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->gid) && |
799 | !gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->egid) && !gid_eq(left: krgid, right: old->sgid); |
800 | egid_new = egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->gid) && |
801 | !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->egid) && !gid_eq(left: kegid, right: old->sgid); |
802 | sgid_new = sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->gid) && |
803 | !gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->egid) && !gid_eq(left: ksgid, right: old->sgid); |
804 | if ((rgid_new || egid_new || sgid_new) && |
805 | !ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) |
806 | return -EPERM; |
807 | |
808 | new = prepare_creds(); |
809 | if (!new) |
810 | return -ENOMEM; |
811 | |
812 | if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
813 | new->gid = krgid; |
814 | if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
815 | new->egid = kegid; |
816 | if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
817 | new->sgid = ksgid; |
818 | new->fsgid = new->egid; |
819 | |
820 | retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
821 | if (retval < 0) |
822 | goto error; |
823 | |
824 | return commit_creds(new); |
825 | |
826 | error: |
827 | abort_creds(new); |
828 | return retval; |
829 | } |
830 | |
831 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
832 | { |
833 | return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid); |
834 | } |
835 | |
836 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
837 | { |
838 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
839 | int retval; |
840 | gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; |
841 | |
842 | rgid = from_kgid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, gid: cred->gid); |
843 | egid = from_kgid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, gid: cred->egid); |
844 | sgid = from_kgid_munged(to: cred->user_ns, gid: cred->sgid); |
845 | |
846 | retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp); |
847 | if (!retval) { |
848 | retval = put_user(egid, egidp); |
849 | if (!retval) |
850 | retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); |
851 | } |
852 | |
853 | return retval; |
854 | } |
855 | |
856 | |
857 | /* |
858 | * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This |
859 | * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at |
860 | * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when |
861 | * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. |
862 | */ |
863 | long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid) |
864 | { |
865 | const struct cred *old; |
866 | struct cred *new; |
867 | uid_t old_fsuid; |
868 | kuid_t kuid; |
869 | |
870 | old = current_cred(); |
871 | old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(to: old->user_ns, uid: old->fsuid); |
872 | |
873 | kuid = make_kuid(from: old->user_ns, uid); |
874 | if (!uid_valid(uid: kuid)) |
875 | return old_fsuid; |
876 | |
877 | new = prepare_creds(); |
878 | if (!new) |
879 | return old_fsuid; |
880 | |
881 | if (uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->uid) || uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->euid) || |
882 | uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->suid) || uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->fsuid) || |
883 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) { |
884 | if (!uid_eq(left: kuid, right: old->fsuid)) { |
885 | new->fsuid = kuid; |
886 | if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
887 | goto change_okay; |
888 | } |
889 | } |
890 | |
891 | abort_creds(new); |
892 | return old_fsuid; |
893 | |
894 | change_okay: |
895 | commit_creds(new); |
896 | return old_fsuid; |
897 | } |
898 | |
899 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
900 | { |
901 | return __sys_setfsuid(uid); |
902 | } |
903 | |
904 | /* |
905 | * Samma på svenska.. |
906 | */ |
907 | long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid) |
908 | { |
909 | const struct cred *old; |
910 | struct cred *new; |
911 | gid_t old_fsgid; |
912 | kgid_t kgid; |
913 | |
914 | old = current_cred(); |
915 | old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(to: old->user_ns, gid: old->fsgid); |
916 | |
917 | kgid = make_kgid(from: old->user_ns, gid); |
918 | if (!gid_valid(gid: kgid)) |
919 | return old_fsgid; |
920 | |
921 | new = prepare_creds(); |
922 | if (!new) |
923 | return old_fsgid; |
924 | |
925 | if (gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->gid) || gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->egid) || |
926 | gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->sgid) || gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->fsgid) || |
927 | ns_capable_setid(ns: old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) { |
928 | if (!gid_eq(left: kgid, right: old->fsgid)) { |
929 | new->fsgid = kgid; |
930 | if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
931 | goto change_okay; |
932 | } |
933 | } |
934 | |
935 | abort_creds(new); |
936 | return old_fsgid; |
937 | |
938 | change_okay: |
939 | commit_creds(new); |
940 | return old_fsgid; |
941 | } |
942 | |
943 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
944 | { |
945 | return __sys_setfsgid(gid); |
946 | } |
947 | #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ |
948 | |
949 | /** |
950 | * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process |
951 | * |
952 | * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and |
953 | * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in |
954 | * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. |
955 | * |
956 | * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. |
957 | */ |
958 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) |
959 | { |
960 | return task_tgid_vnr(current); |
961 | } |
962 | |
963 | /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ |
964 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) |
965 | { |
966 | return task_pid_vnr(current); |
967 | } |
968 | |
969 | /* |
970 | * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could |
971 | * change from under us. However, we can use a stale |
972 | * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see |
973 | * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). |
974 | */ |
975 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) |
976 | { |
977 | int pid; |
978 | |
979 | rcu_read_lock(); |
980 | pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); |
981 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
982 | |
983 | return pid; |
984 | } |
985 | |
986 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) |
987 | { |
988 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
989 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); |
990 | } |
991 | |
992 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) |
993 | { |
994 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
995 | return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); |
996 | } |
997 | |
998 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) |
999 | { |
1000 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
1001 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); |
1002 | } |
1003 | |
1004 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) |
1005 | { |
1006 | /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
1007 | return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); |
1008 | } |
1009 | |
1010 | static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
1011 | { |
1012 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
1013 | |
1014 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, ut: &tgutime, st: &tgstime); |
1015 | cutime = current->signal->cutime; |
1016 | cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
1017 | tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: tgutime); |
1018 | tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: tgstime); |
1019 | tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: cutime); |
1020 | tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(x: cstime); |
1021 | } |
1022 | |
1023 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
1024 | { |
1025 | if (tbuf) { |
1026 | struct tms tmp; |
1027 | |
1028 | do_sys_times(tms: &tmp); |
1029 | if (copy_to_user(to: tbuf, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(struct tms))) |
1030 | return -EFAULT; |
1031 | } |
1032 | force_successful_syscall_return(); |
1033 | return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(x: get_jiffies_64()); |
1034 | } |
1035 | |
1036 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
1037 | static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x) |
1038 | { |
1039 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x)); |
1040 | } |
1041 | |
1042 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf) |
1043 | { |
1044 | if (tbuf) { |
1045 | struct tms tms; |
1046 | struct compat_tms tmp; |
1047 | |
1048 | do_sys_times(tms: &tms); |
1049 | /* Convert our struct tms to the compat version. */ |
1050 | tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_utime); |
1051 | tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_stime); |
1052 | tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_cutime); |
1053 | tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(x: tms.tms_cstime); |
1054 | if (copy_to_user(to: tbuf, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
1055 | return -EFAULT; |
1056 | } |
1057 | force_successful_syscall_return(); |
1058 | return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies); |
1059 | } |
1060 | #endif |
1061 | |
1062 | /* |
1063 | * This needs some heavy checking ... |
1064 | * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully |
1065 | * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. |
1066 | * |
1067 | * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really |
1068 | * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user |
1069 | * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 |
1070 | * |
1071 | * !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX. |
1072 | */ |
1073 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
1074 | { |
1075 | struct task_struct *p; |
1076 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
1077 | struct pid *pgrp; |
1078 | int err; |
1079 | |
1080 | if (!pid) |
1081 | pid = task_pid_vnr(tsk: group_leader); |
1082 | if (!pgid) |
1083 | pgid = pid; |
1084 | if (pgid < 0) |
1085 | return -EINVAL; |
1086 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1087 | |
1088 | /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock |
1089 | * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM |
1090 | */ |
1091 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1092 | |
1093 | err = -ESRCH; |
1094 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid); |
1095 | if (!p) |
1096 | goto out; |
1097 | |
1098 | err = -EINVAL; |
1099 | if (!thread_group_leader(p)) |
1100 | goto out; |
1101 | |
1102 | if (same_thread_group(p1: p->real_parent, p2: group_leader)) { |
1103 | err = -EPERM; |
1104 | if (task_session(task: p) != task_session(task: group_leader)) |
1105 | goto out; |
1106 | err = -EACCES; |
1107 | if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)) |
1108 | goto out; |
1109 | } else { |
1110 | err = -ESRCH; |
1111 | if (p != group_leader) |
1112 | goto out; |
1113 | } |
1114 | |
1115 | err = -EPERM; |
1116 | if (p->signal->leader) |
1117 | goto out; |
1118 | |
1119 | pgrp = task_pid(task: p); |
1120 | if (pgid != pid) { |
1121 | struct task_struct *g; |
1122 | |
1123 | pgrp = find_vpid(nr: pgid); |
1124 | g = pid_task(pid: pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
1125 | if (!g || task_session(task: g) != task_session(task: group_leader)) |
1126 | goto out; |
1127 | } |
1128 | |
1129 | err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); |
1130 | if (err) |
1131 | goto out; |
1132 | |
1133 | if (task_pgrp(task: p) != pgrp) |
1134 | change_pid(task: p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid: pgrp); |
1135 | |
1136 | err = 0; |
1137 | out: |
1138 | /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ |
1139 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1140 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1141 | return err; |
1142 | } |
1143 | |
1144 | static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid) |
1145 | { |
1146 | struct task_struct *p; |
1147 | struct pid *grp; |
1148 | int retval; |
1149 | |
1150 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1151 | if (!pid) |
1152 | grp = task_pgrp(current); |
1153 | else { |
1154 | retval = -ESRCH; |
1155 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid); |
1156 | if (!p) |
1157 | goto out; |
1158 | grp = task_pgrp(task: p); |
1159 | if (!grp) |
1160 | goto out; |
1161 | |
1162 | retval = security_task_getpgid(p); |
1163 | if (retval) |
1164 | goto out; |
1165 | } |
1166 | retval = pid_vnr(pid: grp); |
1167 | out: |
1168 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1169 | return retval; |
1170 | } |
1171 | |
1172 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
1173 | { |
1174 | return do_getpgid(pid); |
1175 | } |
1176 | |
1177 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
1178 | |
1179 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
1180 | { |
1181 | return do_getpgid(pid: 0); |
1182 | } |
1183 | |
1184 | #endif |
1185 | |
1186 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
1187 | { |
1188 | struct task_struct *p; |
1189 | struct pid *sid; |
1190 | int retval; |
1191 | |
1192 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1193 | if (!pid) |
1194 | sid = task_session(current); |
1195 | else { |
1196 | retval = -ESRCH; |
1197 | p = find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid); |
1198 | if (!p) |
1199 | goto out; |
1200 | sid = task_session(task: p); |
1201 | if (!sid) |
1202 | goto out; |
1203 | |
1204 | retval = security_task_getsid(p); |
1205 | if (retval) |
1206 | goto out; |
1207 | } |
1208 | retval = pid_vnr(pid: sid); |
1209 | out: |
1210 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1211 | return retval; |
1212 | } |
1213 | |
1214 | static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid) |
1215 | { |
1216 | struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader; |
1217 | |
1218 | if (task_session(task: curr) != pid) |
1219 | change_pid(task: curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid); |
1220 | |
1221 | if (task_pgrp(task: curr) != pid) |
1222 | change_pid(task: curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid); |
1223 | } |
1224 | |
1225 | int ksys_setsid(void) |
1226 | { |
1227 | struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
1228 | struct pid *sid = task_pid(task: group_leader); |
1229 | pid_t session = pid_vnr(pid: sid); |
1230 | int err = -EPERM; |
1231 | |
1232 | write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1233 | /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ |
1234 | if (group_leader->signal->leader) |
1235 | goto out; |
1236 | |
1237 | /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the |
1238 | * proposed session id. |
1239 | */ |
1240 | if (pid_task(pid: sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
1241 | goto out; |
1242 | |
1243 | group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
1244 | set_special_pids(sid); |
1245 | |
1246 | proc_clear_tty(p: group_leader); |
1247 | |
1248 | err = session; |
1249 | out: |
1250 | write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
1251 | if (err > 0) { |
1252 | proc_sid_connector(task: group_leader); |
1253 | sched_autogroup_create_attach(p: group_leader); |
1254 | } |
1255 | return err; |
1256 | } |
1257 | |
1258 | SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
1259 | { |
1260 | return ksys_setsid(); |
1261 | } |
1262 | |
1263 | DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
1264 | |
1265 | #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE |
1266 | #define override_architecture(name) \ |
1267 | (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
1268 | copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ |
1269 | sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) |
1270 | #else |
1271 | #define override_architecture(name) 0 |
1272 | #endif |
1273 | |
1274 | /* |
1275 | * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". |
1276 | * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
1277 | * And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be |
1278 | * 2.6.60. |
1279 | */ |
1280 | static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
1281 | { |
1282 | int ret = 0; |
1283 | |
1284 | if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
1285 | const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; |
1286 | char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
1287 | int ndots = 0; |
1288 | unsigned v; |
1289 | size_t copy; |
1290 | |
1291 | while (*rest) { |
1292 | if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) |
1293 | break; |
1294 | if (!isdigit(c: *rest) && *rest != '.') |
1295 | break; |
1296 | rest++; |
1297 | } |
1298 | v = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL + 60; |
1299 | copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
1300 | copy = scnprintf(buf, size: copy, fmt: "2.6.%u%s" , v, rest); |
1301 | ret = copy_to_user(to: release, from: buf, n: copy + 1); |
1302 | } |
1303 | return ret; |
1304 | } |
1305 | |
1306 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
1307 | { |
1308 | struct new_utsname tmp; |
1309 | |
1310 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1311 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
1312 | up_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1313 | if (copy_to_user(to: name, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
1314 | return -EFAULT; |
1315 | |
1316 | if (override_release(release: name->release, len: sizeof(name->release))) |
1317 | return -EFAULT; |
1318 | if (override_architecture(name)) |
1319 | return -EFAULT; |
1320 | return 0; |
1321 | } |
1322 | |
1323 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME |
1324 | /* |
1325 | * Old cruft |
1326 | */ |
1327 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) |
1328 | { |
1329 | struct old_utsname tmp; |
1330 | |
1331 | if (!name) |
1332 | return -EFAULT; |
1333 | |
1334 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1335 | memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp)); |
1336 | up_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1337 | if (copy_to_user(to: name, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
1338 | return -EFAULT; |
1339 | |
1340 | if (override_release(release: name->release, len: sizeof(name->release))) |
1341 | return -EFAULT; |
1342 | if (override_architecture(name)) |
1343 | return -EFAULT; |
1344 | return 0; |
1345 | } |
1346 | |
1347 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) |
1348 | { |
1349 | struct oldold_utsname tmp; |
1350 | |
1351 | if (!name) |
1352 | return -EFAULT; |
1353 | |
1354 | memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
1355 | |
1356 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1357 | memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1358 | memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1359 | memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1360 | memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1361 | memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
1362 | up_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1363 | if (copy_to_user(to: name, from: &tmp, n: sizeof(tmp))) |
1364 | return -EFAULT; |
1365 | |
1366 | if (override_architecture(name)) |
1367 | return -EFAULT; |
1368 | if (override_release(release: name->release, len: sizeof(name->release))) |
1369 | return -EFAULT; |
1370 | return 0; |
1371 | } |
1372 | #endif |
1373 | |
1374 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1375 | { |
1376 | int errno; |
1377 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
1378 | |
1379 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1380 | return -EPERM; |
1381 | |
1382 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
1383 | return -EINVAL; |
1384 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1385 | if (!copy_from_user(to: tmp, from: name, n: len)) { |
1386 | struct new_utsname *u; |
1387 | |
1388 | add_device_randomness(buf: tmp, len); |
1389 | down_write(sem: &uts_sem); |
1390 | u = utsname(); |
1391 | memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); |
1392 | memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
1393 | errno = 0; |
1394 | uts_proc_notify(proc: UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
1395 | up_write(sem: &uts_sem); |
1396 | } |
1397 | return errno; |
1398 | } |
1399 | |
1400 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
1401 | |
1402 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1403 | { |
1404 | int i; |
1405 | struct new_utsname *u; |
1406 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1]; |
1407 | |
1408 | if (len < 0) |
1409 | return -EINVAL; |
1410 | down_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1411 | u = utsname(); |
1412 | i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
1413 | if (i > len) |
1414 | i = len; |
1415 | memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i); |
1416 | up_read(sem: &uts_sem); |
1417 | if (copy_to_user(to: name, from: tmp, n: i)) |
1418 | return -EFAULT; |
1419 | return 0; |
1420 | } |
1421 | |
1422 | #endif |
1423 | |
1424 | /* |
1425 | * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling |
1426 | * uname() |
1427 | */ |
1428 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
1429 | { |
1430 | int errno; |
1431 | char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
1432 | |
1433 | if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
1434 | return -EPERM; |
1435 | if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
1436 | return -EINVAL; |
1437 | |
1438 | errno = -EFAULT; |
1439 | if (!copy_from_user(to: tmp, from: name, n: len)) { |
1440 | struct new_utsname *u; |
1441 | |
1442 | add_device_randomness(buf: tmp, len); |
1443 | down_write(sem: &uts_sem); |
1444 | u = utsname(); |
1445 | memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); |
1446 | memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
1447 | errno = 0; |
1448 | uts_proc_notify(proc: UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
1449 | up_write(sem: &uts_sem); |
1450 | } |
1451 | return errno; |
1452 | } |
1453 | |
1454 | /* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
1455 | static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, |
1456 | struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
1457 | { |
1458 | struct rlimit *rlim; |
1459 | int retval = 0; |
1460 | |
1461 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1462 | return -EINVAL; |
1463 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
1464 | |
1465 | if (new_rlim) { |
1466 | if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) |
1467 | return -EINVAL; |
1468 | if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && |
1469 | new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) |
1470 | return -EPERM; |
1471 | } |
1472 | |
1473 | /* Holding a refcount on tsk protects tsk->signal from disappearing. */ |
1474 | rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
1475 | task_lock(p: tsk->group_leader); |
1476 | if (new_rlim) { |
1477 | /* |
1478 | * Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can |
1479 | * contain all limits. |
1480 | */ |
1481 | if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && |
1482 | !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
1483 | retval = -EPERM; |
1484 | if (!retval) |
1485 | retval = security_task_setrlimit(p: tsk, resource, new_rlim); |
1486 | } |
1487 | if (!retval) { |
1488 | if (old_rlim) |
1489 | *old_rlim = *rlim; |
1490 | if (new_rlim) |
1491 | *rlim = *new_rlim; |
1492 | } |
1493 | task_unlock(p: tsk->group_leader); |
1494 | |
1495 | /* |
1496 | * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not |
1497 | * infinite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code |
1498 | * ignores the rlimit. |
1499 | */ |
1500 | if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && |
1501 | new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY && |
1502 | IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) { |
1503 | /* |
1504 | * update_rlimit_cpu can fail if the task is exiting, but there |
1505 | * may be other tasks in the thread group that are not exiting, |
1506 | * and they need their cpu timers adjusted. |
1507 | * |
1508 | * The group_leader is the last task to be released, so if we |
1509 | * cannot update_rlimit_cpu on it, then the entire process is |
1510 | * exiting and we do not need to update at all. |
1511 | */ |
1512 | update_rlimit_cpu(task: tsk->group_leader, rlim_new: new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
1513 | } |
1514 | |
1515 | return retval; |
1516 | } |
1517 | |
1518 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1519 | { |
1520 | struct rlimit value; |
1521 | int ret; |
1522 | |
1523 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, old_rlim: &value); |
1524 | if (!ret) |
1525 | ret = copy_to_user(to: rlim, from: &value, n: sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1526 | |
1527 | return ret; |
1528 | } |
1529 | |
1530 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
1531 | |
1532 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
1533 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1534 | { |
1535 | struct rlimit r; |
1536 | struct compat_rlimit r32; |
1537 | |
1538 | if (copy_from_user(to: &r32, from: rlim, n: sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) |
1539 | return -EFAULT; |
1540 | |
1541 | if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
1542 | r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; |
1543 | else |
1544 | r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur; |
1545 | if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
1546 | r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; |
1547 | else |
1548 | r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max; |
1549 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, new_rlim: &r, NULL); |
1550 | } |
1551 | |
1552 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
1553 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1554 | { |
1555 | struct rlimit r; |
1556 | int ret; |
1557 | |
1558 | ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, old_rlim: &r); |
1559 | if (!ret) { |
1560 | struct compat_rlimit r32; |
1561 | if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
1562 | r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; |
1563 | else |
1564 | r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur; |
1565 | if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY) |
1566 | r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY; |
1567 | else |
1568 | r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max; |
1569 | |
1570 | if (copy_to_user(to: rlim, from: &r32, n: sizeof(struct compat_rlimit))) |
1571 | return -EFAULT; |
1572 | } |
1573 | return ret; |
1574 | } |
1575 | |
1576 | #endif |
1577 | |
1578 | #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT |
1579 | |
1580 | /* |
1581 | * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. |
1582 | */ |
1583 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
1584 | struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1585 | { |
1586 | struct rlimit x; |
1587 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1588 | return -EINVAL; |
1589 | |
1590 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
1591 | task_lock(current->group_leader); |
1592 | x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
1593 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
1594 | if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1595 | x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1596 | if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1597 | x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1598 | return copy_to_user(to: rlim, from: &x, n: sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1599 | } |
1600 | |
1601 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
1602 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
1603 | struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1604 | { |
1605 | struct rlimit r; |
1606 | |
1607 | if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
1608 | return -EINVAL; |
1609 | |
1610 | resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS); |
1611 | task_lock(current->group_leader); |
1612 | r = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
1613 | task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
1614 | if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1615 | r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1616 | if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
1617 | r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
1618 | |
1619 | if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) || |
1620 | put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max)) |
1621 | return -EFAULT; |
1622 | return 0; |
1623 | } |
1624 | #endif |
1625 | |
1626 | #endif |
1627 | |
1628 | static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) |
1629 | { |
1630 | #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 |
1631 | return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; |
1632 | #else |
1633 | return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; |
1634 | #endif |
1635 | } |
1636 | |
1637 | static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) |
1638 | { |
1639 | if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) |
1640 | rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
1641 | else |
1642 | rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; |
1643 | if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) |
1644 | rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
1645 | else |
1646 | rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; |
1647 | } |
1648 | |
1649 | static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) |
1650 | { |
1651 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64: rlim64->rlim_cur)) |
1652 | rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; |
1653 | else |
1654 | rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; |
1655 | if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64: rlim64->rlim_max)) |
1656 | rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; |
1657 | else |
1658 | rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; |
1659 | } |
1660 | |
1661 | /* rcu lock must be held */ |
1662 | static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task, |
1663 | unsigned int flags) |
1664 | { |
1665 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
1666 | bool id_match; |
1667 | |
1668 | if (current == task) |
1669 | return 0; |
1670 | |
1671 | tcred = __task_cred(task); |
1672 | id_match = (uid_eq(left: cred->uid, right: tcred->euid) && |
1673 | uid_eq(left: cred->uid, right: tcred->suid) && |
1674 | uid_eq(left: cred->uid, right: tcred->uid) && |
1675 | gid_eq(left: cred->gid, right: tcred->egid) && |
1676 | gid_eq(left: cred->gid, right: tcred->sgid) && |
1677 | gid_eq(left: cred->gid, right: tcred->gid)); |
1678 | if (!id_match && !ns_capable(ns: tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
1679 | return -EPERM; |
1680 | |
1681 | return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags); |
1682 | } |
1683 | |
1684 | SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, |
1685 | const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, |
1686 | struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) |
1687 | { |
1688 | struct rlimit64 old64, new64; |
1689 | struct rlimit old, new; |
1690 | struct task_struct *tsk; |
1691 | unsigned int checkflags = 0; |
1692 | int ret; |
1693 | |
1694 | if (old_rlim) |
1695 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ; |
1696 | |
1697 | if (new_rlim) { |
1698 | if (copy_from_user(to: &new64, from: new_rlim, n: sizeof(new64))) |
1699 | return -EFAULT; |
1700 | rlim64_to_rlim(rlim64: &new64, rlim: &new); |
1701 | checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE; |
1702 | } |
1703 | |
1704 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1705 | tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(nr: pid) : current; |
1706 | if (!tsk) { |
1707 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1708 | return -ESRCH; |
1709 | } |
1710 | ret = check_prlimit_permission(task: tsk, flags: checkflags); |
1711 | if (ret) { |
1712 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1713 | return ret; |
1714 | } |
1715 | get_task_struct(t: tsk); |
1716 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1717 | |
1718 | ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim: new_rlim ? &new : NULL, |
1719 | old_rlim: old_rlim ? &old : NULL); |
1720 | |
1721 | if (!ret && old_rlim) { |
1722 | rlim_to_rlim64(rlim: &old, rlim64: &old64); |
1723 | if (copy_to_user(to: old_rlim, from: &old64, n: sizeof(old64))) |
1724 | ret = -EFAULT; |
1725 | } |
1726 | |
1727 | put_task_struct(t: tsk); |
1728 | return ret; |
1729 | } |
1730 | |
1731 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
1732 | { |
1733 | struct rlimit new_rlim; |
1734 | |
1735 | if (copy_from_user(to: &new_rlim, from: rlim, n: sizeof(*rlim))) |
1736 | return -EFAULT; |
1737 | return do_prlimit(current, resource, new_rlim: &new_rlim, NULL); |
1738 | } |
1739 | |
1740 | /* |
1741 | * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, |
1742 | * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After |
1743 | * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would |
1744 | * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information |
1745 | * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not |
1746 | * measuring them yet). |
1747 | * |
1748 | * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have |
1749 | * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word |
1750 | * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't |
1751 | * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading |
1752 | * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those |
1753 | * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a |
1754 | * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
1755 | * |
1756 | * Locking: |
1757 | * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH |
1758 | * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded |
1759 | * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with |
1760 | * the siglock held. |
1761 | * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and |
1762 | * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one |
1763 | * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else |
1764 | * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the |
1765 | * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just |
1766 | * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. |
1767 | * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal |
1768 | * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> |
1769 | * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
1770 | * |
1771 | */ |
1772 | |
1773 | static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
1774 | { |
1775 | r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; |
1776 | r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; |
1777 | r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; |
1778 | r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; |
1779 | r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(p: t); |
1780 | r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(p: t); |
1781 | } |
1782 | |
1783 | void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) |
1784 | { |
1785 | struct task_struct *t; |
1786 | unsigned long flags; |
1787 | u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
1788 | unsigned long = 0; |
1789 | struct signal_struct *sig = p->signal; |
1790 | |
1791 | memset((char *)r, 0, sizeof (*r)); |
1792 | utime = stime = 0; |
1793 | |
1794 | if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
1795 | task_cputime_adjusted(current, ut: &utime, st: &stime); |
1796 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t: p, r); |
1797 | maxrss = sig->maxrss; |
1798 | goto out; |
1799 | } |
1800 | |
1801 | if (!lock_task_sighand(task: p, flags: &flags)) |
1802 | return; |
1803 | |
1804 | switch (who) { |
1805 | case RUSAGE_BOTH: |
1806 | case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: |
1807 | utime = sig->cutime; |
1808 | stime = sig->cstime; |
1809 | r->ru_nvcsw = sig->cnvcsw; |
1810 | r->ru_nivcsw = sig->cnivcsw; |
1811 | r->ru_minflt = sig->cmin_flt; |
1812 | r->ru_majflt = sig->cmaj_flt; |
1813 | r->ru_inblock = sig->cinblock; |
1814 | r->ru_oublock = sig->coublock; |
1815 | maxrss = sig->cmaxrss; |
1816 | |
1817 | if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
1818 | break; |
1819 | fallthrough; |
1820 | |
1821 | case RUSAGE_SELF: |
1822 | thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, ut: &tgutime, st: &tgstime); |
1823 | utime += tgutime; |
1824 | stime += tgstime; |
1825 | r->ru_nvcsw += sig->nvcsw; |
1826 | r->ru_nivcsw += sig->nivcsw; |
1827 | r->ru_minflt += sig->min_flt; |
1828 | r->ru_majflt += sig->maj_flt; |
1829 | r->ru_inblock += sig->inblock; |
1830 | r->ru_oublock += sig->oublock; |
1831 | if (maxrss < sig->maxrss) |
1832 | maxrss = sig->maxrss; |
1833 | __for_each_thread(sig, t) |
1834 | accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); |
1835 | break; |
1836 | |
1837 | default: |
1838 | BUG(); |
1839 | } |
1840 | unlock_task_sighand(task: p, flags: &flags); |
1841 | |
1842 | out: |
1843 | r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(nsec: utime); |
1844 | r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(nsec: stime); |
1845 | |
1846 | if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { |
1847 | struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(task: p); |
1848 | |
1849 | if (mm) { |
1850 | setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(maxrss: &maxrss, mm); |
1851 | mmput(mm); |
1852 | } |
1853 | } |
1854 | r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
1855 | } |
1856 | |
1857 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
1858 | { |
1859 | struct rusage r; |
1860 | |
1861 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
1862 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1863 | return -EINVAL; |
1864 | |
1865 | getrusage(current, who, r: &r); |
1866 | return copy_to_user(to: ru, from: &r, n: sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
1867 | } |
1868 | |
1869 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
1870 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) |
1871 | { |
1872 | struct rusage r; |
1873 | |
1874 | if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
1875 | who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
1876 | return -EINVAL; |
1877 | |
1878 | getrusage(current, who, r: &r); |
1879 | return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); |
1880 | } |
1881 | #endif |
1882 | |
1883 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
1884 | { |
1885 | mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); |
1886 | return mask; |
1887 | } |
1888 | |
1889 | static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
1890 | { |
1891 | struct fd exe; |
1892 | struct inode *inode; |
1893 | int err; |
1894 | |
1895 | exe = fdget(fd); |
1896 | if (!exe.file) |
1897 | return -EBADF; |
1898 | |
1899 | inode = file_inode(f: exe.file); |
1900 | |
1901 | /* |
1902 | * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make |
1903 | * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an |
1904 | * overall picture. |
1905 | */ |
1906 | err = -EACCES; |
1907 | if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(path: &exe.file->f_path)) |
1908 | goto exit; |
1909 | |
1910 | err = file_permission(file: exe.file, MAY_EXEC); |
1911 | if (err) |
1912 | goto exit; |
1913 | |
1914 | err = replace_mm_exe_file(mm, new_exe_file: exe.file); |
1915 | exit: |
1916 | fdput(fd: exe); |
1917 | return err; |
1918 | } |
1919 | |
1920 | /* |
1921 | * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses. |
1922 | * |
1923 | * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful |
1924 | * in what is allowed for modification from userspace. |
1925 | */ |
1926 | static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map) |
1927 | { |
1928 | unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE; |
1929 | int error = -EINVAL, i; |
1930 | |
1931 | static const unsigned char offsets[] = { |
1932 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code), |
1933 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code), |
1934 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data), |
1935 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data), |
1936 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk), |
1937 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk), |
1938 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack), |
1939 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start), |
1940 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end), |
1941 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start), |
1942 | offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end), |
1943 | }; |
1944 | |
1945 | /* |
1946 | * Make sure the members are not somewhere outside |
1947 | * of allowed address space. |
1948 | */ |
1949 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) { |
1950 | u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]); |
1951 | |
1952 | if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr || |
1953 | (unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr) |
1954 | goto out; |
1955 | } |
1956 | |
1957 | /* |
1958 | * Make sure the pairs are ordered. |
1959 | */ |
1960 | #define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \ |
1961 | ((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \ |
1962 | (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL |
1963 | error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code); |
1964 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data); |
1965 | error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk); |
1966 | error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end); |
1967 | error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end); |
1968 | if (error) |
1969 | goto out; |
1970 | #undef __prctl_check_order |
1971 | |
1972 | error = -EINVAL; |
1973 | |
1974 | /* |
1975 | * Neither we should allow to override limits if they set. |
1976 | */ |
1977 | if (check_data_rlimit(rlim: rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), new: prctl_map->brk, |
1978 | start: prctl_map->start_brk, end_data: prctl_map->end_data, |
1979 | start_data: prctl_map->start_data)) |
1980 | goto out; |
1981 | |
1982 | error = 0; |
1983 | out: |
1984 | return error; |
1985 | } |
1986 | |
1987 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
1988 | static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size) |
1989 | { |
1990 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, }; |
1991 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; |
1992 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
1993 | int error; |
1994 | |
1995 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); |
1996 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256); |
1997 | |
1998 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) |
1999 | return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map), |
2000 | (unsigned int __user *)addr); |
2001 | |
2002 | if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map)) |
2003 | return -EINVAL; |
2004 | |
2005 | if (copy_from_user(to: &prctl_map, from: addr, n: sizeof(prctl_map))) |
2006 | return -EFAULT; |
2007 | |
2008 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(prctl_map: &prctl_map); |
2009 | if (error) |
2010 | return error; |
2011 | |
2012 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size) { |
2013 | /* |
2014 | * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector. |
2015 | */ |
2016 | if (!prctl_map.auxv || |
2017 | prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)) |
2018 | return -EINVAL; |
2019 | |
2020 | memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv)); |
2021 | if (copy_from_user(to: user_auxv, |
2022 | from: (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv, |
2023 | n: prctl_map.auxv_size)) |
2024 | return -EFAULT; |
2025 | |
2026 | /* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */ |
2027 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL; |
2028 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL; |
2029 | } |
2030 | |
2031 | if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) { |
2032 | /* |
2033 | * Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable. |
2034 | * At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN |
2035 | * or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. |
2036 | * Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an |
2037 | * arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones. |
2038 | * This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem. |
2039 | */ |
2040 | if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns())) |
2041 | return -EPERM; |
2042 | |
2043 | error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, fd: prctl_map.exe_fd); |
2044 | if (error) |
2045 | return error; |
2046 | } |
2047 | |
2048 | /* |
2049 | * arg_lock protects concurrent updates but we still need mmap_lock for |
2050 | * read to exclude races with sys_brk. |
2051 | */ |
2052 | mmap_read_lock(mm); |
2053 | |
2054 | /* |
2055 | * We don't validate if these members are pointing to |
2056 | * real present VMAs because application may have correspond |
2057 | * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics |
2058 | * output in procfs mostly, except |
2059 | * |
2060 | * - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups |
2061 | * for VMAs when updating these members so anything wrong written |
2062 | * here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead |
2063 | * to any problem in kernel itself |
2064 | */ |
2065 | |
2066 | spin_lock(lock: &mm->arg_lock); |
2067 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; |
2068 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; |
2069 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; |
2070 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; |
2071 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; |
2072 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; |
2073 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; |
2074 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; |
2075 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; |
2076 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; |
2077 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; |
2078 | spin_unlock(lock: &mm->arg_lock); |
2079 | |
2080 | /* |
2081 | * Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus |
2082 | * if someone reads this member in procfs while we're |
2083 | * updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's |
2084 | * known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to |
2085 | * not introduce additional locks here making the kernel |
2086 | * more complex. |
2087 | */ |
2088 | if (prctl_map.auxv_size) |
2089 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv)); |
2090 | |
2091 | mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
2092 | return 0; |
2093 | } |
2094 | #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */ |
2095 | |
2096 | static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, |
2097 | unsigned long len) |
2098 | { |
2099 | /* |
2100 | * This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to |
2101 | * mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's |
2102 | * up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace |
2103 | * tools which use this vector might be unhappy. |
2104 | */ |
2105 | unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE] = {}; |
2106 | |
2107 | if (len > sizeof(user_auxv)) |
2108 | return -EINVAL; |
2109 | |
2110 | if (copy_from_user(to: user_auxv, from: (const void __user *)addr, n: len)) |
2111 | return -EFAULT; |
2112 | |
2113 | /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ |
2114 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; |
2115 | user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; |
2116 | |
2117 | BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); |
2118 | |
2119 | task_lock(current); |
2120 | memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len); |
2121 | task_unlock(current); |
2122 | |
2123 | return 0; |
2124 | } |
2125 | |
2126 | static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, |
2127 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
2128 | { |
2129 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
2130 | struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { |
2131 | .auxv = NULL, |
2132 | .auxv_size = 0, |
2133 | .exe_fd = -1, |
2134 | }; |
2135 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
2136 | int error; |
2137 | |
2138 | if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV && |
2139 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP && |
2140 | opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE))) |
2141 | return -EINVAL; |
2142 | |
2143 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
2144 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE) |
2145 | return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, addr: (const void __user *)addr, data_size: arg4); |
2146 | #endif |
2147 | |
2148 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
2149 | return -EPERM; |
2150 | |
2151 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) |
2152 | return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, fd: (unsigned int)addr); |
2153 | |
2154 | if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV) |
2155 | return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, len: arg4); |
2156 | |
2157 | if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
2158 | return -EINVAL; |
2159 | |
2160 | error = -EINVAL; |
2161 | |
2162 | /* |
2163 | * arg_lock protects concurrent updates of arg boundaries, we need |
2164 | * mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr |
2165 | * validation. |
2166 | */ |
2167 | mmap_read_lock(mm); |
2168 | vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
2169 | |
2170 | spin_lock(lock: &mm->arg_lock); |
2171 | prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code; |
2172 | prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code; |
2173 | prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data; |
2174 | prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data; |
2175 | prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk; |
2176 | prctl_map.brk = mm->brk; |
2177 | prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack; |
2178 | prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start; |
2179 | prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end; |
2180 | prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start; |
2181 | prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end; |
2182 | |
2183 | switch (opt) { |
2184 | case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
2185 | prctl_map.start_code = addr; |
2186 | break; |
2187 | case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
2188 | prctl_map.end_code = addr; |
2189 | break; |
2190 | case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
2191 | prctl_map.start_data = addr; |
2192 | break; |
2193 | case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: |
2194 | prctl_map.end_data = addr; |
2195 | break; |
2196 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: |
2197 | prctl_map.start_stack = addr; |
2198 | break; |
2199 | case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: |
2200 | prctl_map.start_brk = addr; |
2201 | break; |
2202 | case PR_SET_MM_BRK: |
2203 | prctl_map.brk = addr; |
2204 | break; |
2205 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: |
2206 | prctl_map.arg_start = addr; |
2207 | break; |
2208 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: |
2209 | prctl_map.arg_end = addr; |
2210 | break; |
2211 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: |
2212 | prctl_map.env_start = addr; |
2213 | break; |
2214 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: |
2215 | prctl_map.env_end = addr; |
2216 | break; |
2217 | default: |
2218 | goto out; |
2219 | } |
2220 | |
2221 | error = validate_prctl_map_addr(prctl_map: &prctl_map); |
2222 | if (error) |
2223 | goto out; |
2224 | |
2225 | switch (opt) { |
2226 | /* |
2227 | * If command line arguments and environment |
2228 | * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can |
2229 | * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup |
2230 | * command line arguments and ENV_START/END |
2231 | * for environment. |
2232 | */ |
2233 | case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: |
2234 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: |
2235 | case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: |
2236 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: |
2237 | case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: |
2238 | if (!vma) { |
2239 | error = -EFAULT; |
2240 | goto out; |
2241 | } |
2242 | } |
2243 | |
2244 | mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code; |
2245 | mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code; |
2246 | mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data; |
2247 | mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data; |
2248 | mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk; |
2249 | mm->brk = prctl_map.brk; |
2250 | mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack; |
2251 | mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start; |
2252 | mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end; |
2253 | mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start; |
2254 | mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end; |
2255 | |
2256 | error = 0; |
2257 | out: |
2258 | spin_unlock(lock: &mm->arg_lock); |
2259 | mmap_read_unlock(mm); |
2260 | return error; |
2261 | } |
2262 | |
2263 | #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
2264 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr) |
2265 | { |
2266 | return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); |
2267 | } |
2268 | #else |
2269 | static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr) |
2270 | { |
2271 | return -EINVAL; |
2272 | } |
2273 | #endif |
2274 | |
2275 | static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data) |
2276 | { |
2277 | /* |
2278 | * If task has has_child_subreaper - all its descendants |
2279 | * already have these flag too and new descendants will |
2280 | * inherit it on fork, skip them. |
2281 | * |
2282 | * If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in |
2283 | * it's subtree as they will never get out pidns. |
2284 | */ |
2285 | if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper || |
2286 | is_child_reaper(pid: task_pid(task: p))) |
2287 | return 0; |
2288 | |
2289 | p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1; |
2290 | return 1; |
2291 | } |
2292 | |
2293 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which) |
2294 | { |
2295 | return -EINVAL; |
2296 | } |
2297 | |
2298 | int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which, |
2299 | unsigned long ctrl) |
2300 | { |
2301 | return -EINVAL; |
2302 | } |
2303 | |
2304 | #define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE) |
2305 | |
2306 | #ifdef CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME |
2307 | |
2308 | #define ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN 80 |
2309 | #define ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS "\\`$[]" |
2310 | |
2311 | static inline bool is_valid_name_char(char ch) |
2312 | { |
2313 | /* printable ascii characters, excluding ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS */ |
2314 | return ch > 0x1f && ch < 0x7f && |
2315 | !strchr(ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS, ch); |
2316 | } |
2317 | |
2318 | static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long addr, |
2319 | unsigned long size, unsigned long arg) |
2320 | { |
2321 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
2322 | const char __user *uname; |
2323 | struct anon_vma_name *anon_name = NULL; |
2324 | int error; |
2325 | |
2326 | switch (opt) { |
2327 | case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME: |
2328 | uname = (const char __user *)arg; |
2329 | if (uname) { |
2330 | char *name, *pch; |
2331 | |
2332 | name = strndup_user(uname, ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN); |
2333 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: name)) |
2334 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: name); |
2335 | |
2336 | for (pch = name; *pch != '\0'; pch++) { |
2337 | if (!is_valid_name_char(ch: *pch)) { |
2338 | kfree(objp: name); |
2339 | return -EINVAL; |
2340 | } |
2341 | } |
2342 | /* anon_vma has its own copy */ |
2343 | anon_name = anon_vma_name_alloc(name); |
2344 | kfree(objp: name); |
2345 | if (!anon_name) |
2346 | return -ENOMEM; |
2347 | |
2348 | } |
2349 | |
2350 | mmap_write_lock(mm); |
2351 | error = madvise_set_anon_name(mm, start: addr, len_in: size, anon_name); |
2352 | mmap_write_unlock(mm); |
2353 | anon_vma_name_put(anon_name); |
2354 | break; |
2355 | default: |
2356 | error = -EINVAL; |
2357 | } |
2358 | |
2359 | return error; |
2360 | } |
2361 | |
2362 | #else /* CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME */ |
2363 | static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start, |
2364 | unsigned long size, unsigned long arg) |
2365 | { |
2366 | return -EINVAL; |
2367 | } |
2368 | #endif /* CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME */ |
2369 | |
2370 | static inline unsigned long get_current_mdwe(void) |
2371 | { |
2372 | unsigned long ret = 0; |
2373 | |
2374 | if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags)) |
2375 | ret |= PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN; |
2376 | if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE_NO_INHERIT, ¤t->mm->flags)) |
2377 | ret |= PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT; |
2378 | |
2379 | return ret; |
2380 | } |
2381 | |
2382 | static inline int prctl_set_mdwe(unsigned long bits, unsigned long arg3, |
2383 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
2384 | { |
2385 | unsigned long current_bits; |
2386 | |
2387 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2388 | return -EINVAL; |
2389 | |
2390 | if (bits & ~(PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN | PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT)) |
2391 | return -EINVAL; |
2392 | |
2393 | /* NO_INHERIT only makes sense with REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN */ |
2394 | if (bits & PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT && !(bits & PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN)) |
2395 | return -EINVAL; |
2396 | |
2397 | current_bits = get_current_mdwe(); |
2398 | if (current_bits && current_bits != bits) |
2399 | return -EPERM; /* Cannot unset the flags */ |
2400 | |
2401 | if (bits & PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT) |
2402 | set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE_NO_INHERIT, addr: ¤t->mm->flags); |
2403 | if (bits & PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN) |
2404 | set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, addr: ¤t->mm->flags); |
2405 | |
2406 | return 0; |
2407 | } |
2408 | |
2409 | static inline int prctl_get_mdwe(unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, |
2410 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
2411 | { |
2412 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2413 | return -EINVAL; |
2414 | return get_current_mdwe(); |
2415 | } |
2416 | |
2417 | static int prctl_get_auxv(void __user *addr, unsigned long len) |
2418 | { |
2419 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
2420 | unsigned long size = min_t(unsigned long, sizeof(mm->saved_auxv), len); |
2421 | |
2422 | if (size && copy_to_user(to: addr, from: mm->saved_auxv, n: size)) |
2423 | return -EFAULT; |
2424 | return sizeof(mm->saved_auxv); |
2425 | } |
2426 | |
2427 | SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, |
2428 | unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
2429 | { |
2430 | struct task_struct *me = current; |
2431 | unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; |
2432 | long error; |
2433 | |
2434 | error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
2435 | if (error != -ENOSYS) |
2436 | return error; |
2437 | |
2438 | error = 0; |
2439 | switch (option) { |
2440 | case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: |
2441 | if (!valid_signal(sig: arg2)) { |
2442 | error = -EINVAL; |
2443 | break; |
2444 | } |
2445 | me->pdeath_signal = arg2; |
2446 | break; |
2447 | case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: |
2448 | error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); |
2449 | break; |
2450 | case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: |
2451 | error = get_dumpable(mm: me->mm); |
2452 | break; |
2453 | case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: |
2454 | if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { |
2455 | error = -EINVAL; |
2456 | break; |
2457 | } |
2458 | set_dumpable(mm: me->mm, value: arg2); |
2459 | break; |
2460 | |
2461 | case PR_SET_UNALIGN: |
2462 | error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
2463 | break; |
2464 | case PR_GET_UNALIGN: |
2465 | error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
2466 | break; |
2467 | case PR_SET_FPEMU: |
2468 | error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
2469 | break; |
2470 | case PR_GET_FPEMU: |
2471 | error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
2472 | break; |
2473 | case PR_SET_FPEXC: |
2474 | error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
2475 | break; |
2476 | case PR_GET_FPEXC: |
2477 | error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
2478 | break; |
2479 | case PR_GET_TIMING: |
2480 | error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; |
2481 | break; |
2482 | case PR_SET_TIMING: |
2483 | if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) |
2484 | error = -EINVAL; |
2485 | break; |
2486 | case PR_SET_NAME: |
2487 | comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; |
2488 | if (strncpy_from_user(dst: comm, src: (char __user *)arg2, |
2489 | count: sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) |
2490 | return -EFAULT; |
2491 | set_task_comm(tsk: me, from: comm); |
2492 | proc_comm_connector(task: me); |
2493 | break; |
2494 | case PR_GET_NAME: |
2495 | get_task_comm(comm, me); |
2496 | if (copy_to_user(to: (char __user *)arg2, from: comm, n: sizeof(comm))) |
2497 | return -EFAULT; |
2498 | break; |
2499 | case PR_GET_ENDIAN: |
2500 | error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
2501 | break; |
2502 | case PR_SET_ENDIAN: |
2503 | error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
2504 | break; |
2505 | case PR_GET_SECCOMP: |
2506 | error = prctl_get_seccomp(); |
2507 | break; |
2508 | case PR_SET_SECCOMP: |
2509 | error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); |
2510 | break; |
2511 | case PR_GET_TSC: |
2512 | error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
2513 | break; |
2514 | case PR_SET_TSC: |
2515 | error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
2516 | break; |
2517 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: |
2518 | error = perf_event_task_disable(); |
2519 | break; |
2520 | case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: |
2521 | error = perf_event_task_enable(); |
2522 | break; |
2523 | case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: |
2524 | if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX) |
2525 | error = ULONG_MAX; |
2526 | else |
2527 | error = current->timer_slack_ns; |
2528 | break; |
2529 | case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: |
2530 | if (arg2 <= 0) |
2531 | current->timer_slack_ns = |
2532 | current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
2533 | else |
2534 | current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; |
2535 | break; |
2536 | case PR_MCE_KILL: |
2537 | if (arg4 | arg5) |
2538 | return -EINVAL; |
2539 | switch (arg2) { |
2540 | case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: |
2541 | if (arg3 != 0) |
2542 | return -EINVAL; |
2543 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
2544 | break; |
2545 | case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: |
2546 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
2547 | if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) |
2548 | current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; |
2549 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) |
2550 | current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; |
2551 | else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) |
2552 | current->flags &= |
2553 | ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
2554 | else |
2555 | return -EINVAL; |
2556 | break; |
2557 | default: |
2558 | return -EINVAL; |
2559 | } |
2560 | break; |
2561 | case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: |
2562 | if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) |
2563 | return -EINVAL; |
2564 | if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) |
2565 | error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? |
2566 | PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; |
2567 | else |
2568 | error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; |
2569 | break; |
2570 | case PR_SET_MM: |
2571 | error = prctl_set_mm(opt: arg2, addr: arg3, arg4, arg5); |
2572 | break; |
2573 | case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: |
2574 | error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, tid_addr: (int __user * __user *)arg2); |
2575 | break; |
2576 | case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
2577 | me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; |
2578 | if (!arg2) |
2579 | break; |
2580 | |
2581 | walk_process_tree(top: me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL); |
2582 | break; |
2583 | case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
2584 | error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, |
2585 | (int __user *)arg2); |
2586 | break; |
2587 | case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
2588 | if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2589 | return -EINVAL; |
2590 | |
2591 | task_set_no_new_privs(current); |
2592 | break; |
2593 | case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
2594 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2595 | return -EINVAL; |
2596 | return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; |
2597 | case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: |
2598 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2599 | return -EINVAL; |
2600 | error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags); |
2601 | break; |
2602 | case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: |
2603 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2604 | return -EINVAL; |
2605 | if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm: me->mm)) |
2606 | return -EINTR; |
2607 | if (arg2) |
2608 | set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, addr: &me->mm->flags); |
2609 | else |
2610 | clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, addr: &me->mm->flags); |
2611 | mmap_write_unlock(mm: me->mm); |
2612 | break; |
2613 | case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
2614 | case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT: |
2615 | /* No longer implemented: */ |
2616 | return -EINVAL; |
2617 | case PR_SET_FP_MODE: |
2618 | error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2); |
2619 | break; |
2620 | case PR_GET_FP_MODE: |
2621 | error = GET_FP_MODE(me); |
2622 | break; |
2623 | case PR_SVE_SET_VL: |
2624 | error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2); |
2625 | break; |
2626 | case PR_SVE_GET_VL: |
2627 | error = SVE_GET_VL(); |
2628 | break; |
2629 | case PR_SME_SET_VL: |
2630 | error = SME_SET_VL(arg2); |
2631 | break; |
2632 | case PR_SME_GET_VL: |
2633 | error = SME_GET_VL(); |
2634 | break; |
2635 | case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL: |
2636 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2637 | return -EINVAL; |
2638 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(t: me, which: arg2); |
2639 | break; |
2640 | case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL: |
2641 | if (arg4 || arg5) |
2642 | return -EINVAL; |
2643 | error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(t: me, which: arg2, ctrl: arg3); |
2644 | break; |
2645 | case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: |
2646 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2647 | return -EINVAL; |
2648 | error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2); |
2649 | break; |
2650 | case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS: |
2651 | if (arg4 || arg5) |
2652 | return -EINVAL; |
2653 | error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3); |
2654 | break; |
2655 | case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS: |
2656 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2657 | return -EINVAL; |
2658 | error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me); |
2659 | break; |
2660 | case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: |
2661 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2662 | return -EINVAL; |
2663 | error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2); |
2664 | break; |
2665 | case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: |
2666 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2667 | return -EINVAL; |
2668 | error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(); |
2669 | break; |
2670 | case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER: |
2671 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
2672 | return -EPERM; |
2673 | |
2674 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2675 | return -EINVAL; |
2676 | |
2677 | if (arg2 == 1) |
2678 | current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER; |
2679 | else if (!arg2) |
2680 | current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER; |
2681 | else |
2682 | return -EINVAL; |
2683 | break; |
2684 | case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER: |
2685 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
2686 | return -EPERM; |
2687 | |
2688 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2689 | return -EINVAL; |
2690 | |
2691 | error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER; |
2692 | break; |
2693 | case PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH: |
2694 | error = set_syscall_user_dispatch(mode: arg2, offset: arg3, len: arg4, |
2695 | selector: (char __user *) arg5); |
2696 | break; |
2697 | #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE |
2698 | case PR_SCHED_CORE: |
2699 | error = sched_core_share_pid(cmd: arg2, pid: arg3, type: arg4, uaddr: arg5); |
2700 | break; |
2701 | #endif |
2702 | case PR_SET_MDWE: |
2703 | error = prctl_set_mdwe(bits: arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
2704 | break; |
2705 | case PR_GET_MDWE: |
2706 | error = prctl_get_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
2707 | break; |
2708 | case PR_SET_VMA: |
2709 | error = prctl_set_vma(opt: arg2, addr: arg3, size: arg4, arg: arg5); |
2710 | break; |
2711 | case PR_GET_AUXV: |
2712 | if (arg4 || arg5) |
2713 | return -EINVAL; |
2714 | error = prctl_get_auxv(addr: (void __user *)arg2, len: arg3); |
2715 | break; |
2716 | #ifdef CONFIG_KSM |
2717 | case PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE: |
2718 | if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2719 | return -EINVAL; |
2720 | if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm: me->mm)) |
2721 | return -EINTR; |
2722 | |
2723 | if (arg2) |
2724 | error = ksm_enable_merge_any(mm: me->mm); |
2725 | else |
2726 | error = ksm_disable_merge_any(mm: me->mm); |
2727 | mmap_write_unlock(mm: me->mm); |
2728 | break; |
2729 | case PR_GET_MEMORY_MERGE: |
2730 | if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
2731 | return -EINVAL; |
2732 | |
2733 | error = !!test_bit(MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY, &me->mm->flags); |
2734 | break; |
2735 | #endif |
2736 | case PR_RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL: |
2737 | error = RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL(arg2); |
2738 | break; |
2739 | case PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL: |
2740 | error = RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL(); |
2741 | break; |
2742 | default: |
2743 | error = -EINVAL; |
2744 | break; |
2745 | } |
2746 | return error; |
2747 | } |
2748 | |
2749 | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, |
2750 | struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
2751 | { |
2752 | int err = 0; |
2753 | int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
2754 | |
2755 | if (cpup) |
2756 | err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); |
2757 | if (nodep) |
2758 | err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
2759 | return err ? -EFAULT : 0; |
2760 | } |
2761 | |
2762 | /** |
2763 | * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct |
2764 | * @info: pointer to buffer to fill |
2765 | */ |
2766 | static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) |
2767 | { |
2768 | unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; |
2769 | unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; |
2770 | struct timespec64 tp; |
2771 | |
2772 | memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
2773 | |
2774 | ktime_get_boottime_ts64(ts: &tp); |
2775 | timens_add_boottime(ts: &tp); |
2776 | info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); |
2777 | |
2778 | get_avenrun(loads: info->loads, offset: 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); |
2779 | |
2780 | info->procs = nr_threads; |
2781 | |
2782 | si_meminfo(val: info); |
2783 | si_swapinfo(info); |
2784 | |
2785 | /* |
2786 | * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) |
2787 | * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then |
2788 | * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, |
2789 | * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... |
2790 | * |
2791 | * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> |
2792 | */ |
2793 | |
2794 | mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; |
2795 | if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) |
2796 | goto out; |
2797 | bitcount = 0; |
2798 | mem_unit = info->mem_unit; |
2799 | while (mem_unit > 1) { |
2800 | bitcount++; |
2801 | mem_unit >>= 1; |
2802 | sav_total = mem_total; |
2803 | mem_total <<= 1; |
2804 | if (mem_total < sav_total) |
2805 | goto out; |
2806 | } |
2807 | |
2808 | /* |
2809 | * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by |
2810 | * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible |
2811 | * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x |
2812 | * kernels... |
2813 | */ |
2814 | |
2815 | info->mem_unit = 1; |
2816 | info->totalram <<= bitcount; |
2817 | info->freeram <<= bitcount; |
2818 | info->sharedram <<= bitcount; |
2819 | info->bufferram <<= bitcount; |
2820 | info->totalswap <<= bitcount; |
2821 | info->freeswap <<= bitcount; |
2822 | info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; |
2823 | info->freehigh <<= bitcount; |
2824 | |
2825 | out: |
2826 | return 0; |
2827 | } |
2828 | |
2829 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) |
2830 | { |
2831 | struct sysinfo val; |
2832 | |
2833 | do_sysinfo(info: &val); |
2834 | |
2835 | if (copy_to_user(to: info, from: &val, n: sizeof(struct sysinfo))) |
2836 | return -EFAULT; |
2837 | |
2838 | return 0; |
2839 | } |
2840 | |
2841 | #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
2842 | struct compat_sysinfo { |
2843 | s32 uptime; |
2844 | u32 loads[3]; |
2845 | u32 totalram; |
2846 | u32 freeram; |
2847 | u32 sharedram; |
2848 | u32 bufferram; |
2849 | u32 totalswap; |
2850 | u32 freeswap; |
2851 | u16 procs; |
2852 | u16 pad; |
2853 | u32 totalhigh; |
2854 | u32 freehigh; |
2855 | u32 mem_unit; |
2856 | char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; |
2857 | }; |
2858 | |
2859 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) |
2860 | { |
2861 | struct sysinfo s; |
2862 | struct compat_sysinfo s_32; |
2863 | |
2864 | do_sysinfo(info: &s); |
2865 | |
2866 | /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale |
2867 | * down if needed |
2868 | */ |
2869 | if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) { |
2870 | int bitcount = 0; |
2871 | |
2872 | while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { |
2873 | s.mem_unit <<= 1; |
2874 | bitcount++; |
2875 | } |
2876 | |
2877 | s.totalram >>= bitcount; |
2878 | s.freeram >>= bitcount; |
2879 | s.sharedram >>= bitcount; |
2880 | s.bufferram >>= bitcount; |
2881 | s.totalswap >>= bitcount; |
2882 | s.freeswap >>= bitcount; |
2883 | s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; |
2884 | s.freehigh >>= bitcount; |
2885 | } |
2886 | |
2887 | memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32)); |
2888 | s_32.uptime = s.uptime; |
2889 | s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0]; |
2890 | s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1]; |
2891 | s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2]; |
2892 | s_32.totalram = s.totalram; |
2893 | s_32.freeram = s.freeram; |
2894 | s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram; |
2895 | s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram; |
2896 | s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap; |
2897 | s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap; |
2898 | s_32.procs = s.procs; |
2899 | s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh; |
2900 | s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh; |
2901 | s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit; |
2902 | if (copy_to_user(to: info, from: &s_32, n: sizeof(s_32))) |
2903 | return -EFAULT; |
2904 | return 0; |
2905 | } |
2906 | #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |
2907 | |