1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2/*
3 * AppArmor security module
4 *
5 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
6 *
7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
8 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 */
10
11#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
12#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
13#include <linux/mm.h>
14#include <linux/mman.h>
15#include <linux/mount.h>
16#include <linux/namei.h>
17#include <linux/ptrace.h>
18#include <linux/ctype.h>
19#include <linux/sysctl.h>
20#include <linux/audit.h>
21#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
22#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
23#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
24#include <linux/zstd.h>
25#include <net/sock.h>
26#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
27
28#include "include/apparmor.h"
29#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30#include "include/audit.h"
31#include "include/capability.h"
32#include "include/cred.h"
33#include "include/file.h"
34#include "include/ipc.h"
35#include "include/net.h"
36#include "include/path.h"
37#include "include/label.h"
38#include "include/policy.h"
39#include "include/policy_ns.h"
40#include "include/procattr.h"
41#include "include/mount.h"
42#include "include/secid.h"
43
44/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
45int apparmor_initialized;
46
47union aa_buffer {
48 struct list_head list;
49 DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer);
50};
51
52struct aa_local_cache {
53 unsigned int hold;
54 unsigned int count;
55 struct list_head head;
56};
57
58#define RESERVE_COUNT 2
59static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT;
60static int buffer_count;
61
62static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers);
63static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock);
64static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers);
65
66/*
67 * LSM hook functions
68 */
69
70/*
71 * put the associated labels
72 */
73static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
74{
75 aa_put_label(l: cred_label(cred));
76 set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
77}
78
79/*
80 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
81 */
82static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
83{
84 set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
85 return 0;
86}
87
88/*
89 * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
90 */
91static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
92 gfp_t gfp)
93{
94 set_cred_label(cred: new, label: aa_get_newest_label(l: cred_label(cred: old)));
95 return 0;
96}
97
98/*
99 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
100 */
101static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
102{
103 set_cred_label(cred: new, label: aa_get_newest_label(l: cred_label(cred: old)));
104}
105
106static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
107{
108
109 aa_free_task_ctx(ctx: task_ctx(task));
110}
111
112static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
113 unsigned long clone_flags)
114{
115 struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
116
117 aa_dup_task_ctx(new, old: task_ctx(current));
118
119 return 0;
120}
121
122static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
123 unsigned int mode)
124{
125 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
126 const struct cred *cred;
127 int error;
128
129 cred = get_task_cred(child);
130 tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
131 tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
132 error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, tracee_cred: cred, tracee,
133 request: (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
134 : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
135 __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
136 put_cred(cred);
137
138 return error;
139}
140
141static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
142{
143 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
144 const struct cred *cred;
145 int error;
146
147 tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
148 cred = get_task_cred(parent);
149 tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
150 error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred: cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
151 AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
152 put_cred(cred);
153 __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
154
155 return error;
156}
157
158/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
159static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
160 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
161{
162 struct aa_label *label;
163 const struct cred *cred;
164
165 rcu_read_lock();
166 cred = __task_cred(target);
167 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
168
169 /*
170 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
171 * initialize effective and permitted.
172 */
173 if (!unconfined(label)) {
174 struct aa_profile *profile;
175 struct label_it i;
176
177 label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
178 struct aa_ruleset *rules;
179 if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
180 continue;
181 rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
182 typeof(*rules), list);
183 *effective = cap_intersect(a: *effective,
184 b: rules->caps.allow);
185 *permitted = cap_intersect(a: *permitted,
186 b: rules->caps.allow);
187 }
188 }
189 rcu_read_unlock();
190 aa_put_label(l: label);
191
192 return 0;
193}
194
195static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
196 int cap, unsigned int opts)
197{
198 struct aa_label *label;
199 int error = 0;
200
201 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
202 if (!unconfined(label))
203 error = aa_capable(subj_cred: cred, label, cap, opts);
204 aa_put_label(l: label);
205
206 return error;
207}
208
209/**
210 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
211 * @op: operation being checked
212 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
213 * @mask: requested permissions mask
214 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
215 *
216 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
217 */
218static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
219 struct path_cond *cond)
220{
221 struct aa_label *label;
222 int error = 0;
223
224 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
225 if (!unconfined(label))
226 error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, flags: 0, request: mask,
227 cond);
228 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
229
230 return error;
231}
232
233/**
234 * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
235 * @op: operation being checked
236 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
237 * @mask: requested permissions mask
238 *
239 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
240 */
241static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
242{
243 vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap: mnt_idmap(mnt: path->mnt),
244 inode: d_backing_inode(upper: path->dentry));
245 struct path_cond cond = {
246 vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
247 d_backing_inode(upper: path->dentry)->i_mode
248 };
249
250 if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: path->dentry))
251 return 0;
252
253 return common_perm(op, path, mask, cond: &cond);
254}
255
256/**
257 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
258 * @op: operation being checked
259 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
260 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
261 * @mask: requested permissions mask
262 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
263 *
264 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
265 */
266static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
267 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
268 struct path_cond *cond)
269{
270 struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
271
272 return common_perm(op, path: &path, mask, cond);
273}
274
275/**
276 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
277 * @op: operation being checked
278 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
279 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
280 * @mask: requested permission mask
281 *
282 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
283 */
284static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
285 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
286{
287 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(upper: dentry);
288 struct path_cond cond = { };
289 vfsuid_t vfsuid;
290
291 if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
292 return 0;
293
294 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap: mnt_idmap(mnt: dir->mnt), inode);
295 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
296 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
297
298 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, cond: &cond);
299}
300
301/**
302 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
303 * @op: operation being checked
304 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
305 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
306 * @mask: request permission mask
307 * @mode: created file mode
308 *
309 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
310 */
311static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
312 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
313{
314 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
315
316 if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: dir->dentry))
317 return 0;
318
319 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, cond: &cond);
320}
321
322static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
323{
324 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
325}
326
327static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
328 umode_t mode)
329{
330 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
331 S_IFDIR);
332}
333
334static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
335{
336 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
337}
338
339static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
340 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
341{
342 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
343}
344
345static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
346{
347 return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
348}
349
350static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file)
351{
352 return apparmor_path_truncate(path: &file->f_path);
353}
354
355static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
356 const char *old_name)
357{
358 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
359 S_IFLNK);
360}
361
362static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
363 struct dentry *new_dentry)
364{
365 struct aa_label *label;
366 int error = 0;
367
368 if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: old_dentry))
369 return 0;
370
371 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
372 if (!unconfined(label))
373 error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
374 new_dentry);
375 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
376
377 return error;
378}
379
380static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
381 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
382 const unsigned int flags)
383{
384 struct aa_label *label;
385 int error = 0;
386
387 if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: old_dentry))
388 return 0;
389 if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(dentry: new_dentry))
390 return 0;
391
392 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
393 if (!unconfined(label)) {
394 struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(mnt: old_dir->mnt);
395 vfsuid_t vfsuid;
396 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
397 .dentry = old_dentry };
398 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
399 .dentry = new_dentry };
400 struct path_cond cond = {
401 .mode = d_backing_inode(upper: old_dentry)->i_mode
402 };
403 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode: d_backing_inode(upper: old_dentry));
404 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
405
406 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
407 struct path_cond cond_exchange = {
408 .mode = d_backing_inode(upper: new_dentry)->i_mode,
409 };
410 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode: d_backing_inode(upper: old_dentry));
411 cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
412
413 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
414 label, path: &new_path, flags: 0,
415 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
416 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
417 cond: &cond_exchange);
418 if (!error)
419 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
420 label, path: &old_path,
421 flags: 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
422 AA_MAY_CREATE, cond: &cond_exchange);
423 }
424
425 if (!error)
426 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
427 label, path: &old_path, flags: 0,
428 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
429 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
430 cond: &cond);
431 if (!error)
432 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
433 label, path: &new_path,
434 flags: 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
435 AA_MAY_CREATE, cond: &cond);
436
437 }
438 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
439
440 return error;
441}
442
443static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
444{
445 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
446}
447
448static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
449{
450 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
451}
452
453static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
454{
455 return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
456}
457
458static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
459{
460 struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
461 struct aa_label *label;
462 int error = 0;
463
464 if (!path_mediated_fs(dentry: file->f_path.dentry))
465 return 0;
466
467 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
468 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
469 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
470 * actually execute the image.
471 */
472 if (current->in_execve) {
473 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
474 return 0;
475 }
476
477 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred: file->f_cred);
478 if (!unconfined(label)) {
479 struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
480 struct inode *inode = file_inode(f: file);
481 vfsuid_t vfsuid;
482 struct path_cond cond = {
483 .mode = inode->i_mode,
484 };
485 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
486 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
487
488 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, subj_cred: file->f_cred,
489 label, path: &file->f_path, flags: 0,
490 request: aa_map_file_to_perms(file), cond: &cond);
491 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
492 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
493 }
494 aa_put_label(l: label);
495
496 return error;
497}
498
499static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
500{
501 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
502 struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
503
504 spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
505 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
506 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
507 return 0;
508}
509
510static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
511{
512 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
513
514 if (ctx)
515 aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
516}
517
518static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask,
519 bool in_atomic)
520{
521 struct aa_label *label;
522 int error = 0;
523
524 /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
525 if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
526 return -EACCES;
527
528 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
529 error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, request: mask, in_atomic);
530 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
531
532 return error;
533}
534
535static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
536{
537 return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, mask: aa_map_file_to_perms(file),
538 in_atomic: false);
539}
540
541static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
542{
543 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, in_atomic: false);
544}
545
546static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
547{
548 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
549
550 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
551 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
552
553 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, in_atomic: false);
554}
555
556static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
557 unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic)
558{
559 int mask = 0;
560
561 if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
562 return 0;
563
564 if (prot & PROT_READ)
565 mask |= MAY_READ;
566 /*
567 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
568 * write back to the files
569 */
570 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
571 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
572 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
573 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
574
575 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic);
576}
577
578static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
579 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
580{
581 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC);
582}
583
584static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
585 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
586{
587 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, file: vma->vm_file, prot,
588 flags: !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0,
589 in_atomic: false);
590}
591
592#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
593static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask)
594{
595 if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL)
596 return "sqpoll";
597 if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED)
598 return "override_creds";
599 return "";
600}
601
602static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
603{
604 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va);
605
606 if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
607 audit_log_format(ab, fmt: " requested=\"%s\"",
608 audit_uring_mask(mask: ad->request));
609 if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) {
610 audit_log_format(ab, fmt: " denied=\"%s\"",
611 audit_uring_mask(mask: ad->denied));
612 }
613 }
614 if (ad->uring.target) {
615 audit_log_format(ab, fmt: " tcontext=");
616 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label),
617 label: ad->uring.target,
618 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
619 }
620}
621
622static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
623 struct aa_label *new, int cap,
624 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
625{
626 unsigned int state;
627 struct aa_ruleset *rules;
628 int error = 0;
629
630 AA_BUG(!profile);
631
632 rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list);
633 state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING);
634 if (state) {
635 struct aa_perms perms = { };
636
637 if (new) {
638 aa_label_match(profile, rules, label: new, state,
639 subns: false, request, perms: &perms);
640 } else {
641 perms = *aa_lookup_perms(policy: rules->policy, state);
642 }
643 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms: &perms);
644 error = aa_check_perms(profile, perms: &perms, request, ad,
645 cb: audit_uring_cb);
646 }
647
648 return error;
649}
650
651/**
652 * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
653 * @new: the target creds
654 *
655 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
656 * to service an io_uring operation.
657 */
658static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
659{
660 struct aa_profile *profile;
661 struct aa_label *label;
662 int error;
663 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
664 OP_URING_OVERRIDE);
665
666 ad.uring.target = cred_label(cred: new);
667 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
668 error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
669 profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED,
670 cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
671 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
672
673 return error;
674}
675
676/**
677 * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
678 *
679 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
680 * kernel polling thread.
681 */
682static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void)
683{
684 struct aa_profile *profile;
685 struct aa_label *label;
686 int error;
687 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING,
688 OP_URING_SQPOLL);
689
690 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
691 error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
692 profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL,
693 NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad));
694 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
695
696 return error;
697}
698#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
699
700static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
701 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
702{
703 struct aa_label *label;
704 int error = 0;
705
706 /* Discard magic */
707 if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
708 flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
709
710 flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
711
712 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
713 if (!unconfined(label)) {
714 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
715 error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
716 data);
717 else if (flags & MS_BIND)
718 error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
719 old_name: dev_name, flags);
720 else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
721 MS_UNBINDABLE))
722 error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
723 path, flags);
724 else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
725 error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path,
726 old_name: dev_name);
727 else
728 error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
729 path, type, flags, data);
730 }
731 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
732
733 return error;
734}
735
736static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
737 const struct path *to_path)
738{
739 struct aa_label *label;
740 int error = 0;
741
742 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
743 if (!unconfined(label))
744 error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path,
745 to_path);
746 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
747
748 return error;
749}
750
751static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
752{
753 struct aa_label *label;
754 int error = 0;
755
756 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
757 if (!unconfined(label))
758 error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
759 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
760
761 return error;
762}
763
764static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
765 const struct path *new_path)
766{
767 struct aa_label *label;
768 int error = 0;
769
770 label = aa_get_current_label();
771 if (!unconfined(label))
772 error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
773 aa_put_label(l: label);
774
775 return error;
776}
777
778static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
779 char **value)
780{
781 int error = -ENOENT;
782 /* released below */
783 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
784 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
785 struct aa_label *label = NULL;
786
787 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
788 label = aa_get_newest_label(l: cred_label(cred));
789 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
790 label = aa_get_newest_label(l: ctx->previous);
791 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
792 label = aa_get_newest_label(l: ctx->onexec);
793 else
794 error = -EINVAL;
795
796 if (label)
797 error = aa_getprocattr(label, string: value);
798
799 aa_put_label(l: label);
800 put_cred(cred);
801
802 return error;
803}
804
805static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
806 size_t size)
807{
808 char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
809 size_t arg_size;
810 int error;
811 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE,
812 OP_SETPROCATTR);
813
814 if (size == 0)
815 return -EINVAL;
816
817 /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
818 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
819 /* null terminate */
820 largs = args = kmalloc(size: size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
821 if (!args)
822 return -ENOMEM;
823 memcpy(args, value, size);
824 args[size] = '\0';
825 }
826
827 error = -EINVAL;
828 args = strim(args);
829 command = strsep(&args, " ");
830 if (!args)
831 goto out;
832 args = skip_spaces(args);
833 if (!*args)
834 goto out;
835
836 arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
837 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
838 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
839 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, size: arg_size,
840 AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
841 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
842 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, size: arg_size,
843 AA_CHANGE_TEST);
844 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
845 error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
846 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
847 error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
848 } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
849 error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
850 } else
851 goto fail;
852 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
853 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
854 error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
855 else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
856 error = aa_change_profile(fqname: args, flags: (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
857 AA_CHANGE_STACK));
858 else
859 goto fail;
860 } else
861 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
862 goto fail;
863
864 if (!error)
865 error = size;
866out:
867 kfree(objp: largs);
868 return error;
869
870fail:
871 ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
872 ad.info = name;
873 ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
874 aa_audit_msg(type: AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, ad: &ad, NULL);
875 end_current_label_crit_section(label: ad.subj_label);
876 goto out;
877}
878
879/**
880 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
881 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
882 */
883static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
884{
885 struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
886 struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(cred: bprm->cred);
887
888 /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
889 if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
890 (unconfined(new_label)))
891 return;
892
893 aa_inherit_files(cred: bprm->cred, current->files);
894
895 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
896
897 /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
898 __aa_transition_rlimits(old: label, new: new_label);
899}
900
901/**
902 * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed
903 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
904 */
905static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
906{
907 /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
908 aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx: task_ctx(current));
909
910 return;
911}
912
913static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
914{
915 struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
916 *secid = label->secid;
917 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
918}
919
920static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
921{
922 struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(task: p);
923 *secid = label->secid;
924 aa_put_label(l: label);
925}
926
927static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
928 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
929{
930 struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
931 int error = 0;
932
933 if (!unconfined(label))
934 error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
935 resource, new_rlim);
936 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
937
938 return error;
939}
940
941static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
942 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
943{
944 const struct cred *tc;
945 struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
946 int error;
947
948 tc = get_task_cred(target);
949 tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred: tc);
950 if (cred) {
951 /*
952 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
953 */
954 cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
955 error = aa_may_signal(subj_cred: cred, sender: cl, target_cred: tc, target: tl, sig);
956 aa_put_label(l: cl);
957 return error;
958 } else {
959 cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
960 error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), sender: cl, target_cred: tc, target: tl, sig);
961 __end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
962 }
963 aa_put_label(l: tl);
964 put_cred(cred: tc);
965
966 return error;
967}
968
969static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
970{
971 struct aa_label *label;
972 struct aa_profile *profile;
973 int error = 0;
974 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS,
975 OP_USERNS_CREATE);
976
977 ad.subj_cred = current_cred();
978
979 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
980 if (!unconfined(label)) {
981 error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
982 aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad,
983 AA_USERNS_CREATE));
984 }
985 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
986
987 return error;
988}
989
990/**
991 * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
992 */
993static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
994{
995 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
996
997 ctx = kzalloc(size: sizeof(*ctx), flags);
998 if (!ctx)
999 return -ENOMEM;
1000
1001 sk->sk_security = ctx;
1002
1003 return 0;
1004}
1005
1006/**
1007 * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
1008 */
1009static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
1010{
1011 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
1012
1013 sk->sk_security = NULL;
1014 aa_put_label(l: ctx->label);
1015 aa_put_label(l: ctx->peer);
1016 kfree(objp: ctx);
1017}
1018
1019/**
1020 * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
1021 */
1022static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
1023 struct sock *newsk)
1024{
1025 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
1026 struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(sk: newsk);
1027
1028 if (new->label)
1029 aa_put_label(l: new->label);
1030 new->label = aa_get_label(l: ctx->label);
1031
1032 if (new->peer)
1033 aa_put_label(l: new->peer);
1034 new->peer = aa_get_label(l: ctx->peer);
1035}
1036
1037/**
1038 * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
1039 */
1040static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
1041{
1042 struct aa_label *label;
1043 int error = 0;
1044
1045 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1046
1047 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
1048 if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
1049 error = af_select(family,
1050 create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
1051 aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label,
1052 OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
1053 family, type, protocol));
1054 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
1055
1056 return error;
1057}
1058
1059/**
1060 * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
1061 *
1062 * Note:
1063 * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
1064 * move to a special kernel label
1065 * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
1066 * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
1067 * sock_graft.
1068 */
1069static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
1070 int type, int protocol, int kern)
1071{
1072 struct aa_label *label;
1073
1074 if (kern) {
1075 label = aa_get_label(l: kernel_t);
1076 } else
1077 label = aa_get_current_label();
1078
1079 if (sock->sk) {
1080 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk: sock->sk);
1081
1082 aa_put_label(l: ctx->label);
1083 ctx->label = aa_get_label(l: label);
1084 }
1085 aa_put_label(l: label);
1086
1087 return 0;
1088}
1089
1090/**
1091 * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
1092 */
1093static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
1094 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
1095{
1096 AA_BUG(!sock);
1097 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1098 AA_BUG(!address);
1099 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1100
1101 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1102 bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
1103 aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
1104}
1105
1106/**
1107 * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
1108 */
1109static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
1110 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
1111{
1112 AA_BUG(!sock);
1113 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1114 AA_BUG(!address);
1115 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1116
1117 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1118 connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
1119 aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
1120}
1121
1122/**
1123 * apparmor_socket_listen - check perms before allowing listen
1124 */
1125static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
1126{
1127 AA_BUG(!sock);
1128 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1129 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1130
1131 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1132 listen_perm(sock, backlog),
1133 aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
1134}
1135
1136/**
1137 * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
1138 *
1139 * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
1140 * has not been done.
1141 */
1142static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
1143{
1144 AA_BUG(!sock);
1145 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1146 AA_BUG(!newsock);
1147 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1148
1149 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1150 accept_perm(sock, newsock),
1151 aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
1152}
1153
1154static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
1155 struct msghdr *msg, int size)
1156{
1157 AA_BUG(!sock);
1158 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1159 AA_BUG(!msg);
1160 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1161
1162 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1163 msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
1164 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
1165}
1166
1167/**
1168 * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
1169 */
1170static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
1171 struct msghdr *msg, int size)
1172{
1173 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
1174}
1175
1176/**
1177 * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
1178 */
1179static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
1180 struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
1181{
1182 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
1183}
1184
1185/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
1186static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
1187{
1188 AA_BUG(!sock);
1189 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1190 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1191
1192 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1193 sock_perm(op, request, sock),
1194 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
1195}
1196
1197/**
1198 * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
1199 */
1200static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
1201{
1202 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
1203}
1204
1205/**
1206 * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
1207 */
1208static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
1209{
1210 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
1211}
1212
1213/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
1214static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
1215 int level, int optname)
1216{
1217 AA_BUG(!sock);
1218 AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
1219 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
1220
1221 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
1222 opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
1223 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
1224}
1225
1226/**
1227 * apparmor_socket_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
1228 */
1229static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
1230 int optname)
1231{
1232 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
1233 level, optname);
1234}
1235
1236/**
1237 * apparmor_socket_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
1238 */
1239static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
1240 int optname)
1241{
1242 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
1243 level, optname);
1244}
1245
1246/**
1247 * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
1248 */
1249static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
1250{
1251 return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
1252}
1253
1254#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1255/**
1256 * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
1257 *
1258 * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
1259 *
1260 * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
1261 * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
1262 */
1263static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
1264{
1265 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
1266
1267 if (!skb->secmark)
1268 return 0;
1269
1270 return apparmor_secmark_check(label: ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
1271 secid: skb->secmark, sk);
1272}
1273#endif
1274
1275
1276static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
1277{
1278 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
1279
1280 if (ctx->peer)
1281 return ctx->peer;
1282
1283 return ERR_PTR(error: -ENOPROTOOPT);
1284}
1285
1286/**
1287 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
1288 *
1289 * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
1290 */
1291static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
1292 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
1293 unsigned int len)
1294{
1295 char *name = NULL;
1296 int slen, error = 0;
1297 struct aa_label *label;
1298 struct aa_label *peer;
1299
1300 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
1301 peer = sk_peer_label(sk: sock->sk);
1302 if (IS_ERR(ptr: peer)) {
1303 error = PTR_ERR(ptr: peer);
1304 goto done;
1305 }
1306 slen = aa_label_asxprint(strp: &name, labels_ns(label), label: peer,
1307 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
1308 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
1309 /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
1310 if (slen < 0) {
1311 error = -ENOMEM;
1312 goto done;
1313 }
1314 if (slen > len) {
1315 error = -ERANGE;
1316 goto done_len;
1317 }
1318
1319 if (copy_to_sockptr(dst: optval, src: name, size: slen))
1320 error = -EFAULT;
1321done_len:
1322 if (copy_to_sockptr(dst: optlen, src: &slen, size: sizeof(slen)))
1323 error = -EFAULT;
1324done:
1325 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
1326 kfree(objp: name);
1327 return error;
1328}
1329
1330/**
1331 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
1332 * @sock: the peer socket
1333 * @skb: packet data
1334 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
1335 *
1336 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
1337 */
1338static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
1339 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
1340
1341{
1342 /* TODO: requires secid support */
1343 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
1344}
1345
1346/**
1347 * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
1348 * @sk: child sock
1349 * @parent: parent socket
1350 *
1351 * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
1352 * just set sk security information off of current creating process label
1353 * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
1354 * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
1355 * socket is shared by different tasks.
1356 */
1357static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
1358{
1359 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
1360
1361 if (!ctx->label)
1362 ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
1363}
1364
1365#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1366static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1367 struct request_sock *req)
1368{
1369 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
1370
1371 if (!skb->secmark)
1372 return 0;
1373
1374 return apparmor_secmark_check(label: ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
1375 secid: skb->secmark, sk);
1376}
1377#endif
1378
1379/*
1380 * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
1381 */
1382struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
1383 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
1384 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
1385 .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
1386};
1387
1388static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
1389 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
1390 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
1391 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
1392 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
1393
1394 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount),
1395 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
1396 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
1397 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
1398
1399 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
1400 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
1401 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
1402 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
1403 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
1404 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
1405 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
1406 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
1407 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
1408 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
1409 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
1410
1411 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
1412 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
1413 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
1414 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
1415 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
1416 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
1417 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
1418 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
1419 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),
1420
1421 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
1422 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
1423
1424 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
1425 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
1426 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
1427
1428 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
1429 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
1430 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
1431 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
1432 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
1433 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
1434 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
1435 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
1436 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
1437 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
1438 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
1439 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
1440 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
1441#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1442 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
1443#endif
1444 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
1445 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
1446 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
1447 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
1448 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
1449#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1450 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
1451#endif
1452
1453 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
1454 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
1455 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
1456 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
1457
1458 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec),
1459 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
1460 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
1461
1462 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
1463 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
1464 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
1465 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
1466 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
1467 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
1468 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),
1469
1470#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
1471 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
1472 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
1473 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
1474 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
1475#endif
1476
1477 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
1478 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
1479 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
1480
1481#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
1482 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds),
1483 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll),
1484#endif
1485};
1486
1487/*
1488 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
1489 */
1490
1491static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1492static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1493#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
1494static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
1495 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1496 .set = param_set_aabool,
1497 .get = param_get_aabool
1498};
1499
1500static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1501static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1502#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
1503static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
1504 .set = param_set_aauint,
1505 .get = param_get_aauint
1506};
1507
1508static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
1509 const struct kernel_param *kp);
1510static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
1511 const struct kernel_param *kp);
1512#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int
1513static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = {
1514 .set = param_set_aacompressionlevel,
1515 .get = param_get_aacompressionlevel
1516};
1517
1518static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1519static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1520#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
1521static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
1522 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1523 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
1524 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
1525};
1526
1527static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1528static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1529
1530static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1531static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1532
1533/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
1534 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
1535 */
1536
1537/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
1538enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
1539module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
1540 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1541
1542/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
1543bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
1544#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
1545module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1546#endif
1547
1548/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */
1549bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY);
1550#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
1551module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600);
1552#endif
1553
1554/* policy loaddata compression level */
1555int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL;
1556module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
1557 aacompressionlevel, 0400);
1558
1559/* Debug mode */
1560bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
1561module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1562
1563/* Audit mode */
1564enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
1565module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
1566 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1567
1568/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
1569 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
1570 */
1571bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
1572module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
1573 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1574
1575/* lock out loading/removal of policy
1576 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
1577 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
1578 */
1579bool aa_g_lock_policy;
1580module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
1581 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1582
1583/* Syscall logging mode */
1584bool aa_g_logsyscall;
1585module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1586
1587/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
1588unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
1589module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
1590
1591/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
1592 * on the loaded policy is done.
1593 * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
1594 * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
1595 */
1596bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
1597module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
1598
1599static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1600static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1601#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int
1602static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
1603 .set = param_set_aaintbool,
1604 .get = param_get_aaintbool
1605};
1606/* Boot time disable flag */
1607static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
1608module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
1609
1610static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
1611{
1612 unsigned long enabled;
1613 int error = kstrtoul(s: str, base: 0, res: &enabled);
1614 if (!error)
1615 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
1616 return 1;
1617}
1618
1619__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
1620
1621/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
1622static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1623{
1624 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1625 return -EINVAL;
1626 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1627 return -EPERM;
1628 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1629}
1630
1631static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1632{
1633 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1634 return -EINVAL;
1635 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
1636 return -EPERM;
1637 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1638}
1639
1640static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1641{
1642 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1643 return -EINVAL;
1644 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1645 return -EPERM;
1646 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1647}
1648
1649static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1650{
1651 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1652 return -EINVAL;
1653 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
1654 return -EPERM;
1655 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1656}
1657
1658static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1659{
1660 int error;
1661
1662 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1663 return -EINVAL;
1664 /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
1665 if (apparmor_initialized)
1666 return -EPERM;
1667
1668 error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
1669 aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer));
1670 pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
1671
1672 return error;
1673}
1674
1675static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1676{
1677 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1678 return -EINVAL;
1679 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
1680 return -EPERM;
1681 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
1682}
1683
1684/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */
1685static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1686{
1687 struct kernel_param kp_local;
1688 bool value;
1689 int error;
1690
1691 if (apparmor_initialized)
1692 return -EPERM;
1693
1694 /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
1695 value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
1696 memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
1697 kp_local.arg = &value;
1698
1699 error = param_set_bool(val, kp: &kp_local);
1700 if (!error)
1701 *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg);
1702 return error;
1703}
1704
1705/*
1706 * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to
1707 * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for
1708 * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM
1709 * infrastructure.
1710 */
1711static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1712{
1713 struct kernel_param kp_local;
1714 bool value;
1715
1716 /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
1717 value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
1718 memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
1719 kp_local.arg = &value;
1720
1721 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp: &kp_local);
1722}
1723
1724static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
1725 const struct kernel_param *kp)
1726{
1727 int error;
1728
1729 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1730 return -EINVAL;
1731 if (apparmor_initialized)
1732 return -EPERM;
1733
1734 error = param_set_int(val, kp);
1735
1736 aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
1737 AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
1738 pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n",
1739 aa_g_rawdata_compression_level);
1740
1741 return error;
1742}
1743
1744static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
1745 const struct kernel_param *kp)
1746{
1747 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1748 return -EINVAL;
1749 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
1750 return -EPERM;
1751 return param_get_int(buffer, kp);
1752}
1753
1754static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1755{
1756 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1757 return -EINVAL;
1758 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
1759 return -EPERM;
1760 return sprintf(buf: buffer, fmt: "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
1761}
1762
1763static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1764{
1765 int i;
1766
1767 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1768 return -EINVAL;
1769 if (!val)
1770 return -EINVAL;
1771 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1772 return -EPERM;
1773
1774 i = match_string(array: audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, string: val);
1775 if (i < 0)
1776 return -EINVAL;
1777
1778 aa_g_audit = i;
1779 return 0;
1780}
1781
1782static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1783{
1784 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1785 return -EINVAL;
1786 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
1787 return -EPERM;
1788
1789 return sprintf(buf: buffer, fmt: "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
1790}
1791
1792static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1793{
1794 int i;
1795
1796 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1797 return -EINVAL;
1798 if (!val)
1799 return -EINVAL;
1800 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1801 return -EPERM;
1802
1803 i = match_string(array: aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
1804 string: val);
1805 if (i < 0)
1806 return -EINVAL;
1807
1808 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
1809 return 0;
1810}
1811
1812char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic)
1813{
1814 union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
1815 struct aa_local_cache *cache;
1816 bool try_again = true;
1817 gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
1818
1819 /* use per cpu cached buffers first */
1820 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1821 if (!list_empty(head: &cache->head)) {
1822 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list);
1823 list_del(entry: &aa_buf->list);
1824 cache->hold--;
1825 cache->count--;
1826 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1827 return &aa_buf->buffer[0];
1828 }
1829 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1830
1831 if (!spin_trylock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock)) {
1832 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1833 cache->hold += 1;
1834 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1835 spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1836 } else {
1837 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1838 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1839 }
1840retry:
1841 if (buffer_count > reserve_count ||
1842 (in_atomic && !list_empty(head: &aa_global_buffers))) {
1843 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
1844 list);
1845 list_del(entry: &aa_buf->list);
1846 buffer_count--;
1847 spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1848 return aa_buf->buffer;
1849 }
1850 if (in_atomic) {
1851 /*
1852 * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase
1853 * how many buffers to keep in reserve
1854 */
1855 reserve_count++;
1856 flags = GFP_ATOMIC;
1857 }
1858 spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1859
1860 if (!in_atomic)
1861 might_sleep();
1862 aa_buf = kmalloc(size: aa_g_path_max, flags);
1863 if (!aa_buf) {
1864 if (try_again) {
1865 try_again = false;
1866 spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1867 goto retry;
1868 }
1869 pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n");
1870 return NULL;
1871 }
1872 return aa_buf->buffer;
1873}
1874
1875void aa_put_buffer(char *buf)
1876{
1877 union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
1878 struct aa_local_cache *cache;
1879
1880 if (!buf)
1881 return;
1882 aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]);
1883
1884 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1885 if (!cache->hold) {
1886 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1887
1888 if (spin_trylock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock)) {
1889 /* put back on global list */
1890 list_add(new: &aa_buf->list, head: &aa_global_buffers);
1891 buffer_count++;
1892 spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1893 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1894 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1895 return;
1896 }
1897 /* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */
1898 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1899 cache->hold += 1;
1900 }
1901
1902 /* cache in percpu list */
1903 list_add(new: &aa_buf->list, head: &cache->head);
1904 cache->count++;
1905 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers);
1906}
1907
1908/*
1909 * AppArmor init functions
1910 */
1911
1912/**
1913 * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
1914 *
1915 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
1916 */
1917static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
1918{
1919 struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred;
1920
1921 set_cred_label(cred, label: aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
1922
1923 return 0;
1924}
1925
1926static void destroy_buffers(void)
1927{
1928 union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
1929
1930 spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1931 while (!list_empty(head: &aa_global_buffers)) {
1932 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
1933 list);
1934 list_del(entry: &aa_buf->list);
1935 spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1936 kfree(objp: aa_buf);
1937 spin_lock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1938 }
1939 spin_unlock(lock: &aa_buffers_lock);
1940}
1941
1942static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
1943{
1944 union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
1945 int i, num;
1946
1947 /*
1948 * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce
1949 * lock contention
1950 */
1951 for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1952 per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0;
1953 per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0;
1954 INIT_LIST_HEAD(list: &per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head);
1955 }
1956 /*
1957 * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are
1958 * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers
1959 * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
1960 * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
1961 * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
1962 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
1963 */
1964 if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
1965 num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
1966 else
1967 num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT;
1968
1969 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1970
1971 aa_buf = kmalloc(size: aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL |
1972 __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
1973 if (!aa_buf) {
1974 destroy_buffers();
1975 return -ENOMEM;
1976 }
1977 aa_put_buffer(buf: aa_buf->buffer);
1978 }
1979 return 0;
1980}
1981
1982#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1983static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
1984 void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1985{
1986 if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1987 return -EPERM;
1988 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1989 return -EINVAL;
1990
1991 return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1992}
1993
1994static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
1995#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
1996 {
1997 .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
1998 .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
1999 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
2000 .mode = 0600,
2001 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
2002 },
2003#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
2004 {
2005 .procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode",
2006 .data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode,
2007 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
2008 .mode = 0600,
2009 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
2010 },
2011 {
2012 .procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined",
2013 .data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted,
2014 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
2015 .mode = 0600,
2016 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
2017 },
2018 { }
2019};
2020
2021static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
2022{
2023 return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2024}
2025#else
2026static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
2027{
2028 return 0;
2029}
2030#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
2031
2032#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
2033static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
2034 struct sk_buff *skb,
2035 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
2036{
2037 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
2038 struct sock *sk;
2039
2040 if (!skb->secmark)
2041 return NF_ACCEPT;
2042
2043 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
2044 if (sk == NULL)
2045 return NF_ACCEPT;
2046
2047 ctx = aa_sock(sk);
2048 if (!apparmor_secmark_check(label: ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
2049 secid: skb->secmark, sk))
2050 return NF_ACCEPT;
2051
2052 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
2053
2054}
2055
2056static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
2057 {
2058 .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute,
2059 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
2060 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
2061 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
2062 },
2063#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2064 {
2065 .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute,
2066 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
2067 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
2068 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
2069 },
2070#endif
2071};
2072
2073static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
2074{
2075 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, reg: apparmor_nf_ops,
2076 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
2077}
2078
2079static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
2080{
2081 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, reg: apparmor_nf_ops,
2082 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
2083}
2084
2085static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
2086 .init = apparmor_nf_register,
2087 .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
2088};
2089
2090static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
2091{
2092 int err;
2093
2094 if (!apparmor_enabled)
2095 return 0;
2096
2097 err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
2098 if (err)
2099 panic(fmt: "Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
2100
2101 return 0;
2102}
2103__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
2104#endif
2105
2106static char nulldfa_src[] = {
2107 #include "nulldfa.in"
2108};
2109struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
2110
2111static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = {
2112 #include "stacksplitdfa.in"
2113};
2114struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
2115struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;
2116
2117static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
2118{
2119 int error = -ENOMEM;
2120
2121 nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL);
2122 if (!nullpdb)
2123 return -ENOMEM;
2124
2125 nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob: nulldfa_src, size: sizeof(nulldfa_src),
2126 TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
2127 TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
2128 if (IS_ERR(ptr: nulldfa)) {
2129 error = PTR_ERR(ptr: nulldfa);
2130 goto fail;
2131 }
2132 nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(dfa: nulldfa);
2133 nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(n: 2, size: sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL);
2134 if (!nullpdb->perms)
2135 goto fail;
2136 nullpdb->size = 2;
2137
2138 stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob: stacksplitdfa_src,
2139 size: sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
2140 TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
2141 TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
2142 if (IS_ERR(ptr: stacksplitdfa)) {
2143 error = PTR_ERR(ptr: stacksplitdfa);
2144 goto fail;
2145 }
2146
2147 return 0;
2148
2149fail:
2150 aa_put_pdb(pdb: nullpdb);
2151 aa_put_dfa(dfa: nulldfa);
2152 nullpdb = NULL;
2153 nulldfa = NULL;
2154 stacksplitdfa = NULL;
2155
2156 return error;
2157}
2158
2159static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
2160{
2161 aa_put_dfa(dfa: stacksplitdfa);
2162 aa_put_dfa(dfa: nulldfa);
2163 aa_put_pdb(pdb: nullpdb);
2164 nullpdb = NULL;
2165 stacksplitdfa = NULL;
2166 nulldfa = NULL;
2167}
2168
2169static int __init apparmor_init(void)
2170{
2171 int error;
2172
2173 error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
2174 if (error) {
2175 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
2176 goto alloc_out;
2177 }
2178
2179 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
2180 if (error) {
2181 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
2182 goto alloc_out;
2183 }
2184
2185 error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
2186 if (error) {
2187 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
2188 goto alloc_out;
2189
2190 }
2191
2192 error = alloc_buffers();
2193 if (error) {
2194 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
2195 goto alloc_out;
2196 }
2197
2198 error = set_init_ctx();
2199 if (error) {
2200 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
2201 aa_free_root_ns();
2202 goto buffers_out;
2203 }
2204 security_add_hooks(hooks: apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
2205 lsm: "apparmor");
2206
2207 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
2208 apparmor_initialized = 1;
2209 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
2210 aa_info_message(str: "AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
2211 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
2212 aa_info_message(str: "AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
2213 else
2214 aa_info_message(str: "AppArmor initialized");
2215
2216 return error;
2217
2218buffers_out:
2219 destroy_buffers();
2220alloc_out:
2221 aa_destroy_aafs();
2222 aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
2223
2224 apparmor_enabled = false;
2225 return error;
2226}
2227
2228DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
2229 .name = "apparmor",
2230 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
2231 .enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
2232 .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
2233 .init = apparmor_init,
2234};
2235

source code of linux/security/apparmor/lsm.c