1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
2 | /* |
3 | * AppArmor security module |
4 | * |
5 | * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. |
6 | * |
7 | * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE |
8 | * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. |
9 | */ |
10 | |
11 | #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
12 | #include <linux/moduleparam.h> |
13 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
14 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
15 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
16 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
17 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
18 | #include <linux/ctype.h> |
19 | #include <linux/sysctl.h> |
20 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
21 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
22 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
23 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
24 | #include <linux/zstd.h> |
25 | #include <net/sock.h> |
26 | #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> |
27 | |
28 | #include "include/apparmor.h" |
29 | #include "include/apparmorfs.h" |
30 | #include "include/audit.h" |
31 | #include "include/capability.h" |
32 | #include "include/cred.h" |
33 | #include "include/file.h" |
34 | #include "include/ipc.h" |
35 | #include "include/net.h" |
36 | #include "include/path.h" |
37 | #include "include/label.h" |
38 | #include "include/policy.h" |
39 | #include "include/policy_ns.h" |
40 | #include "include/procattr.h" |
41 | #include "include/mount.h" |
42 | #include "include/secid.h" |
43 | |
44 | /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ |
45 | int apparmor_initialized; |
46 | |
47 | union aa_buffer { |
48 | struct list_head list; |
49 | DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer); |
50 | }; |
51 | |
52 | struct aa_local_cache { |
53 | unsigned int hold; |
54 | unsigned int count; |
55 | struct list_head head; |
56 | }; |
57 | |
58 | #define RESERVE_COUNT 2 |
59 | static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT; |
60 | static int buffer_count; |
61 | |
62 | static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers); |
63 | static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock); |
64 | static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers); |
65 | |
66 | /* |
67 | * LSM hook functions |
68 | */ |
69 | |
70 | /* |
71 | * put the associated labels |
72 | */ |
73 | static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
74 | { |
75 | aa_put_label(l: cred_label(cred)); |
76 | set_cred_label(cred, NULL); |
77 | } |
78 | |
79 | /* |
80 | * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials |
81 | */ |
82 | static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
83 | { |
84 | set_cred_label(cred, NULL); |
85 | return 0; |
86 | } |
87 | |
88 | /* |
89 | * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block |
90 | */ |
91 | static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
92 | gfp_t gfp) |
93 | { |
94 | set_cred_label(cred: new, label: aa_get_newest_label(l: cred_label(cred: old))); |
95 | return 0; |
96 | } |
97 | |
98 | /* |
99 | * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds |
100 | */ |
101 | static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
102 | { |
103 | set_cred_label(cred: new, label: aa_get_newest_label(l: cred_label(cred: old))); |
104 | } |
105 | |
106 | static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) |
107 | { |
108 | |
109 | aa_free_task_ctx(ctx: task_ctx(task)); |
110 | } |
111 | |
112 | static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, |
113 | unsigned long clone_flags) |
114 | { |
115 | struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); |
116 | |
117 | aa_dup_task_ctx(new, old: task_ctx(current)); |
118 | |
119 | return 0; |
120 | } |
121 | |
122 | static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
123 | unsigned int mode) |
124 | { |
125 | struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; |
126 | const struct cred *cred; |
127 | int error; |
128 | |
129 | cred = get_task_cred(child); |
130 | tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ |
131 | tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
132 | error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, tracee_cred: cred, tracee, |
133 | request: (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ |
134 | : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); |
135 | __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); |
136 | put_cred(cred); |
137 | |
138 | return error; |
139 | } |
140 | |
141 | static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
142 | { |
143 | struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; |
144 | const struct cred *cred; |
145 | int error; |
146 | |
147 | tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
148 | cred = get_task_cred(parent); |
149 | tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ |
150 | error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred: cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee, |
151 | AA_PTRACE_TRACE); |
152 | put_cred(cred); |
153 | __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); |
154 | |
155 | return error; |
156 | } |
157 | |
158 | /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ |
159 | static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
160 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
161 | { |
162 | struct aa_label *label; |
163 | const struct cred *cred; |
164 | |
165 | rcu_read_lock(); |
166 | cred = __task_cred(target); |
167 | label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
168 | |
169 | /* |
170 | * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will |
171 | * initialize effective and permitted. |
172 | */ |
173 | if (!unconfined(label)) { |
174 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
175 | struct label_it i; |
176 | |
177 | label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { |
178 | struct aa_ruleset *rules; |
179 | if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) |
180 | continue; |
181 | rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, |
182 | typeof(*rules), list); |
183 | *effective = cap_intersect(a: *effective, |
184 | b: rules->caps.allow); |
185 | *permitted = cap_intersect(a: *permitted, |
186 | b: rules->caps.allow); |
187 | } |
188 | } |
189 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
190 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
191 | |
192 | return 0; |
193 | } |
194 | |
195 | static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, |
196 | int cap, unsigned int opts) |
197 | { |
198 | struct aa_label *label; |
199 | int error = 0; |
200 | |
201 | label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
202 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
203 | error = aa_capable(subj_cred: cred, label, cap, opts); |
204 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
205 | |
206 | return error; |
207 | } |
208 | |
209 | /** |
210 | * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths |
211 | * @op: operation being checked |
212 | * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) |
213 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
214 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
215 | * |
216 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
217 | */ |
218 | static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, |
219 | struct path_cond *cond) |
220 | { |
221 | struct aa_label *label; |
222 | int error = 0; |
223 | |
224 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
225 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
226 | error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, flags: 0, request: mask, |
227 | cond); |
228 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
229 | |
230 | return error; |
231 | } |
232 | |
233 | /** |
234 | * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond |
235 | * @op: operation being checked |
236 | * @path: location to check (NOT NULL) |
237 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
238 | * |
239 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
240 | */ |
241 | static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) |
242 | { |
243 | vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap: mnt_idmap(mnt: path->mnt), |
244 | inode: d_backing_inode(upper: path->dentry)); |
245 | struct path_cond cond = { |
246 | vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), |
247 | d_backing_inode(upper: path->dentry)->i_mode |
248 | }; |
249 | |
250 | if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: path->dentry)) |
251 | return 0; |
252 | |
253 | return common_perm(op, path, mask, cond: &cond); |
254 | } |
255 | |
256 | /** |
257 | * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry |
258 | * @op: operation being checked |
259 | * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) |
260 | * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) |
261 | * @mask: requested permissions mask |
262 | * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) |
263 | * |
264 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
265 | */ |
266 | static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
267 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, |
268 | struct path_cond *cond) |
269 | { |
270 | struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry }; |
271 | |
272 | return common_perm(op, path: &path, mask, cond); |
273 | } |
274 | |
275 | /** |
276 | * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm |
277 | * @op: operation being checked |
278 | * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) |
279 | * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) |
280 | * @mask: requested permission mask |
281 | * |
282 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
283 | */ |
284 | static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
285 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) |
286 | { |
287 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(upper: dentry); |
288 | struct path_cond cond = { }; |
289 | vfsuid_t vfsuid; |
290 | |
291 | if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) |
292 | return 0; |
293 | |
294 | vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap: mnt_idmap(mnt: dir->mnt), inode); |
295 | cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); |
296 | cond.mode = inode->i_mode; |
297 | |
298 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, cond: &cond); |
299 | } |
300 | |
301 | /** |
302 | * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create |
303 | * @op: operation being checked |
304 | * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) |
305 | * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) |
306 | * @mask: request permission mask |
307 | * @mode: created file mode |
308 | * |
309 | * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied |
310 | */ |
311 | static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir, |
312 | struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) |
313 | { |
314 | struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; |
315 | |
316 | if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: dir->dentry)) |
317 | return 0; |
318 | |
319 | return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, cond: &cond); |
320 | } |
321 | |
322 | static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
323 | { |
324 | return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
325 | } |
326 | |
327 | static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
328 | umode_t mode) |
329 | { |
330 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
331 | S_IFDIR); |
332 | } |
333 | |
334 | static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
335 | { |
336 | return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); |
337 | } |
338 | |
339 | static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
340 | umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) |
341 | { |
342 | return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); |
343 | } |
344 | |
345 | static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path) |
346 | { |
347 | return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR); |
348 | } |
349 | |
350 | static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file) |
351 | { |
352 | return apparmor_path_truncate(path: &file->f_path); |
353 | } |
354 | |
355 | static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
356 | const char *old_name) |
357 | { |
358 | return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
359 | S_IFLNK); |
360 | } |
361 | |
362 | static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, |
363 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
364 | { |
365 | struct aa_label *label; |
366 | int error = 0; |
367 | |
368 | if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: old_dentry)) |
369 | return 0; |
370 | |
371 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
372 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
373 | error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir, |
374 | new_dentry); |
375 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
376 | |
377 | return error; |
378 | } |
379 | |
380 | static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
381 | const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, |
382 | const unsigned int flags) |
383 | { |
384 | struct aa_label *label; |
385 | int error = 0; |
386 | |
387 | if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: old_dentry)) |
388 | return 0; |
389 | if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(dentry: new_dentry)) |
390 | return 0; |
391 | |
392 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
393 | if (!unconfined(label)) { |
394 | struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(mnt: old_dir->mnt); |
395 | vfsuid_t vfsuid; |
396 | struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, |
397 | .dentry = old_dentry }; |
398 | struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, |
399 | .dentry = new_dentry }; |
400 | struct path_cond cond = { |
401 | .mode = d_backing_inode(upper: old_dentry)->i_mode |
402 | }; |
403 | vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode: d_backing_inode(upper: old_dentry)); |
404 | cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); |
405 | |
406 | if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { |
407 | struct path_cond cond_exchange = { |
408 | .mode = d_backing_inode(upper: new_dentry)->i_mode, |
409 | }; |
410 | vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode: d_backing_inode(upper: old_dentry)); |
411 | cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); |
412 | |
413 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), |
414 | label, path: &new_path, flags: 0, |
415 | MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | |
416 | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
417 | cond: &cond_exchange); |
418 | if (!error) |
419 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), |
420 | label, path: &old_path, |
421 | flags: 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | |
422 | AA_MAY_CREATE, cond: &cond_exchange); |
423 | } |
424 | |
425 | if (!error) |
426 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), |
427 | label, path: &old_path, flags: 0, |
428 | MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | |
429 | AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, |
430 | cond: &cond); |
431 | if (!error) |
432 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), |
433 | label, path: &new_path, |
434 | flags: 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | |
435 | AA_MAY_CREATE, cond: &cond); |
436 | |
437 | } |
438 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
439 | |
440 | return error; |
441 | } |
442 | |
443 | static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) |
444 | { |
445 | return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD); |
446 | } |
447 | |
448 | static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) |
449 | { |
450 | return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN); |
451 | } |
452 | |
453 | static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) |
454 | { |
455 | return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); |
456 | } |
457 | |
458 | static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) |
459 | { |
460 | struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); |
461 | struct aa_label *label; |
462 | int error = 0; |
463 | |
464 | if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: file->f_path.dentry)) |
465 | return 0; |
466 | |
467 | /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. |
468 | * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with |
469 | * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to |
470 | * actually execute the image. |
471 | */ |
472 | if (current->in_execve) { |
473 | fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
474 | return 0; |
475 | } |
476 | |
477 | label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred: file->f_cred); |
478 | if (!unconfined(label)) { |
479 | struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); |
480 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(f: file); |
481 | vfsuid_t vfsuid; |
482 | struct path_cond cond = { |
483 | .mode = inode->i_mode, |
484 | }; |
485 | vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); |
486 | cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); |
487 | |
488 | error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, subj_cred: file->f_cred, |
489 | label, path: &file->f_path, flags: 0, |
490 | request: aa_map_file_to_perms(file), cond: &cond); |
491 | /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ |
492 | fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); |
493 | } |
494 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
495 | |
496 | return error; |
497 | } |
498 | |
499 | static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
500 | { |
501 | struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); |
502 | struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
503 | |
504 | spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); |
505 | rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); |
506 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
507 | return 0; |
508 | } |
509 | |
510 | static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
511 | { |
512 | struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); |
513 | |
514 | if (ctx) |
515 | aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); |
516 | } |
517 | |
518 | static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask, |
519 | bool in_atomic) |
520 | { |
521 | struct aa_label *label; |
522 | int error = 0; |
523 | |
524 | /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */ |
525 | if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry) |
526 | return -EACCES; |
527 | |
528 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
529 | error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, request: mask, in_atomic); |
530 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
531 | |
532 | return error; |
533 | } |
534 | |
535 | static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file) |
536 | { |
537 | return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, mask: aa_map_file_to_perms(file), |
538 | in_atomic: false); |
539 | } |
540 | |
541 | static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
542 | { |
543 | return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, in_atomic: false); |
544 | } |
545 | |
546 | static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
547 | { |
548 | u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; |
549 | |
550 | if (cmd == F_WRLCK) |
551 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
552 | |
553 | return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, in_atomic: false); |
554 | } |
555 | |
556 | static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, |
557 | unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic) |
558 | { |
559 | int mask = 0; |
560 | |
561 | if (!file || !file_ctx(file)) |
562 | return 0; |
563 | |
564 | if (prot & PROT_READ) |
565 | mask |= MAY_READ; |
566 | /* |
567 | * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't |
568 | * write back to the files |
569 | */ |
570 | if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) |
571 | mask |= MAY_WRITE; |
572 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
573 | mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; |
574 | |
575 | return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic); |
576 | } |
577 | |
578 | static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
579 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) |
580 | { |
581 | return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC); |
582 | } |
583 | |
584 | static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
585 | unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) |
586 | { |
587 | return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, file: vma->vm_file, prot, |
588 | flags: !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0, |
589 | in_atomic: false); |
590 | } |
591 | |
592 | #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING |
593 | static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask) |
594 | { |
595 | if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL) |
596 | return "sqpoll" ; |
597 | if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED) |
598 | return "override_creds" ; |
599 | return "" ; |
600 | } |
601 | |
602 | static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) |
603 | { |
604 | struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); |
605 | |
606 | if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { |
607 | audit_log_format(ab, fmt: " requested=\"%s\"" , |
608 | audit_uring_mask(mask: ad->request)); |
609 | if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { |
610 | audit_log_format(ab, fmt: " denied=\"%s\"" , |
611 | audit_uring_mask(mask: ad->denied)); |
612 | } |
613 | } |
614 | if (ad->uring.target) { |
615 | audit_log_format(ab, fmt: " tcontext=" ); |
616 | aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), |
617 | label: ad->uring.target, |
618 | FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); |
619 | } |
620 | } |
621 | |
622 | static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, |
623 | struct aa_label *new, int cap, |
624 | struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) |
625 | { |
626 | unsigned int state; |
627 | struct aa_ruleset *rules; |
628 | int error = 0; |
629 | |
630 | AA_BUG(!profile); |
631 | |
632 | rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); |
633 | state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING); |
634 | if (state) { |
635 | struct aa_perms perms = { }; |
636 | |
637 | if (new) { |
638 | aa_label_match(profile, rules, label: new, state, |
639 | subns: false, request, perms: &perms); |
640 | } else { |
641 | perms = *aa_lookup_perms(policy: rules->policy, state); |
642 | } |
643 | aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms: &perms); |
644 | error = aa_check_perms(profile, perms: &perms, request, ad, |
645 | cb: audit_uring_cb); |
646 | } |
647 | |
648 | return error; |
649 | } |
650 | |
651 | /** |
652 | * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override |
653 | * @new: the target creds |
654 | * |
655 | * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials |
656 | * to service an io_uring operation. |
657 | */ |
658 | static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) |
659 | { |
660 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
661 | struct aa_label *label; |
662 | int error; |
663 | DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, |
664 | OP_URING_OVERRIDE); |
665 | |
666 | ad.uring.target = cred_label(cred: new); |
667 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
668 | error = fn_for_each(label, profile, |
669 | profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED, |
670 | cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); |
671 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
672 | |
673 | return error; |
674 | } |
675 | |
676 | /** |
677 | * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created |
678 | * |
679 | * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring |
680 | * kernel polling thread. |
681 | */ |
682 | static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void) |
683 | { |
684 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
685 | struct aa_label *label; |
686 | int error; |
687 | DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, |
688 | OP_URING_SQPOLL); |
689 | |
690 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
691 | error = fn_for_each(label, profile, |
692 | profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL, |
693 | NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); |
694 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
695 | |
696 | return error; |
697 | } |
698 | #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ |
699 | |
700 | static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, |
701 | const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) |
702 | { |
703 | struct aa_label *label; |
704 | int error = 0; |
705 | |
706 | /* Discard magic */ |
707 | if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) |
708 | flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; |
709 | |
710 | flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; |
711 | |
712 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
713 | if (!unconfined(label)) { |
714 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
715 | error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags, |
716 | data); |
717 | else if (flags & MS_BIND) |
718 | error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path, |
719 | old_name: dev_name, flags); |
720 | else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | |
721 | MS_UNBINDABLE)) |
722 | error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label, |
723 | path, flags); |
724 | else if (flags & MS_MOVE) |
725 | error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path, |
726 | old_name: dev_name); |
727 | else |
728 | error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name, |
729 | path, type, flags, data); |
730 | } |
731 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
732 | |
733 | return error; |
734 | } |
735 | |
736 | static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, |
737 | const struct path *to_path) |
738 | { |
739 | struct aa_label *label; |
740 | int error = 0; |
741 | |
742 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
743 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
744 | error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path, |
745 | to_path); |
746 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
747 | |
748 | return error; |
749 | } |
750 | |
751 | static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
752 | { |
753 | struct aa_label *label; |
754 | int error = 0; |
755 | |
756 | label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
757 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
758 | error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags); |
759 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
760 | |
761 | return error; |
762 | } |
763 | |
764 | static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, |
765 | const struct path *new_path) |
766 | { |
767 | struct aa_label *label; |
768 | int error = 0; |
769 | |
770 | label = aa_get_current_label(); |
771 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
772 | error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path); |
773 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
774 | |
775 | return error; |
776 | } |
777 | |
778 | static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name, |
779 | char **value) |
780 | { |
781 | int error = -ENOENT; |
782 | /* released below */ |
783 | const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); |
784 | struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); |
785 | struct aa_label *label = NULL; |
786 | |
787 | if (strcmp(name, "current" ) == 0) |
788 | label = aa_get_newest_label(l: cred_label(cred)); |
789 | else if (strcmp(name, "prev" ) == 0 && ctx->previous) |
790 | label = aa_get_newest_label(l: ctx->previous); |
791 | else if (strcmp(name, "exec" ) == 0 && ctx->onexec) |
792 | label = aa_get_newest_label(l: ctx->onexec); |
793 | else |
794 | error = -EINVAL; |
795 | |
796 | if (label) |
797 | error = aa_getprocattr(label, string: value); |
798 | |
799 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
800 | put_cred(cred); |
801 | |
802 | return error; |
803 | } |
804 | |
805 | static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, |
806 | size_t size) |
807 | { |
808 | char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; |
809 | size_t arg_size; |
810 | int error; |
811 | DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, |
812 | OP_SETPROCATTR); |
813 | |
814 | if (size == 0) |
815 | return -EINVAL; |
816 | |
817 | /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ |
818 | if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { |
819 | /* null terminate */ |
820 | largs = args = kmalloc(size: size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
821 | if (!args) |
822 | return -ENOMEM; |
823 | memcpy(args, value, size); |
824 | args[size] = '\0'; |
825 | } |
826 | |
827 | error = -EINVAL; |
828 | args = strim(args); |
829 | command = strsep(&args, " " ); |
830 | if (!args) |
831 | goto out; |
832 | args = skip_spaces(args); |
833 | if (!*args) |
834 | goto out; |
835 | |
836 | arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); |
837 | if (strcmp(name, "current" ) == 0) { |
838 | if (strcmp(command, "changehat" ) == 0) { |
839 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, size: arg_size, |
840 | AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); |
841 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat" ) == 0) { |
842 | error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, size: arg_size, |
843 | AA_CHANGE_TEST); |
844 | } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile" ) == 0) { |
845 | error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); |
846 | } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile" ) == 0) { |
847 | error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_TEST); |
848 | } else if (strcmp(command, "stack" ) == 0) { |
849 | error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_STACK); |
850 | } else |
851 | goto fail; |
852 | } else if (strcmp(name, "exec" ) == 0) { |
853 | if (strcmp(command, "exec" ) == 0) |
854 | error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC); |
855 | else if (strcmp(command, "stack" ) == 0) |
856 | error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, flags: (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC | |
857 | AA_CHANGE_STACK)); |
858 | else |
859 | goto fail; |
860 | } else |
861 | /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ |
862 | goto fail; |
863 | |
864 | if (!error) |
865 | error = size; |
866 | out: |
867 | kfree(objp: largs); |
868 | return error; |
869 | |
870 | fail: |
871 | ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
872 | ad.info = name; |
873 | ad.error = error = -EINVAL; |
874 | aa_audit_msg(type: AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, ad: &ad, NULL); |
875 | end_current_label_crit_section(label: ad.subj_label); |
876 | goto out; |
877 | } |
878 | |
879 | /** |
880 | * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds |
881 | * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
882 | */ |
883 | static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
884 | { |
885 | struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); |
886 | struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(cred: bprm->cred); |
887 | |
888 | /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ |
889 | if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) || |
890 | (unconfined(new_label))) |
891 | return; |
892 | |
893 | aa_inherit_files(cred: bprm->cred, current->files); |
894 | |
895 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
896 | |
897 | /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ |
898 | __aa_transition_rlimits(old: label, new: new_label); |
899 | } |
900 | |
901 | /** |
902 | * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed |
903 | * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) |
904 | */ |
905 | static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
906 | { |
907 | /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ |
908 | aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx: task_ctx(current)); |
909 | |
910 | return; |
911 | } |
912 | |
913 | static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) |
914 | { |
915 | struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
916 | *secid = label->secid; |
917 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
918 | } |
919 | |
920 | static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
921 | { |
922 | struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(task: p); |
923 | *secid = label->secid; |
924 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
925 | } |
926 | |
927 | static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, |
928 | unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
929 | { |
930 | struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
931 | int error = 0; |
932 | |
933 | if (!unconfined(label)) |
934 | error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task, |
935 | resource, new_rlim); |
936 | __end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
937 | |
938 | return error; |
939 | } |
940 | |
941 | static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info, |
942 | int sig, const struct cred *cred) |
943 | { |
944 | const struct cred *tc; |
945 | struct aa_label *cl, *tl; |
946 | int error; |
947 | |
948 | tc = get_task_cred(target); |
949 | tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred: tc); |
950 | if (cred) { |
951 | /* |
952 | * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior |
953 | */ |
954 | cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); |
955 | error = aa_may_signal(subj_cred: cred, sender: cl, target_cred: tc, target: tl, sig); |
956 | aa_put_label(l: cl); |
957 | return error; |
958 | } else { |
959 | cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
960 | error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), sender: cl, target_cred: tc, target: tl, sig); |
961 | __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); |
962 | } |
963 | aa_put_label(l: tl); |
964 | put_cred(cred: tc); |
965 | |
966 | return error; |
967 | } |
968 | |
969 | static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred) |
970 | { |
971 | struct aa_label *label; |
972 | struct aa_profile *profile; |
973 | int error = 0; |
974 | DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS, |
975 | OP_USERNS_CREATE); |
976 | |
977 | ad.subj_cred = current_cred(); |
978 | |
979 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
980 | if (!unconfined(label)) { |
981 | error = fn_for_each(label, profile, |
982 | aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad, |
983 | AA_USERNS_CREATE)); |
984 | } |
985 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
986 | |
987 | return error; |
988 | } |
989 | |
990 | /** |
991 | * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field |
992 | */ |
993 | static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) |
994 | { |
995 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; |
996 | |
997 | ctx = kzalloc(size: sizeof(*ctx), flags); |
998 | if (!ctx) |
999 | return -ENOMEM; |
1000 | |
1001 | sk->sk_security = ctx; |
1002 | |
1003 | return 0; |
1004 | } |
1005 | |
1006 | /** |
1007 | * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field |
1008 | */ |
1009 | static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
1010 | { |
1011 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
1012 | |
1013 | sk->sk_security = NULL; |
1014 | aa_put_label(l: ctx->label); |
1015 | aa_put_label(l: ctx->peer); |
1016 | kfree(objp: ctx); |
1017 | } |
1018 | |
1019 | /** |
1020 | * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field |
1021 | */ |
1022 | static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, |
1023 | struct sock *newsk) |
1024 | { |
1025 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
1026 | struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(sk: newsk); |
1027 | |
1028 | if (new->label) |
1029 | aa_put_label(l: new->label); |
1030 | new->label = aa_get_label(l: ctx->label); |
1031 | |
1032 | if (new->peer) |
1033 | aa_put_label(l: new->peer); |
1034 | new->peer = aa_get_label(l: ctx->peer); |
1035 | } |
1036 | |
1037 | /** |
1038 | * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket |
1039 | */ |
1040 | static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) |
1041 | { |
1042 | struct aa_label *label; |
1043 | int error = 0; |
1044 | |
1045 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1046 | |
1047 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
1048 | if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) |
1049 | error = af_select(family, |
1050 | create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), |
1051 | aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, |
1052 | OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, |
1053 | family, type, protocol)); |
1054 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
1055 | |
1056 | return error; |
1057 | } |
1058 | |
1059 | /** |
1060 | * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct |
1061 | * |
1062 | * Note: |
1063 | * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to |
1064 | * move to a special kernel label |
1065 | * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or |
1066 | * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in |
1067 | * sock_graft. |
1068 | */ |
1069 | static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
1070 | int type, int protocol, int kern) |
1071 | { |
1072 | struct aa_label *label; |
1073 | |
1074 | if (kern) { |
1075 | label = aa_get_label(l: kernel_t); |
1076 | } else |
1077 | label = aa_get_current_label(); |
1078 | |
1079 | if (sock->sk) { |
1080 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk: sock->sk); |
1081 | |
1082 | aa_put_label(l: ctx->label); |
1083 | ctx->label = aa_get_label(l: label); |
1084 | } |
1085 | aa_put_label(l: label); |
1086 | |
1087 | return 0; |
1088 | } |
1089 | |
1090 | /** |
1091 | * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket |
1092 | */ |
1093 | static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, |
1094 | struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
1095 | { |
1096 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1097 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1098 | AA_BUG(!address); |
1099 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1100 | |
1101 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1102 | bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), |
1103 | aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); |
1104 | } |
1105 | |
1106 | /** |
1107 | * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address |
1108 | */ |
1109 | static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, |
1110 | struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
1111 | { |
1112 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1113 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1114 | AA_BUG(!address); |
1115 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1116 | |
1117 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1118 | connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), |
1119 | aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); |
1120 | } |
1121 | |
1122 | /** |
1123 | * apparmor_socket_listen - check perms before allowing listen |
1124 | */ |
1125 | static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
1126 | { |
1127 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1128 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1129 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1130 | |
1131 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1132 | listen_perm(sock, backlog), |
1133 | aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk)); |
1134 | } |
1135 | |
1136 | /** |
1137 | * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. |
1138 | * |
1139 | * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept |
1140 | * has not been done. |
1141 | */ |
1142 | static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
1143 | { |
1144 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1145 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1146 | AA_BUG(!newsock); |
1147 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1148 | |
1149 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1150 | accept_perm(sock, newsock), |
1151 | aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk)); |
1152 | } |
1153 | |
1154 | static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, |
1155 | struct msghdr *msg, int size) |
1156 | { |
1157 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1158 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1159 | AA_BUG(!msg); |
1160 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1161 | |
1162 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1163 | msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), |
1164 | aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
1165 | } |
1166 | |
1167 | /** |
1168 | * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket |
1169 | */ |
1170 | static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, |
1171 | struct msghdr *msg, int size) |
1172 | { |
1173 | return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); |
1174 | } |
1175 | |
1176 | /** |
1177 | * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message |
1178 | */ |
1179 | static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, |
1180 | struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) |
1181 | { |
1182 | return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); |
1183 | } |
1184 | |
1185 | /* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ |
1186 | static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) |
1187 | { |
1188 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1189 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1190 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1191 | |
1192 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1193 | sock_perm(op, request, sock), |
1194 | aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
1195 | } |
1196 | |
1197 | /** |
1198 | * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address |
1199 | */ |
1200 | static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
1201 | { |
1202 | return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); |
1203 | } |
1204 | |
1205 | /** |
1206 | * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address |
1207 | */ |
1208 | static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
1209 | { |
1210 | return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); |
1211 | } |
1212 | |
1213 | /* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ |
1214 | static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, |
1215 | int level, int optname) |
1216 | { |
1217 | AA_BUG(!sock); |
1218 | AA_BUG(!sock->sk); |
1219 | AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); |
1220 | |
1221 | return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, |
1222 | opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), |
1223 | aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); |
1224 | } |
1225 | |
1226 | /** |
1227 | * apparmor_socket_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options |
1228 | */ |
1229 | static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
1230 | int optname) |
1231 | { |
1232 | return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, |
1233 | level, optname); |
1234 | } |
1235 | |
1236 | /** |
1237 | * apparmor_socket_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options |
1238 | */ |
1239 | static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
1240 | int optname) |
1241 | { |
1242 | return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, |
1243 | level, optname); |
1244 | } |
1245 | |
1246 | /** |
1247 | * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn |
1248 | */ |
1249 | static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
1250 | { |
1251 | return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); |
1252 | } |
1253 | |
1254 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
1255 | /** |
1256 | * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk |
1257 | * |
1258 | * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held |
1259 | * |
1260 | * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() |
1261 | * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() |
1262 | */ |
1263 | static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
1264 | { |
1265 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
1266 | |
1267 | if (!skb->secmark) |
1268 | return 0; |
1269 | |
1270 | return apparmor_secmark_check(label: ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, |
1271 | secid: skb->secmark, sk); |
1272 | } |
1273 | #endif |
1274 | |
1275 | |
1276 | static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) |
1277 | { |
1278 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
1279 | |
1280 | if (ctx->peer) |
1281 | return ctx->peer; |
1282 | |
1283 | return ERR_PTR(error: -ENOPROTOOPT); |
1284 | } |
1285 | |
1286 | /** |
1287 | * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer |
1288 | * |
1289 | * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan |
1290 | */ |
1291 | static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, |
1292 | sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen, |
1293 | unsigned int len) |
1294 | { |
1295 | char *name = NULL; |
1296 | int slen, error = 0; |
1297 | struct aa_label *label; |
1298 | struct aa_label *peer; |
1299 | |
1300 | label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); |
1301 | peer = sk_peer_label(sk: sock->sk); |
1302 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: peer)) { |
1303 | error = PTR_ERR(ptr: peer); |
1304 | goto done; |
1305 | } |
1306 | slen = aa_label_asxprint(strp: &name, labels_ns(label), label: peer, |
1307 | FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | |
1308 | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); |
1309 | /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ |
1310 | if (slen < 0) { |
1311 | error = -ENOMEM; |
1312 | goto done; |
1313 | } |
1314 | if (slen > len) { |
1315 | error = -ERANGE; |
1316 | goto done_len; |
1317 | } |
1318 | |
1319 | if (copy_to_sockptr(dst: optval, src: name, size: slen)) |
1320 | error = -EFAULT; |
1321 | done_len: |
1322 | if (copy_to_sockptr(dst: optlen, src: &slen, size: sizeof(slen))) |
1323 | error = -EFAULT; |
1324 | done: |
1325 | end_current_label_crit_section(label); |
1326 | kfree(objp: name); |
1327 | return error; |
1328 | } |
1329 | |
1330 | /** |
1331 | * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet |
1332 | * @sock: the peer socket |
1333 | * @skb: packet data |
1334 | * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet |
1335 | * |
1336 | * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent |
1337 | */ |
1338 | static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, |
1339 | struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
1340 | |
1341 | { |
1342 | /* TODO: requires secid support */ |
1343 | return -ENOPROTOOPT; |
1344 | } |
1345 | |
1346 | /** |
1347 | * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket |
1348 | * @sk: child sock |
1349 | * @parent: parent socket |
1350 | * |
1351 | * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can |
1352 | * just set sk security information off of current creating process label |
1353 | * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based |
1354 | * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled |
1355 | * socket is shared by different tasks. |
1356 | */ |
1357 | static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
1358 | { |
1359 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
1360 | |
1361 | if (!ctx->label) |
1362 | ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); |
1363 | } |
1364 | |
1365 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
1366 | static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
1367 | struct request_sock *req) |
1368 | { |
1369 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
1370 | |
1371 | if (!skb->secmark) |
1372 | return 0; |
1373 | |
1374 | return apparmor_secmark_check(label: ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, |
1375 | secid: skb->secmark, sk); |
1376 | } |
1377 | #endif |
1378 | |
1379 | /* |
1380 | * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label. |
1381 | */ |
1382 | struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { |
1383 | .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *), |
1384 | .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), |
1385 | .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), |
1386 | }; |
1387 | |
1388 | static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { |
1389 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), |
1390 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), |
1391 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), |
1392 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), |
1393 | |
1394 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount), |
1395 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), |
1396 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), |
1397 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), |
1398 | |
1399 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), |
1400 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), |
1401 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), |
1402 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), |
1403 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), |
1404 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), |
1405 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), |
1406 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), |
1407 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), |
1408 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), |
1409 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), |
1410 | |
1411 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), |
1412 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive), |
1413 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), |
1414 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), |
1415 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), |
1416 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), |
1417 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), |
1418 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), |
1419 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate), |
1420 | |
1421 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), |
1422 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), |
1423 | |
1424 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), |
1425 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), |
1426 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), |
1427 | |
1428 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), |
1429 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), |
1430 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), |
1431 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), |
1432 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), |
1433 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), |
1434 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), |
1435 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), |
1436 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), |
1437 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), |
1438 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), |
1439 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), |
1440 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), |
1441 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
1442 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), |
1443 | #endif |
1444 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, |
1445 | apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), |
1446 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, |
1447 | apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), |
1448 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), |
1449 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK |
1450 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), |
1451 | #endif |
1452 | |
1453 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), |
1454 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), |
1455 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), |
1456 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), |
1457 | |
1458 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), |
1459 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), |
1460 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), |
1461 | |
1462 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), |
1463 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), |
1464 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj), |
1465 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj), |
1466 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), |
1467 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), |
1468 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create), |
1469 | |
1470 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
1471 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init), |
1472 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known), |
1473 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match), |
1474 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free), |
1475 | #endif |
1476 | |
1477 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), |
1478 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), |
1479 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), |
1480 | |
1481 | #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING |
1482 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds), |
1483 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll), |
1484 | #endif |
1485 | }; |
1486 | |
1487 | /* |
1488 | * AppArmor sysfs module parameters |
1489 | */ |
1490 | |
1491 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1492 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1493 | #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool |
1494 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { |
1495 | .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, |
1496 | .set = param_set_aabool, |
1497 | .get = param_get_aabool |
1498 | }; |
1499 | |
1500 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1501 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1502 | #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint |
1503 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { |
1504 | .set = param_set_aauint, |
1505 | .get = param_get_aauint |
1506 | }; |
1507 | |
1508 | static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, |
1509 | const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1510 | static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, |
1511 | const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1512 | #define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int |
1513 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = { |
1514 | .set = param_set_aacompressionlevel, |
1515 | .get = param_get_aacompressionlevel |
1516 | }; |
1517 | |
1518 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1519 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1520 | #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool |
1521 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { |
1522 | .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, |
1523 | .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, |
1524 | .get = param_get_aalockpolicy |
1525 | }; |
1526 | |
1527 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1528 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1529 | |
1530 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1531 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1532 | |
1533 | /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters |
1534 | * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. |
1535 | */ |
1536 | |
1537 | /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ |
1538 | enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; |
1539 | module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, |
1540 | &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1541 | |
1542 | /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ |
1543 | bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); |
1544 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH |
1545 | module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1546 | #endif |
1547 | |
1548 | /* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */ |
1549 | bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY); |
1550 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY |
1551 | module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600); |
1552 | #endif |
1553 | |
1554 | /* policy loaddata compression level */ |
1555 | int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL; |
1556 | module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, |
1557 | aacompressionlevel, 0400); |
1558 | |
1559 | /* Debug mode */ |
1560 | bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); |
1561 | module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1562 | |
1563 | /* Audit mode */ |
1564 | enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; |
1565 | module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, |
1566 | &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1567 | |
1568 | /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This |
1569 | * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running |
1570 | */ |
1571 | bool = true; |
1572 | module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, |
1573 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1574 | |
1575 | /* lock out loading/removal of policy |
1576 | * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to |
1577 | * load policy, if lock_policy is set |
1578 | */ |
1579 | bool aa_g_lock_policy; |
1580 | module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, |
1581 | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1582 | |
1583 | /* Syscall logging mode */ |
1584 | bool aa_g_logsyscall; |
1585 | module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); |
1586 | |
1587 | /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ |
1588 | unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; |
1589 | module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); |
1590 | |
1591 | /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification |
1592 | * on the loaded policy is done. |
1593 | * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now |
1594 | * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. |
1595 | */ |
1596 | bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD); |
1597 | module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); |
1598 | |
1599 | static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1600 | static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); |
1601 | #define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int |
1602 | static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = { |
1603 | .set = param_set_aaintbool, |
1604 | .get = param_get_aaintbool |
1605 | }; |
1606 | /* Boot time disable flag */ |
1607 | static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1; |
1608 | module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444); |
1609 | |
1610 | static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |
1611 | { |
1612 | unsigned long enabled; |
1613 | int error = kstrtoul(s: str, base: 0, res: &enabled); |
1614 | if (!error) |
1615 | apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
1616 | return 1; |
1617 | } |
1618 | |
1619 | __setup("apparmor=" , apparmor_enabled_setup); |
1620 | |
1621 | /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ |
1622 | static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1623 | { |
1624 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1625 | return -EINVAL; |
1626 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
1627 | return -EPERM; |
1628 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
1629 | } |
1630 | |
1631 | static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1632 | { |
1633 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1634 | return -EINVAL; |
1635 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
1636 | return -EPERM; |
1637 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
1638 | } |
1639 | |
1640 | static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1641 | { |
1642 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1643 | return -EINVAL; |
1644 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
1645 | return -EPERM; |
1646 | return param_set_bool(val, kp); |
1647 | } |
1648 | |
1649 | static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1650 | { |
1651 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1652 | return -EINVAL; |
1653 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
1654 | return -EPERM; |
1655 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); |
1656 | } |
1657 | |
1658 | static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1659 | { |
1660 | int error; |
1661 | |
1662 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1663 | return -EINVAL; |
1664 | /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */ |
1665 | if (apparmor_initialized) |
1666 | return -EPERM; |
1667 | |
1668 | error = param_set_uint(val, kp); |
1669 | aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer)); |
1670 | pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n" , aa_g_path_max); |
1671 | |
1672 | return error; |
1673 | } |
1674 | |
1675 | static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1676 | { |
1677 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1678 | return -EINVAL; |
1679 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
1680 | return -EPERM; |
1681 | return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); |
1682 | } |
1683 | |
1684 | /* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */ |
1685 | static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1686 | { |
1687 | struct kernel_param kp_local; |
1688 | bool value; |
1689 | int error; |
1690 | |
1691 | if (apparmor_initialized) |
1692 | return -EPERM; |
1693 | |
1694 | /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ |
1695 | value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); |
1696 | memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); |
1697 | kp_local.arg = &value; |
1698 | |
1699 | error = param_set_bool(val, kp: &kp_local); |
1700 | if (!error) |
1701 | *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg); |
1702 | return error; |
1703 | } |
1704 | |
1705 | /* |
1706 | * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to |
1707 | * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for |
1708 | * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM |
1709 | * infrastructure. |
1710 | */ |
1711 | static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1712 | { |
1713 | struct kernel_param kp_local; |
1714 | bool value; |
1715 | |
1716 | /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ |
1717 | value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); |
1718 | memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); |
1719 | kp_local.arg = &value; |
1720 | |
1721 | return param_get_bool(buffer, kp: &kp_local); |
1722 | } |
1723 | |
1724 | static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, |
1725 | const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1726 | { |
1727 | int error; |
1728 | |
1729 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1730 | return -EINVAL; |
1731 | if (apparmor_initialized) |
1732 | return -EPERM; |
1733 | |
1734 | error = param_set_int(val, kp); |
1735 | |
1736 | aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, |
1737 | AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL); |
1738 | pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n" , |
1739 | aa_g_rawdata_compression_level); |
1740 | |
1741 | return error; |
1742 | } |
1743 | |
1744 | static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, |
1745 | const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1746 | { |
1747 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1748 | return -EINVAL; |
1749 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
1750 | return -EPERM; |
1751 | return param_get_int(buffer, kp); |
1752 | } |
1753 | |
1754 | static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1755 | { |
1756 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1757 | return -EINVAL; |
1758 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
1759 | return -EPERM; |
1760 | return sprintf(buf: buffer, fmt: "%s" , audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); |
1761 | } |
1762 | |
1763 | static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1764 | { |
1765 | int i; |
1766 | |
1767 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1768 | return -EINVAL; |
1769 | if (!val) |
1770 | return -EINVAL; |
1771 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
1772 | return -EPERM; |
1773 | |
1774 | i = match_string(array: audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, string: val); |
1775 | if (i < 0) |
1776 | return -EINVAL; |
1777 | |
1778 | aa_g_audit = i; |
1779 | return 0; |
1780 | } |
1781 | |
1782 | static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1783 | { |
1784 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1785 | return -EINVAL; |
1786 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) |
1787 | return -EPERM; |
1788 | |
1789 | return sprintf(buf: buffer, fmt: "%s" , aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); |
1790 | } |
1791 | |
1792 | static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) |
1793 | { |
1794 | int i; |
1795 | |
1796 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1797 | return -EINVAL; |
1798 | if (!val) |
1799 | return -EINVAL; |
1800 | if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
1801 | return -EPERM; |
1802 | |
1803 | i = match_string(array: aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX, |
1804 | string: val); |
1805 | if (i < 0) |
1806 | return -EINVAL; |
1807 | |
1808 | aa_g_profile_mode = i; |
1809 | return 0; |
1810 | } |
1811 | |
1812 | char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic) |
1813 | { |
1814 | union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
1815 | struct aa_local_cache *cache; |
1816 | bool try_again = true; |
1817 | gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
1818 | |
1819 | /* use per cpu cached buffers first */ |
1820 | cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1821 | if (!list_empty(head: &cache->head)) { |
1822 | aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list); |
1823 | list_del(entry: &aa_buf->list); |
1824 | cache->hold--; |
1825 | cache->count--; |
1826 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1827 | return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; |
1828 | } |
1829 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1830 | |
1831 | if (!spin_trylock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock)) { |
1832 | cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1833 | cache->hold += 1; |
1834 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1835 | spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1836 | } else { |
1837 | cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1838 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1839 | } |
1840 | retry: |
1841 | if (buffer_count > reserve_count || |
1842 | (in_atomic && !list_empty(head: &aa_global_buffers))) { |
1843 | aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, |
1844 | list); |
1845 | list_del(entry: &aa_buf->list); |
1846 | buffer_count--; |
1847 | spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1848 | return aa_buf->buffer; |
1849 | } |
1850 | if (in_atomic) { |
1851 | /* |
1852 | * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase |
1853 | * how many buffers to keep in reserve |
1854 | */ |
1855 | reserve_count++; |
1856 | flags = GFP_ATOMIC; |
1857 | } |
1858 | spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1859 | |
1860 | if (!in_atomic) |
1861 | might_sleep(); |
1862 | aa_buf = kmalloc(size: aa_g_path_max, flags); |
1863 | if (!aa_buf) { |
1864 | if (try_again) { |
1865 | try_again = false; |
1866 | spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1867 | goto retry; |
1868 | } |
1869 | pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n" ); |
1870 | return NULL; |
1871 | } |
1872 | return aa_buf->buffer; |
1873 | } |
1874 | |
1875 | void aa_put_buffer(char *buf) |
1876 | { |
1877 | union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
1878 | struct aa_local_cache *cache; |
1879 | |
1880 | if (!buf) |
1881 | return; |
1882 | aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]); |
1883 | |
1884 | cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1885 | if (!cache->hold) { |
1886 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1887 | |
1888 | if (spin_trylock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock)) { |
1889 | /* put back on global list */ |
1890 | list_add(new: &aa_buf->list, head: &aa_global_buffers); |
1891 | buffer_count++; |
1892 | spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1893 | cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1894 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1895 | return; |
1896 | } |
1897 | /* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */ |
1898 | cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1899 | cache->hold += 1; |
1900 | } |
1901 | |
1902 | /* cache in percpu list */ |
1903 | list_add(new: &aa_buf->list, head: &cache->head); |
1904 | cache->count++; |
1905 | put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); |
1906 | } |
1907 | |
1908 | /* |
1909 | * AppArmor init functions |
1910 | */ |
1911 | |
1912 | /** |
1913 | * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task. |
1914 | * |
1915 | * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined |
1916 | */ |
1917 | static int __init set_init_ctx(void) |
1918 | { |
1919 | struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred; |
1920 | |
1921 | set_cred_label(cred, label: aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns))); |
1922 | |
1923 | return 0; |
1924 | } |
1925 | |
1926 | static void destroy_buffers(void) |
1927 | { |
1928 | union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
1929 | |
1930 | spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1931 | while (!list_empty(head: &aa_global_buffers)) { |
1932 | aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, |
1933 | list); |
1934 | list_del(entry: &aa_buf->list); |
1935 | spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1936 | kfree(objp: aa_buf); |
1937 | spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1938 | } |
1939 | spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock); |
1940 | } |
1941 | |
1942 | static int __init alloc_buffers(void) |
1943 | { |
1944 | union aa_buffer *aa_buf; |
1945 | int i, num; |
1946 | |
1947 | /* |
1948 | * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce |
1949 | * lock contention |
1950 | */ |
1951 | for_each_possible_cpu(i) { |
1952 | per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0; |
1953 | per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0; |
1954 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(list: &per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head); |
1955 | } |
1956 | /* |
1957 | * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are |
1958 | * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers |
1959 | * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more |
1960 | * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. |
1961 | * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be |
1962 | * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. |
1963 | */ |
1964 | if (num_online_cpus() > 1) |
1965 | num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; |
1966 | else |
1967 | num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT; |
1968 | |
1969 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { |
1970 | |
1971 | aa_buf = kmalloc(size: aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL | |
1972 | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
1973 | if (!aa_buf) { |
1974 | destroy_buffers(); |
1975 | return -ENOMEM; |
1976 | } |
1977 | aa_put_buffer(buf: aa_buf->buffer); |
1978 | } |
1979 | return 0; |
1980 | } |
1981 | |
1982 | #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL |
1983 | static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, |
1984 | void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) |
1985 | { |
1986 | if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) |
1987 | return -EPERM; |
1988 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
1989 | return -EINVAL; |
1990 | |
1991 | return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); |
1992 | } |
1993 | |
1994 | static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { |
1995 | #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS |
1996 | { |
1997 | .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy" , |
1998 | .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, |
1999 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
2000 | .mode = 0600, |
2001 | .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, |
2002 | }, |
2003 | #endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */ |
2004 | { |
2005 | .procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode" , |
2006 | .data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode, |
2007 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
2008 | .mode = 0600, |
2009 | .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, |
2010 | }, |
2011 | { |
2012 | .procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined" , |
2013 | .data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted, |
2014 | .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
2015 | .mode = 0600, |
2016 | .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, |
2017 | }, |
2018 | { } |
2019 | }; |
2020 | |
2021 | static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void) |
2022 | { |
2023 | return register_sysctl("kernel" , apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; |
2024 | } |
2025 | #else |
2026 | static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void) |
2027 | { |
2028 | return 0; |
2029 | } |
2030 | #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |
2031 | |
2032 | #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) |
2033 | static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, |
2034 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
2035 | const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
2036 | { |
2037 | struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; |
2038 | struct sock *sk; |
2039 | |
2040 | if (!skb->secmark) |
2041 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
2042 | |
2043 | sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); |
2044 | if (sk == NULL) |
2045 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
2046 | |
2047 | ctx = aa_sock(sk); |
2048 | if (!apparmor_secmark_check(label: ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, |
2049 | secid: skb->secmark, sk)) |
2050 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
2051 | |
2052 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
2053 | |
2054 | } |
2055 | |
2056 | static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { |
2057 | { |
2058 | .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, |
2059 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
2060 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
2061 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
2062 | }, |
2063 | #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) |
2064 | { |
2065 | .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, |
2066 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
2067 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
2068 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
2069 | }, |
2070 | #endif |
2071 | }; |
2072 | |
2073 | static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net) |
2074 | { |
2075 | return nf_register_net_hooks(net, reg: apparmor_nf_ops, |
2076 | ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); |
2077 | } |
2078 | |
2079 | static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net) |
2080 | { |
2081 | nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, reg: apparmor_nf_ops, |
2082 | ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); |
2083 | } |
2084 | |
2085 | static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = { |
2086 | .init = apparmor_nf_register, |
2087 | .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister, |
2088 | }; |
2089 | |
2090 | static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) |
2091 | { |
2092 | int err; |
2093 | |
2094 | if (!apparmor_enabled) |
2095 | return 0; |
2096 | |
2097 | err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops); |
2098 | if (err) |
2099 | panic(fmt: "Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n" , err); |
2100 | |
2101 | return 0; |
2102 | } |
2103 | __initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init); |
2104 | #endif |
2105 | |
2106 | static char nulldfa_src[] = { |
2107 | #include "nulldfa.in" |
2108 | }; |
2109 | struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; |
2110 | |
2111 | static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = { |
2112 | #include "stacksplitdfa.in" |
2113 | }; |
2114 | struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; |
2115 | struct aa_policydb *nullpdb; |
2116 | |
2117 | static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) |
2118 | { |
2119 | int error = -ENOMEM; |
2120 | |
2121 | nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL); |
2122 | if (!nullpdb) |
2123 | return -ENOMEM; |
2124 | |
2125 | nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob: nulldfa_src, size: sizeof(nulldfa_src), |
2126 | TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | |
2127 | TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); |
2128 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: nulldfa)) { |
2129 | error = PTR_ERR(ptr: nulldfa); |
2130 | goto fail; |
2131 | } |
2132 | nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(dfa: nulldfa); |
2133 | nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(n: 2, size: sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL); |
2134 | if (!nullpdb->perms) |
2135 | goto fail; |
2136 | nullpdb->size = 2; |
2137 | |
2138 | stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob: stacksplitdfa_src, |
2139 | size: sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src), |
2140 | TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | |
2141 | TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); |
2142 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: stacksplitdfa)) { |
2143 | error = PTR_ERR(ptr: stacksplitdfa); |
2144 | goto fail; |
2145 | } |
2146 | |
2147 | return 0; |
2148 | |
2149 | fail: |
2150 | aa_put_pdb(pdb: nullpdb); |
2151 | aa_put_dfa(dfa: nulldfa); |
2152 | nullpdb = NULL; |
2153 | nulldfa = NULL; |
2154 | stacksplitdfa = NULL; |
2155 | |
2156 | return error; |
2157 | } |
2158 | |
2159 | static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void) |
2160 | { |
2161 | aa_put_dfa(dfa: stacksplitdfa); |
2162 | aa_put_dfa(dfa: nulldfa); |
2163 | aa_put_pdb(pdb: nullpdb); |
2164 | nullpdb = NULL; |
2165 | stacksplitdfa = NULL; |
2166 | nulldfa = NULL; |
2167 | } |
2168 | |
2169 | static int __init apparmor_init(void) |
2170 | { |
2171 | int error; |
2172 | |
2173 | error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); |
2174 | if (error) { |
2175 | AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n" ); |
2176 | goto alloc_out; |
2177 | } |
2178 | |
2179 | error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); |
2180 | if (error) { |
2181 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n" ); |
2182 | goto alloc_out; |
2183 | } |
2184 | |
2185 | error = apparmor_init_sysctl(); |
2186 | if (error) { |
2187 | AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n" ); |
2188 | goto alloc_out; |
2189 | |
2190 | } |
2191 | |
2192 | error = alloc_buffers(); |
2193 | if (error) { |
2194 | AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n" ); |
2195 | goto alloc_out; |
2196 | } |
2197 | |
2198 | error = set_init_ctx(); |
2199 | if (error) { |
2200 | AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n" ); |
2201 | aa_free_root_ns(); |
2202 | goto buffers_out; |
2203 | } |
2204 | security_add_hooks(hooks: apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), |
2205 | lsm: "apparmor" ); |
2206 | |
2207 | /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ |
2208 | apparmor_initialized = 1; |
2209 | if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) |
2210 | aa_info_message(str: "AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled" ); |
2211 | else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) |
2212 | aa_info_message(str: "AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled" ); |
2213 | else |
2214 | aa_info_message(str: "AppArmor initialized" ); |
2215 | |
2216 | return error; |
2217 | |
2218 | buffers_out: |
2219 | destroy_buffers(); |
2220 | alloc_out: |
2221 | aa_destroy_aafs(); |
2222 | aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); |
2223 | |
2224 | apparmor_enabled = false; |
2225 | return error; |
2226 | } |
2227 | |
2228 | DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { |
2229 | .name = "apparmor" , |
2230 | .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, |
2231 | .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, |
2232 | .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, |
2233 | .init = apparmor_init, |
2234 | }; |
2235 | |