1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later |
2 | /* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631] |
3 | * |
4 | * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation |
5 | * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com> |
6 | */ |
7 | |
8 | #include <linux/fips.h> |
9 | #include <linux/module.h> |
10 | #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h> |
11 | #include <crypto/kpp.h> |
12 | #include <crypto/dh.h> |
13 | #include <crypto/rng.h> |
14 | #include <linux/mpi.h> |
15 | |
16 | struct dh_ctx { |
17 | MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ |
18 | MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ |
19 | MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ |
20 | }; |
21 | |
22 | static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx) |
23 | { |
24 | mpi_free(a: ctx->p); |
25 | mpi_free(a: ctx->g); |
26 | mpi_free(a: ctx->xa); |
27 | memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); |
28 | } |
29 | |
30 | /* |
31 | * If base is g we compute the public key |
32 | * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] |
33 | * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret |
34 | * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] |
35 | */ |
36 | static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val) |
37 | { |
38 | /* val = base^xa mod p */ |
39 | return mpi_powm(res: val, base, exp: ctx->xa, mod: ctx->p); |
40 | } |
41 | |
42 | static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
43 | { |
44 | return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); |
45 | } |
46 | |
47 | static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len) |
48 | { |
49 | if (fips_enabled) |
50 | return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0; |
51 | |
52 | return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0; |
53 | } |
54 | |
55 | static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params) |
56 | { |
57 | if (dh_check_params_length(p_len: params->p_size << 3)) |
58 | return -EINVAL; |
59 | |
60 | ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(xbuffer: params->p, nbytes: params->p_size); |
61 | if (!ctx->p) |
62 | return -EINVAL; |
63 | |
64 | ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(xbuffer: params->g, nbytes: params->g_size); |
65 | if (!ctx->g) |
66 | return -EINVAL; |
67 | |
68 | return 0; |
69 | } |
70 | |
71 | static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, |
72 | unsigned int len) |
73 | { |
74 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); |
75 | struct dh params; |
76 | |
77 | /* Free the old MPI key if any */ |
78 | dh_clear_ctx(ctx); |
79 | |
80 | if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, params: ¶ms) < 0) |
81 | goto err_clear_ctx; |
82 | |
83 | if (dh_set_params(ctx, params: ¶ms) < 0) |
84 | goto err_clear_ctx; |
85 | |
86 | ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(xbuffer: params.key, nbytes: params.key_size); |
87 | if (!ctx->xa) |
88 | goto err_clear_ctx; |
89 | |
90 | return 0; |
91 | |
92 | err_clear_ctx: |
93 | dh_clear_ctx(ctx); |
94 | return -EINVAL; |
95 | } |
96 | |
97 | /* |
98 | * SP800-56A public key verification: |
99 | * |
100 | * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed |
101 | * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A |
102 | * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed. |
103 | * |
104 | * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation |
105 | * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. |
106 | */ |
107 | static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y) |
108 | { |
109 | MPI val, q; |
110 | int ret; |
111 | |
112 | if (!fips_enabled) |
113 | return 0; |
114 | |
115 | if (unlikely(!ctx->p)) |
116 | return -EINVAL; |
117 | |
118 | /* |
119 | * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2. |
120 | * |
121 | * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1 |
122 | * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that |
123 | * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and |
124 | * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1. |
125 | */ |
126 | if (mpi_cmp_ui(u: y, v: 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(u: y, v: ctx->p) >= 0) |
127 | return -EINVAL; |
128 | |
129 | /* |
130 | * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p |
131 | * |
132 | * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2. |
133 | */ |
134 | val = mpi_alloc(nlimbs: 0); |
135 | if (!val) |
136 | return -ENOMEM; |
137 | |
138 | q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p)); |
139 | if (!q) { |
140 | mpi_free(a: val); |
141 | return -ENOMEM; |
142 | } |
143 | |
144 | /* |
145 | * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one |
146 | * from it before shifting to the right. |
147 | */ |
148 | mpi_rshift(x: q, a: ctx->p, n: 1); |
149 | |
150 | ret = mpi_powm(res: val, base: y, exp: q, mod: ctx->p); |
151 | mpi_free(a: q); |
152 | if (ret) { |
153 | mpi_free(a: val); |
154 | return ret; |
155 | } |
156 | |
157 | ret = mpi_cmp_ui(u: val, v: 1); |
158 | |
159 | mpi_free(a: val); |
160 | |
161 | if (ret != 0) |
162 | return -EINVAL; |
163 | |
164 | return 0; |
165 | } |
166 | |
167 | static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req) |
168 | { |
169 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req); |
170 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); |
171 | MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(nlimbs: 0); |
172 | int ret = 0; |
173 | int sign; |
174 | |
175 | if (!val) |
176 | return -ENOMEM; |
177 | |
178 | if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) { |
179 | ret = -EINVAL; |
180 | goto err_free_val; |
181 | } |
182 | |
183 | if (req->src) { |
184 | base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(sgl: req->src, len: req->src_len); |
185 | if (!base) { |
186 | ret = -EINVAL; |
187 | goto err_free_val; |
188 | } |
189 | ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, y: base); |
190 | if (ret) |
191 | goto err_free_base; |
192 | } else { |
193 | base = ctx->g; |
194 | } |
195 | |
196 | ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val); |
197 | if (ret) |
198 | goto err_free_base; |
199 | |
200 | if (fips_enabled) { |
201 | /* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */ |
202 | if (req->src) { |
203 | MPI pone; |
204 | |
205 | /* z <= 1 */ |
206 | if (mpi_cmp_ui(u: val, v: 1) < 1) { |
207 | ret = -EBADMSG; |
208 | goto err_free_base; |
209 | } |
210 | |
211 | /* z == p - 1 */ |
212 | pone = mpi_alloc(nlimbs: 0); |
213 | |
214 | if (!pone) { |
215 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
216 | goto err_free_base; |
217 | } |
218 | |
219 | ret = mpi_sub_ui(w: pone, u: ctx->p, vval: 1); |
220 | if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(u: pone, v: val)) |
221 | ret = -EBADMSG; |
222 | |
223 | mpi_free(a: pone); |
224 | |
225 | if (ret) |
226 | goto err_free_base; |
227 | |
228 | /* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */ |
229 | } else { |
230 | if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, y: val)) { |
231 | ret = -EAGAIN; |
232 | goto err_free_val; |
233 | } |
234 | } |
235 | } |
236 | |
237 | ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(a: val, sg: req->dst, nbytes: req->dst_len, sign: &sign); |
238 | if (ret) |
239 | goto err_free_base; |
240 | |
241 | if (sign < 0) |
242 | ret = -EBADMSG; |
243 | err_free_base: |
244 | if (req->src) |
245 | mpi_free(a: base); |
246 | err_free_val: |
247 | mpi_free(a: val); |
248 | return ret; |
249 | } |
250 | |
251 | static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
252 | { |
253 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); |
254 | |
255 | return mpi_get_size(a: ctx->p); |
256 | } |
257 | |
258 | static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
259 | { |
260 | struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); |
261 | |
262 | dh_clear_ctx(ctx); |
263 | } |
264 | |
265 | static struct kpp_alg dh = { |
266 | .set_secret = dh_set_secret, |
267 | .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value, |
268 | .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value, |
269 | .max_size = dh_max_size, |
270 | .exit = dh_exit_tfm, |
271 | .base = { |
272 | .cra_name = "dh" , |
273 | .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic" , |
274 | .cra_priority = 100, |
275 | .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, |
276 | .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx), |
277 | }, |
278 | }; |
279 | |
280 | |
281 | struct dh_safe_prime { |
282 | unsigned int max_strength; |
283 | unsigned int p_size; |
284 | const char *p; |
285 | }; |
286 | |
287 | static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 }; |
288 | |
289 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx { |
290 | struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn; |
291 | const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime; |
292 | }; |
293 | |
294 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx { |
295 | struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; |
296 | }; |
297 | |
298 | static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst) |
299 | { |
300 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); |
301 | |
302 | crypto_drop_kpp(spawn: &ctx->dh_spawn); |
303 | kfree(objp: inst); |
304 | } |
305 | |
306 | static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx( |
307 | struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
308 | { |
309 | return kpp_instance_ctx(inst: kpp_alg_instance(kpp: tfm)); |
310 | } |
311 | |
312 | static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
313 | { |
314 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = |
315 | dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); |
316 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); |
317 | |
318 | tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(spawn: &inst_ctx->dh_spawn); |
319 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)) |
320 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); |
321 | |
322 | kpp_set_reqsize(kpp: tfm, reqsize: sizeof(struct kpp_request) + |
323 | crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)); |
324 | |
325 | return 0; |
326 | } |
327 | |
328 | static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
329 | { |
330 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); |
331 | |
332 | crypto_free_kpp(tfm: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); |
333 | } |
334 | |
335 | static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val) |
336 | { |
337 | unsigned int i; |
338 | |
339 | for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) { |
340 | u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]); |
341 | |
342 | tmp += val; |
343 | val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1; |
344 | dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp); |
345 | } |
346 | |
347 | return val; |
348 | } |
349 | |
350 | static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime, |
351 | unsigned int *key_size) |
352 | { |
353 | unsigned int n, oversampling_size; |
354 | __be64 *key; |
355 | int err; |
356 | u64 h, o; |
357 | |
358 | /* |
359 | * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3, |
360 | * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp.. |
361 | * |
362 | * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that |
363 | * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1 |
364 | * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups. |
365 | * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to |
366 | * avoid excessively large private keys while still |
367 | * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in |
368 | * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[], |
369 | * the following holds for such N: |
370 | * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64 |
371 | * bits and |
372 | * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound. |
373 | */ |
374 | n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength); |
375 | WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1)); |
376 | n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */ |
377 | |
378 | /* |
379 | * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits |
380 | * required as per 5.6.1.1.3. |
381 | */ |
382 | oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64); |
383 | key = kmalloc(size: oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
384 | if (!key) |
385 | return ERR_PTR(error: -ENOMEM); |
386 | |
387 | /* |
388 | * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64 |
389 | * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer. |
390 | */ |
391 | err = -EFAULT; |
392 | if (crypto_get_default_rng()) |
393 | goto out_err; |
394 | |
395 | err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(tfm: crypto_default_rng, rdata: (u8 *)key, |
396 | dlen: oversampling_size); |
397 | crypto_put_default_rng(); |
398 | if (err) |
399 | goto out_err; |
400 | |
401 | /* |
402 | * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus, |
403 | * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N. |
404 | * |
405 | * For step 6, calculate |
406 | * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1. |
407 | * |
408 | * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that |
409 | * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h, |
410 | * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds. |
411 | * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words |
412 | * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0] |
413 | * representing the 64 most significant bits and l |
414 | * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark |
415 | * from above, |
416 | * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1). |
417 | * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after |
418 | * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2. |
419 | * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as |
420 | * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one, |
421 | * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will |
422 | * be zero after a second reduction: |
423 | * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1). |
424 | * At this point, it is still possible that |
425 | * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1) |
426 | * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of |
427 | * the final increment overflowing in this case. |
428 | */ |
429 | h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]); |
430 | h = __add_u64_to_be(dst: key + 1, n, val: h); |
431 | h = __add_u64_to_be(dst: key + 1, n, val: h); |
432 | WARN_ON_ONCE(h); |
433 | |
434 | /* Increment to obtain the final result. */ |
435 | o = __add_u64_to_be(dst: key + 1, n, val: 1); |
436 | /* |
437 | * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or |
438 | * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian |
439 | * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to |
440 | * one, c.f. above. |
441 | */ |
442 | if (o) |
443 | key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1); |
444 | |
445 | /* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */ |
446 | *key_size = n << 3; |
447 | /* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */ |
448 | memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size); |
449 | |
450 | return key; |
451 | |
452 | out_err: |
453 | kfree_sensitive(objp: key); |
454 | return ERR_PTR(error: err); |
455 | } |
456 | |
457 | static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer, |
458 | unsigned int len) |
459 | { |
460 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = |
461 | dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); |
462 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); |
463 | struct dh params = {}; |
464 | void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL; |
465 | unsigned int buf_size; |
466 | int err; |
467 | |
468 | if (buffer) { |
469 | err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buf: buffer, len, params: ¶ms); |
470 | if (err) |
471 | return err; |
472 | if (params.p_size || params.g_size) |
473 | return -EINVAL; |
474 | } |
475 | |
476 | params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p; |
477 | params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size; |
478 | params.g = safe_prime_g; |
479 | params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g); |
480 | |
481 | if (!params.key_size) { |
482 | key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(safe_prime: inst_ctx->safe_prime, |
483 | key_size: ¶ms.key_size); |
484 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: key)) |
485 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: key); |
486 | params.key = key; |
487 | } |
488 | |
489 | buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(params: ¶ms); |
490 | buf = kmalloc(size: buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
491 | if (!buf) { |
492 | err = -ENOMEM; |
493 | goto out; |
494 | } |
495 | |
496 | err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, len: buf_size, params: ¶ms); |
497 | if (err) |
498 | goto out; |
499 | |
500 | err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buffer: buf, len: buf_size); |
501 | out: |
502 | kfree_sensitive(objp: buf); |
503 | kfree_sensitive(objp: key); |
504 | return err; |
505 | } |
506 | |
507 | static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err) |
508 | { |
509 | struct kpp_request *req = data; |
510 | |
511 | kpp_request_complete(req, err); |
512 | } |
513 | |
514 | static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req) |
515 | { |
516 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = |
517 | kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm: crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req)); |
518 | struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req); |
519 | |
520 | kpp_request_set_tfm(req: dh_req, tfm: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); |
521 | kpp_request_set_callback(req: dh_req, flgs: req->base.flags, |
522 | cmpl: dh_safe_prime_complete_req, data: req); |
523 | |
524 | kpp_request_set_input(req: dh_req, input: req->src, input_len: req->src_len); |
525 | kpp_request_set_output(req: dh_req, output: req->dst, output_len: req->dst_len); |
526 | |
527 | return dh_req; |
528 | } |
529 | |
530 | static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req) |
531 | { |
532 | struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); |
533 | |
534 | return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req: dh_req); |
535 | } |
536 | |
537 | static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req) |
538 | { |
539 | struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); |
540 | |
541 | return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req: dh_req); |
542 | } |
543 | |
544 | static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) |
545 | { |
546 | struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); |
547 | |
548 | return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm: tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); |
549 | } |
550 | |
551 | static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create( |
552 | struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, |
553 | const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime) |
554 | { |
555 | struct kpp_instance *inst; |
556 | struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx; |
557 | const char *dh_name; |
558 | struct kpp_alg *dh_alg; |
559 | u32 mask; |
560 | int err; |
561 | |
562 | err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, mask_ret: &mask); |
563 | if (err) |
564 | return err; |
565 | |
566 | dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(rta: tb[1]); |
567 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: dh_name)) |
568 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: dh_name); |
569 | |
570 | inst = kzalloc(size: sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); |
571 | if (!inst) |
572 | return -ENOMEM; |
573 | |
574 | ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); |
575 | |
576 | err = crypto_grab_kpp(spawn: &ctx->dh_spawn, inst: kpp_crypto_instance(inst), |
577 | name: dh_name, type: 0, mask); |
578 | if (err) |
579 | goto err_free_inst; |
580 | |
581 | err = -EINVAL; |
582 | dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(spawn: &ctx->dh_spawn); |
583 | if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh" )) |
584 | goto err_free_inst; |
585 | |
586 | ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime; |
587 | |
588 | err = crypto_inst_setname(inst: kpp_crypto_instance(inst), |
589 | name: tmpl->name, alg: &dh_alg->base); |
590 | if (err) |
591 | goto err_free_inst; |
592 | |
593 | inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret; |
594 | inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key; |
595 | inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret; |
596 | inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size; |
597 | inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm; |
598 | inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm; |
599 | inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority; |
600 | inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; |
601 | inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx); |
602 | |
603 | inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance; |
604 | |
605 | err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst); |
606 | if (err) |
607 | goto err_free_inst; |
608 | |
609 | return 0; |
610 | |
611 | err_free_inst: |
612 | dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst); |
613 | |
614 | return err; |
615 | } |
616 | |
617 | #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS |
618 | |
619 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = { |
620 | .max_strength = 112, |
621 | .p_size = 256, |
622 | .p = |
623 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" |
624 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" |
625 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" |
626 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" |
627 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" |
628 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" |
629 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" |
630 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" |
631 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" |
632 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" |
633 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" |
634 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" |
635 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" |
636 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" |
637 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" |
638 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" , |
639 | }; |
640 | |
641 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = { |
642 | .max_strength = 128, |
643 | .p_size = 384, |
644 | .p = |
645 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" |
646 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" |
647 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" |
648 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" |
649 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" |
650 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" |
651 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" |
652 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" |
653 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" |
654 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" |
655 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" |
656 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" |
657 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" |
658 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" |
659 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" |
660 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" |
661 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" |
662 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" |
663 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" |
664 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" |
665 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" |
666 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" |
667 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" |
668 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" , |
669 | }; |
670 | |
671 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = { |
672 | .max_strength = 152, |
673 | .p_size = 512, |
674 | .p = |
675 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" |
676 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" |
677 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" |
678 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" |
679 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" |
680 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" |
681 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" |
682 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" |
683 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" |
684 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" |
685 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" |
686 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" |
687 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" |
688 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" |
689 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" |
690 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" |
691 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" |
692 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" |
693 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" |
694 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" |
695 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" |
696 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" |
697 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" |
698 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" |
699 | "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" |
700 | "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" |
701 | "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" |
702 | "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" |
703 | "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" |
704 | "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" |
705 | "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" |
706 | "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" , |
707 | }; |
708 | |
709 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = { |
710 | .max_strength = 176, |
711 | .p_size = 768, |
712 | .p = |
713 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" |
714 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" |
715 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" |
716 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" |
717 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" |
718 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" |
719 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" |
720 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" |
721 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" |
722 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" |
723 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" |
724 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" |
725 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" |
726 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" |
727 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" |
728 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" |
729 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" |
730 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" |
731 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" |
732 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" |
733 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" |
734 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" |
735 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" |
736 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" |
737 | "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" |
738 | "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" |
739 | "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" |
740 | "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" |
741 | "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" |
742 | "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" |
743 | "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" |
744 | "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" |
745 | "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" |
746 | "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" |
747 | "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" |
748 | "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" |
749 | "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" |
750 | "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" |
751 | "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" |
752 | "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" |
753 | "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" |
754 | "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" |
755 | "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" |
756 | "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" |
757 | "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" |
758 | "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" |
759 | "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" |
760 | "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" , |
761 | }; |
762 | |
763 | static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = { |
764 | .max_strength = 200, |
765 | .p_size = 1024, |
766 | .p = |
767 | "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" |
768 | "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" |
769 | "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" |
770 | "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" |
771 | "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" |
772 | "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" |
773 | "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" |
774 | "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" |
775 | "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" |
776 | "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" |
777 | "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" |
778 | "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" |
779 | "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" |
780 | "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" |
781 | "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" |
782 | "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" |
783 | "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" |
784 | "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" |
785 | "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" |
786 | "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" |
787 | "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" |
788 | "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" |
789 | "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" |
790 | "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" |
791 | "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" |
792 | "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" |
793 | "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" |
794 | "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" |
795 | "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" |
796 | "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" |
797 | "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" |
798 | "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" |
799 | "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" |
800 | "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" |
801 | "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" |
802 | "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" |
803 | "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" |
804 | "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" |
805 | "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" |
806 | "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" |
807 | "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" |
808 | "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" |
809 | "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" |
810 | "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" |
811 | "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" |
812 | "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" |
813 | "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" |
814 | "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38" |
815 | "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43" |
816 | "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef" |
817 | "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65" |
818 | "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4" |
819 | "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c" |
820 | "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22" |
821 | "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee" |
822 | "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc" |
823 | "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9" |
824 | "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31" |
825 | "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8" |
826 | "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30" |
827 | "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe" |
828 | "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d" |
829 | "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c" |
830 | "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff" , |
831 | }; |
832 | |
833 | static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, |
834 | struct rtattr **tb) |
835 | { |
836 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, safe_prime: &ffdhe2048_prime); |
837 | } |
838 | |
839 | static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, |
840 | struct rtattr **tb) |
841 | { |
842 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, safe_prime: &ffdhe3072_prime); |
843 | } |
844 | |
845 | static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, |
846 | struct rtattr **tb) |
847 | { |
848 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, safe_prime: &ffdhe4096_prime); |
849 | } |
850 | |
851 | static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, |
852 | struct rtattr **tb) |
853 | { |
854 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, safe_prime: &ffdhe6144_prime); |
855 | } |
856 | |
857 | static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, |
858 | struct rtattr **tb) |
859 | { |
860 | return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, safe_prime: &ffdhe8192_prime); |
861 | } |
862 | |
863 | static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = { |
864 | { |
865 | .name = "ffdhe2048" , |
866 | .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create, |
867 | .module = THIS_MODULE, |
868 | }, |
869 | { |
870 | .name = "ffdhe3072" , |
871 | .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create, |
872 | .module = THIS_MODULE, |
873 | }, |
874 | { |
875 | .name = "ffdhe4096" , |
876 | .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create, |
877 | .module = THIS_MODULE, |
878 | }, |
879 | { |
880 | .name = "ffdhe6144" , |
881 | .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create, |
882 | .module = THIS_MODULE, |
883 | }, |
884 | { |
885 | .name = "ffdhe8192" , |
886 | .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create, |
887 | .module = THIS_MODULE, |
888 | }, |
889 | }; |
890 | |
891 | #else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ |
892 | |
893 | static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {}; |
894 | |
895 | #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ |
896 | |
897 | |
898 | static int __init dh_init(void) |
899 | { |
900 | int err; |
901 | |
902 | err = crypto_register_kpp(alg: &dh); |
903 | if (err) |
904 | return err; |
905 | |
906 | err = crypto_register_templates(tmpls: crypto_ffdhe_templates, |
907 | ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); |
908 | if (err) { |
909 | crypto_unregister_kpp(alg: &dh); |
910 | return err; |
911 | } |
912 | |
913 | return 0; |
914 | } |
915 | |
916 | static void __exit dh_exit(void) |
917 | { |
918 | crypto_unregister_templates(tmpls: crypto_ffdhe_templates, |
919 | ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); |
920 | crypto_unregister_kpp(alg: &dh); |
921 | } |
922 | |
923 | subsys_initcall(dh_init); |
924 | module_exit(dh_exit); |
925 | MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh" ); |
926 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL" ); |
927 | MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm" ); |
928 | |